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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1. Background and motivation 
 
The benefits attributed to the adoption of broadband Internet in a society 
(Crandall et al., 2007; Katz et al., 2009; Czernich et al., 2011) have stimulated 
national governments and international institutions to promote the diffusion 
of this service across all individuals, no matter their economic status or 
geographic location. The telecommunications market is characterised by high 
entry barriers, and over the course of the last few decades, regulatory bodies 
have implemented several policies which facilitate operators’ entry (giving 
“entry assistance”). Most regulatory measures have been focused on the 
wholesale market, where lies the main ‘bottleneck’ (or “essential facility”), 
which is either very costly to replicate, or is a scarce resource (Renda, 2010; 
Bouckaert et al., 2010). The principal focus here is that it is essential to reach 
competition upstream so as to have a competitive retail market which, in turn, 
stimulates broadband penetration.  
 
One of the main measures of the intensity of competition in a market is the 
level of retail prices, which is also an important determinant for the adoption 
of the Internet by consumers.
1
 At the beginning of 2014, and following the 
publication of a European Commission (EC) report on Internet prices across 
the EU, 2 the Commissioner Neeli Kroes expressed her concerns over the 
large discrepancies (up to 400%) in retail broadband prices across EU 
countries, claiming this was a signal that there is not a single market for the 
Internet.  In spite of this, apart from the price benchmarking reports 
published by regulatory authorities and organisations, the literature on the 
broadband market has offered very little attention to the establishment of the 

1 According to the Special Eurobarometer (2014), price was the most important factor when in 
it comes to choosing an Internet connection (71%). See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_409_en.pdf 
2 Broadband Internet Access Cost report for year 2013 (BIAC 2013) See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/study-retail-broadband-access-prices-2013-
smart-20100038) 
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prices of this service, possibly due to a lack of consistent datasets and the 
inherent difficulties in measuring the price of a heterogeneous service. On the 
other hand, existing papers which have studied broadband prices (Wallsten 
and Riso, 2010; Greenstein and McDevitt, 2011) have mostly taken a hedonic 
approach to the analysis of broadband prices, but have not studied how the 
market structure and regulatory policies affect retail tariffs.  
 
The inflexion point towards greater competition in the telecommunications 
market started with the liberalization of telecommunications services in the US 
in 1982 with the breakup of the ex-monopoly telecoms operator AT&T 
(Renda, 2010). As result of this, an extensive body of literature has arisen 
around the “essential facilities” doctrine, which considers that if a firm 
controls an input or an asset that is essential to its competitors, it must provide 
access to this essential facility when the replication is impossible or too costly 
from a legal, structural, or economic point of view (Hovenkamp, 2008).        
In the last years, an important part of the regulatory policies in the 
telecommunications sector have focused on facilitating entrants’ access to this 
essential facility in order to stimulate competition, thereby leading to higher 
penetration levels. However, the application of the essential facilities doctrine 
is very dynamic in the telecommunications market, making it hard for policy 
makers to set the right obligations of access to the essential input in order to 
avoid bottlenecks or market foreclosure. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
promote entry in the short term while at the same time encouraging firms to 
invest in the medium/long-term future.  
 
In most countries, while the wholesale broadband market is strongly regulated, 
regulation in the retail market is scarce, and reduces to ensure that incumbents 
do not abuse their dominant position. For example, “margin squeeze” tests 
study the replicability of an incumbent’s plans in such a way that there is a 
sufficient margin between its upstream and downstream prices. This means 
that entrants are then able to match the incumbent’s retail prices. In the fixed 
broadband sector, regulators have set ex-ante obligations on operators. In the 
case of the European Union, national regulators impose mandatory access to 
the incumbent’s fixed network (the bottleneck) and set the network access 
prices paid by entrants to the incumbent, thereby supporting wholesale 
competition which, in turn, should also stimulate retail competition. In the 
mobile market, regulators have fostered entry by regulating the costs of 
terminating phone calls (Mobile Termination Rates, MTRs) on a different 

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operators’ network, and by forcing mobile operators with their own network 
(MNOs) to make their networks available to entrants (in this case, spectrum 
frequencies constitute the bottleneck). This has allowed the creation of the so-
called mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs).  
 
The intervention of governmental institutions in the telecoms industry has 
been a key factor in explaining the current market structure and the progress 
of communications services. The market has evolved from a situation where a 
monopolistic firm provided all the communication services, to an oligopoly 
setting in which several communications firms play a role. In this context, 
service diffusion and competition has significantly strengthened, and telecoms 
operators have adopted “innovative pricing plans” to segment consumers, 
attract new subscribers and build customer loyalty (Srinuan et al., 2012). In this 
sense, they have implemented different commercial strategies such as tiered 
pricing (e.g.: according to data volumes or connection speeds), premiums 
charges on new technologies (e.g.: 4G mobile technology), or bundling (e.g.: 
commercializing together broadband with voice services). 
 
The three chapters of this dissertation share a common thread in that they 
analyse the pricing policies used by operators when they establish the tariffs of 
their plans. The price drivers are grouped into three categories: 1- the 
characteristics of the broadband service, 2- the operators’ commercial 
strategies, and 3- the market structure and regulatory policies implemented. In 
order to estimate the pricing equation I begin by first applying a hedonic 
approach with only the characteristics of the broadband service evaluated. 
And afterwards the pricing model evolves to analyse the prices from a holistic 
point of view. Indeed, the models use the described three groups of variables 
that might affect the level of prices paid by the end-consumer. The 
methodologies used in the research of price drivers also share the 
characteristic of using two econometric techniques for panel data: ordinary 
least squares (OLS) with fixed effects, and two stage least squares (2SLS, 
instrumental variable techniques).  
 
The first empirical study uses data on fixed broadband plans from 15 EU 
countries from 2008 to 2011, while the second covers mobile broadband plans 
from 37 countries all across the globe from 2011 to 2014. Both datasets are 
combined with data from other public sources to add socioeconomic control 
factors to the models. The last chapter analyses in depth the evolution and 


current state of the mobile broadband sector in Spain up until 2014.   
 
All in all, this dissertation focuses particularly on retail prices in order to 
measure competition in the telecommunications sector, and uses the variability 
of broadband features, market structure, as well as regulatory indicators across 
countries and time periods, to reveal insights into the drivers of these price 
structures. As previously mentioned, the level of broadband prices concerns 
both national governments and international organisations, and this 
dissertation should help to provide some guidance to regulators and 
competition authorities, helping them in the implementation of policies so as 
to foster competition in the market and ultimately stimulate the diffusion of 
broadband services. 
 
This introductory chapter is divided in three sections. Section 2 provides an 
overview on broadband services and technologies. Section 3 describes the 
regulation implemented within this sector, emphasizing the regulatory policies 
that have been crucial in Europe. Then, section 4 undertakes a revision of 
economic literature on the broadband sector, focusing on the previous 
research which has most served to develop this dissertation. Finally, section 5 
provides a brief summary of the three chapters of my dissertation and 
describes the main contributions of each chapter. 
 
 
2. The Internet service and broadband access 
 
The Internet has been one of the principal technological advances in the 
transformation of society over the last few decades, not to mention the main 
driver of information and communications technologies (ICTs) over the same 
period. Indeed, the Internet has completely modified our way of working, and 
has contributed to innovation in several markets (e.g. healthcare and 
education). It has also increased productive efficiency and growth in general 
(ITU, 2003a; Cradall et al, 2007; Czernich, 2011). Moreover, the Internet has 
changed society in terms of personal relationships, information access, and 
entertainment (Rajani and Chandio, 2004; Amichai-Hamburger and Hayat, 
2013).
3
 

3 Some studies have highlighted the addiction to Internet might have negative effects in 
individuals such as isolation, and worsen physical or emotional health (Kraut et al., 1998; 
Kehoe et al., 2009).  


 
The Internet’s development started in the 1960s and was implemented for first 
time in 1969, when four host computers were combined together into the 
initial ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), allowing 
data communications (packet switching) between three universities in 
California and one in Utah (US). The first Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
appeared at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. They offered 
new interconnection facilities and graphic tools across the network, and 
promoted Internet services to the mass population. The Internet, as a system 
of interconnected computer networks, was converted into a global 
information service, as well as a medium of interaction between individuals no 
matter their location, thanks to a range of websites (‘WWW’ navigation) 
contained in numerous servers,  of which the network is comprised 
(Kleinrock, 2005; Leiner et al., 2012).  
 
The term ‘broadband’ was traditionally applied to Internet connections that 
allowed for data transmissions faster than the previous dial-up or ISDN 
(Integrated Service Digital Network) technologies (Cava and Alabau, 2006). 
The download (upload) speed data transmission threshold that has been 
adopted to define broadband by international institutions such as the OECD 
or ITU is 256 kbps (ITU and UNESCO, 2014), whereas the European 
Commission sets 144 kbps as the minimum speed (EC, 2009a; BIAC, 2012). 
The definition of broadband access to Internet varies across institutions and 
has evolved over time. In this respect, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) has recently defined broadband as Internet data 
transmissions that allow the end-user to download content at 25 Mbps (3 
Mbps upload), much higher than its previous definition of 4 Mbps (1 Mbps 
upload).
4
 Although it is obvious that broadband technologies and digital 
content evolve quickly, one of the problems inherent in changing the 
definition of broadband is that data becomes more difficult to compare across 
time.  
 
The development of high speed Internet connections heralded the start of the 
broadband service, which was referred to in name for the first time in 1988 by 
the ITU, when it was defined as “qualifying a service or system requiring 
transmission channels capable of supporting rates greater than the primary 

4 See FCC news January 2015: http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-finds-us-broadband-
deployment-not-keeping-pace   


rate”.
 5
 At the end of the 1990s, broadband connections had allowed much 
higher data transmission rates than dial-up, thereby boosting Internet usage. 
The diffusion of the Internet (Fig. 1) as a global communications service has 
been very rapid since the onset of broadband access. Since 2000, the 
broadband service has experienced strong growth. While there were 83 million 
broadband subscribers in the OECD countries by the end of 2003, by June 
2007 subscriptions had grown by 165% to 221 million lines (OECD, 2008).  
At present, broadband continues its expansion, with much higher transmission 
rates supported by new generation access networks (NGANs) such as fibre 
and 4G technologies, which allow for numerous and more sophisticated 
services. In recent years, broadband diffusion has been led by mobile 
technologies. According to the OECD, by the middle of 2014 there were 
344.6 million fixed broadband lines, and the number of mobile broadband 
lines had reached 983 million in OECD countries. Most of these mobile 
broadband subscriptions (around 85%) were on smartphone and tablets, while 
less than 15% were data dedicated services using modem USB devices 
(OECD, 2015).  
 
Despite the rapid growth of the broadband service, there is a big debate about 
the inequality of broadband adoption. It has also been argued that some 
countries or customer segments are experiencing lower adoption rates than is 
desirable, and suffer from the so-called “digital divide” which claims that some 
individuals are marginalised from digital services, as is evidenced by the gap in 
digital technologies between developing and developed countries (EC, 2012a; 
ITU, 2014). For this reason, many international institutions and national 
governments have declared the Internet essential to our society, and have 
designed strategic plans so that all citizens have access to broadband services 
(ITU, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 

5 The use of Internet became very popular with the dial-up access in the nineties. At the 
beginning of the 21st century, many consumers in develop countries used the Internet access 
at high speeds. From 2014, broadband is a ubiquitous service over around the world, with an 
average speed connection over 4Mbit/s (Akamai, State of the Internet Report 2014). 
 
	

Figure 1: Broadband penetration for the OECD average and a sample of 
OECD countries. 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
2.1. Broadband technologies 
 
The first Internet connections were fixed narrowband technologies; these are 
the dial-up modems and ISDN connections which allowed for download 
speeds up to 56 kbps and 128 kbps respectively. Both technologies used the 
old copper telephone lines, but while dial-up was an analog system that did not 
allow for simultaneous voice and data transmissions, ISDN technologies were 
digital and the simultaneity of data and voice transmissions was possible. 
 
The emergence of fixed broadband Internet occurred with the development of 
new technologies that allowed for high speed data transmission rates 
(Papacharissi and Zaks, 2006). Nowadays, the most widespread broadband 
technology is DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) which in 2014 represented around 
50% share in OECD countries. These technologies are based on the 
conversion of telephone copper lines to a digital line using a wider spectrum 
of frequencies, which allows for the simultaneity of Internet and voice 


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transmissions (the “always-on service”). There are various forms of xDSL 
technologies, which evolved from Asymmetric DSL (ADSL) into more 
advanced modes: High Rate DSL (HDSL), Symmetric DSL (SDSL) and Very 
High Data rate DSL (VDSL). DSL download (and upload) technologies are 
able to provide connection speeds ranging from 256 kbps to 52 Mbps, 
although these speeds depend on the physical distance of the user to the 
telephone exchange (this is why it is so often called the “last-mile 
technology”).  
 
The fibre technology corresponds with a NGNA (new generation access 
network), which in 2014 represented around 15% of total fixed broadband 
connections in OECD countries. Cable modem, which uses access lines for 
cable television (or Community Antenna Television, CATV), represented 
around 30% of the total fixed broadband connections and is able to provide 
higher download and upload speed rates than the original DSL technologies, 
and its speed depends much less on the physical location of the customer. 
Moreover, the upgrade of cable TV networks, referred to as DOCSIS 3.0 
technology, allows for higher bandwidths of 150 Mbits/s and more. Fibre 
optic technologies (FTTx) allow for transmission speeds of up to 1 Gbps. 
There are also different types of fibre technologies depending on whether the 
wire in “last mile” is made from fibre or copper. Therefore, FTTN (fibre to 
the node), FTTC (fibre to the cabinet), FTTB (fibre to the building), and 
FTTH (fibre to the home), are all deployments which use fibre. However, the 
distance of the fibre network becomes a step closer to the premises from 
FTTN to FTTH, and for FTTH the “last-mile” is made entirely of fibre. 
FTTH is also the technology that provides the highest speed connections 
(OECD, 2012).   
 
Other less common technologies include satellite and WiMax, which are 
wireless technologies used for fixed broadband connections. Another method, 
BPL, is broadband using power lines.  These technologies are primarily used 
to provide coverage to remote areas within a country. 
 
Lastly, since the appearance of 3G mobile technologies at the beginning of 
this century, mobile broadband has become the fastest-growing 
communications technology, both in terms of subscribers and data traffic 
(Cisco, 2015). Most mobile broadband plans nowadays are used via 
smartphone or tablet devices, making up around 85% of the total mobile 
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broadband connections in OECD countries, while the remaining 15% are data 
dedicated service; datacards used via USB modems which have experience a 
relative decline recently. 
 
The first mobile technology was launched in Japan at the end of the 1970s, a 
1G technology that allowed only voice and text messages. The capabilities of 
the Internet on mobile devices developed thanks to the evolution of analog 
mobile standards of voice (1G technology) to digital standards such as GSM 
or GPRS, which allowed for voice and data transmissions (2G). GSM was 
launched in 1991 in Finland and expanded quickly to other countries.  
 
Interestingly, Europe used different and incompatible standards for 1G 
technology and a single standard (GSM) for 2G technologies; the US, on the 
other hand, did the opposite (a single standard for 1G and multiple standards 
for 2G). These two different strategies also seem to have had different effects 
on the diffusion of the service, and would seem to favour the positive impact 
of single standards in order to obtain higher mobile broadband penetrations. 
As a result, in 1997, of the 40 million 2G subscribers, more than 80% were 
GSM subscribers (Gruber, 2005; ITU, 1999).6 
 
Later, the emergence of 3G standards for first time in Japan in 2002 
announced the ‘birth’ of the mobile broadband service. 3G technology started 
soon after in Europe, and later on in the US. The unsuccessful launch of 2G 
technologies in the US caused mobile penetration to slow down. 3G 
technologies such as UMTS or WCDMA enable transmissions of a few Mbps, 
and soon started to be used on smartphones (SIM card) and laptops (through 
modems USB). New advances in 3G technologies, such as 3.5G and 3.75G, 
enabled download speeds of several Mbps, and HSPA+ is able to reach similar 
speeds as those offered by LTE (4G) technology. Indeed, 4G technology, 
which was launched in 2008, has significantly increased speed rates (and also 
the volume of consumption in gigabytes); up to 150 Mbps for download, and 
up to 50 Mbps to upload data, narrowing the speed gap that exists between 
fixed and mobile broadband technologies (Kumar et al., 2010; Lee et al., 
2011). This situation might facilitate some substitution of fixed for mobile 
broadband in the years to come (Nakamura, 2015).
7
 Finally, the launch of the 

6 After the creation of the European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI) in 1988, the 
release of the GSM standard (2G technology) reflected the commitment between policy 
makers of creating standards for ICT technologies that were globally compatible. 
7 In Europe, there were a total of 10 million of lines connected to Internet via LTE by 

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next 5G technologies is expected by 2020, and transmission speed rates with 
this new generation technology will surpass 20 Gbps. 
 
 
3. Regulation of the broadband service in Europe 
 
3.1. Background: the liberalisation of the telecoms industry  
 
In the last five decades, the telecommunications market industry has been 
continuously affected by regulation interventions (“antitrust policies”) aimed 
at introducing more competition in the market. A monopoly might have some 
advantages of lowering costs thanks to economies of scale (lower average 
costs when higher quantities are produced) and scope (efficiencies created 
when a single firm produces goods with common features); this is the “natural 
monopoly” theory. Indeed, under circumstances where fixed costs are high, it 
might be less costly for a single firm to produce the same or multiple goods, 
rather than a number of firms. However, the existence of a monopoly also 
makes it more likely that the single firm abuses its dominant position. 
Consequently, there is a loss of efficiency. In this situation, regulation of 
natural monopolies can be seen as a measure to avoid the disadvantages 
associated with the abuse of “significant market power”, while maintaining the 
production efficiencies associated with a single firm serving the market.  
 
For a significant period of time during the twentieth century the 
telecommunications market was regulated, and was dominated by public 
monopolies which were sustained on the grounds of financeability (high sunk 
investment costs) and the universalization of public utilities. From the 1970s 
onward, the telecommunications market structure changed radically when a 
new wave of economic theories and business forces supporting deregulation 
(Stigler, 1971), coupled with technological progress, transformed the 
telecommunications market. The liberalisation of the market started in the US 
in 1982, when the integrated telecommunications monopoly AT&T had to 
open its network to other independent operators. Later, in 1984, the Modified 
Final Judgment (judge Harlod Greene) required the divestment of the company.  
Following the US example, similar changes extended to other countries, 
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September 2013 and a total of 91 operators had started providing LTE to their customers. 
According to Cisco (2013) the traffic in mobile networks is expected to increase yearly by 
66% in the period 2012-2017. 


starting in the United Kingdom with the privatisation of BT, which spread to 
Chile, Japan, and New Zealand (Calzada and Costas, 2014). In the US, at the 
end of the eighties the regulation of the sector was primarily focused on the 
incumbent operator, with the objective of promoting entry and incentivizing 
consumers to switch to new market entrants. The next step in the 
liberalisation process took place in 1996 with the launch of the 
Telecommunications Act in the US, which liberalized completely the market. This 
regulatory followed a regulatory approach based on the “essential facility 
doctrine” and aimed at promoting intra-platform competition, with the 
imposition of network interconnection between entrants and the incumbent 
operator, and the wholesale access to the incumbents’ networks at regulated 
rates (unbundling of the local loop, ULL) (Renda, 2010). Also, the 
Telecommunications Act set the necessary context needed to support the 
“universal service”, which was one of the most important claims of those that 
were in favor of a monopolistic market.8  Nevertheless, at this stage there was 
still not a clear system of how to correspond the level of the interconnection 
prices with the costs of providing the access (Rickford, 1998).  
 
In 1987, sometime after the liberalization of the US and the UK markets, the 
EC proposed a new regulatory framework
9
 aimed at opening up the national 
EU markets for telecommunications equipment and services. The 
liberalisation process was seen as a challenge, and the EU also feared that the 
European economy could become less competitive in comparison to the US. 
In addition, the arrival of US businesses to Europe stimulated the full 
liberalisation process of the EU telecoms market, which eventually happened 
in 1998 with a regulatory package that set a wide programme of policies aimed 
at creating a single telecommunications market and introducing competition 
(Calzada and Costas, 2014). This regulatory package had to be adopted by the 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in each EU country, but the EC may 
veto the NRAs decisions on the scope of the geographic market and the 
identification of “significant market power” (SMP). Moreover, the EC 1998 
regulatory framework established the boundaries between ‘ex ante’ regulation 
and ‘ex post’ competition law enforcement. Later, in 2002 a “new” regulatory 
framework based on the anti-trust methodology was implemented to tackle 
the problems of a lack of efficiency associated with SMP. A pre-requisite for 

8  See https://transition.fcc.gov/telecom.html  
9 The publication of the Green Paper on the development of the common market for 
telecommunications services and equipment in 1987 set the main directions of the 
telecommunications policy in Europe (Gruber, 2008). 
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the adoption of remedies by NRAs was that these remedies have to be 
‘proportionate’ to the existing ‘inefficiencies’ (or “market failure”) identified by 
the regulator. By proportionality the EC states that a remedy (e.g. a divesture) 
cannot be made if it does not effectively address competition concerns, and 
the EC will prioritise the less burdensome remedy for the firms (EC, 2012). 
Finally, a substantial reform was made in 2009 when the EC updated the 2002 
regulatory package by implementing a group of amendments on both the 
existing policies and new ones, such as facilitating the operators’ access to the 
radio spectrum, as well as measures to increase the level of consumer 
protection. The new regulatory reform also included the establishment of an 
independent “Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications” 
(BEREC) to build on the increased independence of NRAs and improve 
existing coordination mechanisms (EC, 2007; Alabau and Guijarro, 2011). 
 
 
3.2. Regulation of the broadband market in the EU 
 
After the liberalisation of the European telecoms market at the end of the 
1990s, the EU enforced mandatory access to the incumbent’s network so that 
new entrant operators were capable of providing communications services 
after paying an interconnection access fee to the incumbent.
10
 One of the 
most important EC Directives is the Interconnection Directive (1997)11 which 
places a series of obligations on operators with significant market power, 
making it mandatory for them to set interconnection charges that are 
transparent and cost orientated, whilst including a reasonable rate of return 
(the EC recommended the NRAs use of the Long Run Incremental Costs, 
LRAIC).  
 
European regulatory policies on the broadband sector are mainly focused on 
the wholesale market.
12
 Thus, the EU’s approach is to combine intrusive 
regulation on the wholesale side and de-regulation in the retail market. It is 

10 Initially, mandatory access was adopted by the FCC but from 2003 the US telecoms 
regulator stopped imposing mandatory unbundling and price regulation on fibre 
technologies and extended it to DSL in September 2005 (Renda, 2010). 
11
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997L0033:EN:HTML 
12 The most important regulation (‘ex post’) in the downstream market is the use of “margin 
squeeze” tests. These tests are focused on ensuring that the proposed retail prices are not 
anticompetitive given the price of relevant wholesale inputs, the interconnection prices, and 
in order to allow entrants to be able to at least replicate the incumbent plans rather than 
keeping retail prices at a particular level. 
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expected that it will be enough to promote competition in the upstream 
market to foster competition and bring large benefits to consumers in the 
downstream market. Also, regulators might adjust the wholesale regulation 
depending on the development of a particular market at a certain point. For 
instance, the regulator may set “regulatory holidays” which means the 
regulator commits to a fixed period of time free of access once a new network 
is built. Another regulation that can be applied is the “sunset clauses”, which 
specifies, ex ante, a period of time after which the incumbent’s facilities are no 
longer regulated.   
 
The regulation of the fixed broadband market which is imposed on the 
incumbent’s network can give rise to two types of competition within the 
incumbent’s network: “service-based” or “facility-based” intra-platform 
competition. Regulation at service-base level implies that either the entrant 
operator simply resells the incumbents services, or that it makes some 
investment in order to have a “point of presence” from where they connect to 
the incumbent’s networks and offer their own broadband services. This is the 
so-called bitstream or indirect access. This type of entry does not demand a 
high investment, and it allows the entrant to progressively invest and climb the 
‘ladder’ so as to reach the next ‘rung’, which is facility-based entry (Cave, 
2006). This regulatory approach implies unbundling the local loop elements of 
the incumbent’s network (ULL), but also requires that the entrants invest in 
their own equipment and facilities to provide the broadband service. We can 
also identify two types of direct access or ULL: i) full access (full ULL) implies 
that the entrants access the incumbent’s lines without restrictions, and ii) 
shared access (shared or partial ULL) means that access is restricted to the 
provision of the broadband service and that the incumbent retains the line’s 
low frequencies to offer a voice telephony service. Moreover, under shared 
access the entrant is still able to provide a voice service to the customer using 
voice over IP (VoIP), this is the naked ADSL.  The direct access (ULL) 
requires additional investments compared to bitstream, as there are fewer points 
of connection to the incumbent’s network (and a longer distance from these 
access points to the customers’ premises). However, access prices under direct 
access are cheaper for the entrant than bitstream. Finally, the direct access 
allows entrants for a higher degree of differentiation from the incumbent’s 
broadband plans in the retail market. 
 
In the wireless broadband sector the main bottleneck is the radio spectrum, 


which is restricted to a limited number of frequencies. Governments regulate 
the spectrum in such a way that it can be used efficiently by operators to 
provide their wireless services. The allocation of the spectrum frequency 
bands is a two stage process (Gruber, 2008). First, the allocation of the 
spectrum is decided at international level by the ITU, who decides how much 
spectrum is allocated to a specific application (e.g. TV and mobile services). 
The second stage is decided by the NRAs in each country, who assign the 
frequencies between mobile operators. In recent years, European regulators 
have allocated a number of licenses by auction, thereby offering a set of 
frequencies of the radio spectrum.13 Some of these frequencies were freed up 
after the migration from analogue to digital television, which is more spectrum 
efficient. This is the so-called “digital dividend” (EC, 2009b).  Last but not 
least, since 2002 the EC has aimed to allow firms which do not hold spectrum 
licenses, but are willing to provide mobile services, to access the market by 
reaching agreements with those mobile operators “owning” a part of the 
spectrum (mobile network operators, MNOs). Thus, a great number of Mobile 
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) have gradually appeared in EU 
countries in the last decade, which have helped to foster competition in the 
mobile market (Kiiski, 2006; Kimiloglu et al. 2011). 
 
 
4. Relevant literature related to broadband pricing policies 
 
There is extensive literature on the regulation of broadband services and its 
effect on competition. Indeed, there are many studies that analyse how the 
regulation of the wholesale broadband access has impacted on the level of 
diffusion and also, more recently, on the quality of the service (e.g. higher 
download speeds). This section highlights the studies that have been of most 
importance in the economics of broadband Internet access, and which present 
similarities in the methodology that has been used for the development of this 
dissertation on pricing regulation.  
 
 

13 There is extensive literature on auction theory as well as on auctions applied to the 
spectrum allocation (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002; Cramton, 2013). Also, there exist other 
mechanisms to assign the spectrum, apart from auctions, which are: i) first-come-first served, 
ii) lottery, and iii) “beauty contest”. As for “beauty contests”, the most popular process to 
allocate the spectrum after auctions, the regulator first establishes the criteria and chooses 
the winner(s) operators according to this selection criteria (Gruber, 2008). 
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4.1. The impact of broadband on economic growth 
 
The main interest for examining the drivers of broadband penetration is to 
analyse the positive effects of the Internet on economic growth. For example, 
the Internet has been crucial in the emergence of ‘tele-working’, transforming 
the way business works, and it has also launched the utilisation of virtual 
unilateral or bilateral platforms, for instance job market portals, putting 
workers and businesses in contact with one another in ways not seen 
previously. 
 
Previous to the literature on broadband, Roller and Waverman (2001) analyse 
the impact of fixed voice telephony diffusion on economic growth, and find 
that around a third of the economic growth in the OECD countries is due 
directly or indirectly to telecommunications. However, other theories have 
signaled that the Internet’s development can have even greater qualitative 
effects (e.g. information transmission) which increase competition and the 
development of new products and processes, such as new entrepreneurial or 
working methods (Fornefeld M. et al., 2010).
14
 
 
Czernich et al. (2011) take a panel of 25 OECD countries between 1996 and 
2007 and find that a 10-percent point increase in broadband penetration drives 
GDP per capita upwards by 0.9 to 1.5 percentage points. These authors 
consider broadband penetration to be endogenous in the process of economic 
growth, and to mitigate the consequences of endogeneity, they support their 
analysis with an instrumental variable estimation using existing copper 
telephone networks and the number of cable TV subscribers.  
 
Another study by Koutroumpis (2009) uses the data of 22 OECD countries 
from 2002 to 2007 to estimate the impact of broadband infrastructure on 
growth. He finds a significant causal positive link, especially when a critical 
mass of infrastructure is reached. The causality between broadband 
infrastructures and economic development is also analysed in two papers on 
regulation (Gillet et al., 2006; Crandall et al., 2007). These studies exploit the 
differences in the development of the broadband service across different US 
states, and find a positive relation between broadband diffusion and economic 
growth indicators such as employment, wages, and property prices. However, 

14 See The Impact of Broadband on Growth and Productivity conducted on behalf of the European 
Commission by Micus Management Consulting GmbH. 
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these studies lack of an empirical strategy to identify the causality of 
broadband adoption.  Previously, Crandall et al. (2002) estimated that the 
adoption of Internet business solutions had yielded US organisations 
cumulative cost savings of $155.2 billion and increased revenues of $444 
billion from the first year of implementation through to 2001. 
 
Other studies, not directly related to broadband but to technological progress 
in general, have analysed the effects of new technologies and their impact on 
GDP (Nelson and Phelps, 1996; Benhabib and Espiegel, 2005). These studies 
suggest that, thanks to IT, there are “information spillovers” which promote 
economic growth.  
 
All in all, these findings confirm that the telecoms industry is an essential 
component in the economy and improves welfare significantly. As for 
broadband, the literature seems to find a clear relationship between broadband 
penetration and GDP growth. Broadband services have promoted 
employment and improved efficiency thanks to new working methods and 
processes, amongst other positive effects related to economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the reverse causality between broadband adoption and GDP has 
been an obstacle in these studies, making it more difficult to estimate the 
effects of broadband on economic growth. 
 
 
4.2. Studies on fixed broadband diffusion   
 
The benefits associated to broadband access have given rise to a wave of 
theoretical and empirical research focused on analysing the drivers that impact 
on broadband adoption. The national and international organisations’ 
concerns on the so-called “broadband divide” (OECD, 1995) reflects interests 
in providing access to rural and remote geographic areas, or individuals with 
low rents who cannot access the Internet. These interests strive to help 
specific segments of the population avoid being excluded from the digital 
world, and therefore from wider society.  
 
The diffusion models used in the literature on broadband penetration are 
usually either log-linear models or logistic models, which assume that the 
diffusion of the service follows an “S-shape” logistic curve. Griliches (1957) 
pioneered these logistic penetration models in his study of the diffusion of 
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hybrid corn varieties. For instance, an early application of logistic models in 
the telecoms was made by Gruber and Verboven (2001), who studied the 
factors influencing the diffusion of mobile services in European countries 
from 1981 to 1997. However, in many countries the number of subscriptions 
exceeds the population, often by a considerable degree, indicating a tendency 
towards saturation in terms of primary diffusion. In these cases, the 
relationship between penetration and its drivers might be more linear, and 
hence empirical analysis might be implemented using a more traditional 
multivariate analysis (e.g. a ‘lin-lin’ or a ‘log-lin’ econometric model) applied on 
panel or cross sectional datasets.   
 
The regulatory approach followed by the EU to regulate broadband access is 
based on the “ladder of investment theory”, LOI, (Cave and Volgensang, 
2003; Cave, 2006).15 This theory is based on the difficulties to replicate the 
incumbents’ facilities by new entrants and the needs to facilitate entry to the 
broadband market. This theory starts with the principles of interconnection 
and access pricing (Armstrong, 2002). According to this theory, the NRAs are 
responsible for facilitating the entry of new players to the broadband market 
when they are not able to develop their own infrastructure. They also have to 
regulate the access prices so that new entrants can afford the provision of the 
service. The entrant operator would therefore go through different phases 
(“rungs”) in the access process, the first step being bitstream, followed by direct 
access (LLU), until a sufficient base of customers allowing the operator (if 
necessary) to deploy its own network has been reached. The LOI theory is 
presented as a way of introducing intra-platform competition in the broadband 
market when the incumbent lends the use of copper lines to new entrants; 
compared to the situation where the entrant competes with other players using 
its own network (inter-platform competition). 
 
A great number of papers have empirically tested the LOI theory. Some of 
these studies found scenarios where the LOI theory might not have been 
effective. Denni and Gruber (2005) and Distaso et al. (2006) study the effects 
of intra-platform and inter-platform competition through panel data analysis 
in the US and Europe respectively, and find that in the long term inter-

15 The LOI theory was proposed for first time by Martin Cave in 2001 in a report to the 
European Commission. The concept of LOI is detailed in “Encouraging infrastructure 
competition via the ladder of investment” (Cave, 2006). Ideas about the LOI theory were 
also developed in previous papers by Cave and Prosperetti (2001), and Cave and Volgensang 
(2003). Later, Cave (2010) and Cave (2014) also extend the LOI theory to NGANs. 
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platform competition has a stronger effect on penetration than intra-platform 
competition. The findings of Aron and Burnstein (2003) are along the same 
lines, and using US state data in 2000 found that inter-platform competition 
and cost elements are the drivers of broadband adoption. Haussman and Sidak 
(2005) make an empirical revision of the LOI theory, and more specifically the 
experiences of five countries with LLU. They don’t find any stylised fact that 
supports the LOI theory approach. A study by Crandall and Sidak (2007) 
empirically examines the LOI experience in the EU, and finds that there was 
not a transition from resale/bitstream to LLU, in fact, incumbents’ investment 
in new infrastructures is lower for countries that strongly promote mandatory 
access. Additionally, Hazlett and Bazelon’s (2005) find that the LOI theory did 
not work for broadband nor for the local telephony market in the period 1999 
to 2004 in the US. Wallsten (2006) constructs a panel dataset across 30 
countries using two sources, the OECD and ITU, and fails to conclude if LLU 
or bitstream have stimulated broadband penetration, but finds a robust and 
negative effect on penetration growth due to “subloop unbundling” which is 
the most extensive form of mandatory unbundling (the entrants access is even 
further from the local exchange than when using bitstream). Finally, Hoffler 
(2007) uses data from 16 western European countries from 2000-2004, and 
concludes that competition between DSL and cable TV had a significant 
impact on broadband penetration. However, this author highlights 
inefficiencies due to the duplication of existing platforms. 
 
In an advanced development phase of the broadband market, more recent 
papers have also tested the LOI theory using rich panel datasets, and the 
results are still mixed. Bouckaert et al. (2010) conclude that inter-platform 
competition (between DSL, cable modem and fibre) is the main driver of fixed 
broadband penetration. They use a panel dataset of 20 OECD countries from 
the period 2003 to 2008 to estimate the effect of regulation and competition 
on the size of penetration levels. The study of Pereira and Ribeiro (2010) 
focuses on the case of competition between DSL and cable operators in 
Portugal. They find that inter-platform competition increases the diffusion of 
broadband. Alternatively, Gruber and Koutroumpis (2013) find that inter-
platform competition does not stimulate broadband adoption, and that 
markets using a single technology more intensively present higher penetration 
levels.  Bacache et al. (2013) analyse a dataset of 15 EU countries over the 
period 2002 to 2010, and find only weak evidence to support the transition 
from bitstream to LLU, rejecting the hypothesis of migration from LLU to the 
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deployment of a new network by the entrant. This is in line with the paper of 
Bourreau et al. (2010), which presents a critique of the LOI theory and 
suggests that the main problem with the LOI theory is that once entrants 
obtain some profits with bitstream access, their incentives to invest further 
might not be high, creating a ‘‘replacement effect”. More recently, Nardotto et 
al. (2014) use data for the UK over the period 2005 to 2010 and find that LLU 
had little or no effect on broadband penetration. Interestingly however, they 
obtain that LLU increased quality in terms of higher download speeds. On the 
other hand, they demonstrate that inter-platform competition from cable 
modem increased local broadband penetration  
 
The regulation of NGANs and the debate about the incumbents’ interest in 
deploying fibre networks under access regulation, combined with entrants’ 
incentives to invest in their own networks, has also inspired a lot of research. 
The empirical paper on the effects of access regulation on NGANs’ 
investment, developed by Wallsten and Hausladen (2009), uses a dataset of 27 
EU countries from 2002 to 2007. The result of their analysis is that the higher 
the use of LLU or bitstream, the lower the frequency fibre penetration. 
However, inter-platform competition between DSL and cable modem has a 
positive impact on the number of fibre connections.  In their empirical study, 
Grajek and Roller (2012) show the effect that access regulation had on 
operators’ incentives to invest using a panel dataset of 20 countries for the 
period 1997 to 2006. According to their findings, both the incumbents and 
entrants have been discouraged by regulation, suggesting that the European 
regulatory framework has not been able to promote facility-based competition. 
These authors conclude that when incumbents have invested in new networks, 
the regulators have toughened access regulation while not changing the access 
price policies in line with entrants’ investments. Finally, Briglauer et al. (2013) 
apply panel data estimation techniques to a sample of 27 EU countries from 
2005 to 2011 and, interestingly, find that the investment in fibre technologies 
has been lower if regulatory policies have been effective in promoting the use 
of bitstream amongst entrants. They also find that cable modem and wireless 
technologies have had a non-linear impact on the deployment of NGANs, a 
pattern which follows a “U-shape”. 
 
A few studies have also analysed how the level of access price-levels set by 
NRAs might produce different outcome on the effectiveness of the LOI 
theory. In an early revision of the literature, Valletti (2003) signals that there is 
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not a clear relationship between access prices and investment incentives. Also, 
Crandall et al. (2004) do not find that lower UNE (Unbundling Network 
Element) rates stimulate future facility-based investment in the US. On the 
contrary, Waverman et al. (2007) model the effect of LLU prices and find that 
a 10 percent reduction in LLU prices results in an 18% reduction in 
subscribers to alternative infrastructures. Along the same lines, Willig (2006) 
finds that a decrease in the price of LLU encourages both competition and 
investment. Lastly, Inderst and Peitz’s (2012) theoretical model finds that a 
higher access charge would reduce the investment incentives of the 
incumbent, whilst increasing those of the entrant. 
 
Overall, these studies show us that the LOI theory seems not to have 
performed as many might have wished when the theory was first conceived. In 
fact, many of these studies point out that inter-platform competition 
stimulates broadband adoption, whilst intra-platform competition does not. 
Moreover, all papers in the literature review seem to find a negative effect on 
investment in new networks in countries that have used the LOI approach. 
However, those papers which use more recent and longer series of data seem 
to find some (slight) evidence of a transition from bitstream to LLU, or at least 
an improvement in the quality delivered by broadband services with the use of 
LLU compared to bitstream (Nardotto et al., 2014). 
 
 
4.3. Studies on the diffusion of the mobile broadband   
 
A group of empirical papers have analysed the evolution of the mobile voice 
service over recent decades. Some papers, such as Gruber and Verboven 
(2001), use the logistic diffusion model to analyse the evolution of cellular 
mobile services from 1981 to 1997 all over the world. These authors found 
that standardisation policies in the analogue phase (1G technology) had a 
positive effect on mobile penetration, but the subsequent standardisation of 
digital technologies (2G) in the EU might not have had a significant impact on 
the diffusion of the service. Similarly, Liikanen et al. (2004) analysed the 
impact of first and second generation mobile technology in a group of 80 
countries over the period 1992-98. They showed that the level of penetration 
of 1G technology positively affected the expansion of 2G technology, 
meaning that the substitution effect between technologies dominated the 
network effect. It seems that this effect has also been important in the 
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transition from 2G, to 2.5G, and to 3G. Therefore, in the case of mobile 
telephony the compatibility among technologies has avoided a lock-in effect. 
More recently, Bohlin et al. (2010) have analysed the factors determining the 
diffusion of mobile telephony in a group of 177 countries over the period 
1990-2007. They show that the expansion of 2G and the 3G technologies has 
been strongly influenced by the level of urbanisation in the countries in 
question, as well as the GDP per capita, the penetration of fixed broadband 
Internet, and the regulation of the market. They also explain that 1G 
technology promoted the subsequent development of 2G, but that this 
standard has had a negative impact in the expansion of 3G. This suggests that 
2G and 3G were competing for a common customer base. The level of 
competition in the market appears as a key factor in the speed of diffusion of 
one technology standard, but this effect was less important during the 
transition from 2G to 3G technology. Regarding the latter, the same authors 
argue that the capability of 2G technologies to provide data transmissions 
made it less necessary for customers to switch to 3G networks. This result 
could also be related to the higher saturation of the mobile market around the 
year 2000 when 3G was launched, compared to the beginning of the 1990’a 
when 2G technology was first offered. 
 
The mobile broadband service appeared more recently, therefore literature is 
still sparse compared to the available studies on fixed broadband. An 
exception is the study by Lee et al. (2011) who find that the main drivers for 
fixed broadband in OECD countries are LLU, income, population density, 
education and prices. These authors also analyse mobile broadband diffusion 
from 2003 to 2008, showing that multiple standardisation policies and 
population density significantly affect the diffusion of mobile broadband 
services. Moreover, they examine jointly the drivers of fixed and mobile 
broadband, and their results suggest that in many OECD countries mobile 
broadband is a complement to fixed broadband. Srinuan et al. (2012) uses 
survey data for 2010 in Thailand and finds that price, availability of fixed 
telephony, and age exhibit a positive and significant effect on mobile Internet 
adoption, as well as area of living and the characteristic of the mobile operator 
are important factors. This study also shows that mobile broadband is useful 
in reducing the “digital divide”, as some consumers prefer to use mobile 
broadband instead of fixed broadband. Haucap et al. (2014) analysed the effect 
of tariff diversity on broadband uptake rates using a dataset of fixed 
broadband plans and mobile broadband plans via USB modem devices. They 
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find that mobile broadband prices do not affect the level of fixed broadband 
penetration, and that the main drivers of the adoption of fixed broadband 
services are their prices, income, and tariff diversity. 
 
Studies on mobile broadband diffusion usually include the analysis of fixed 
broadband, or investigate the substitution patterns between both services. 
Contrary to fixed broadband, where there are many studies that test the LOI 
theory, studies on mobile broadband are more diverse. Nonetheless, many of 
the papers on mobile broadband cover the effects of the technological 
evolution and the implementation of standards, which point out the network 
effects advantages for countries which adopted a common standard during the 
analog phase (1G). However, the transition and release of several digital 
standards (2G and 3G technologies) seems to be less important in the 
diffusion of the service. This is probably because the possibilities of 
compatibility, as well as the similar features offered by 2G and 3G digital 
standards, might have been reflected in lower penetration growth rates of 3G. 
 
 
4.4. Pricing policies in the retail broadband sector   
 
So far, very few papers have analysed the price setting mechanisms of 
broadband services. Wallsten and Riso (2010) describe and analyse a data set 
of 25,000 residential and business broadband plans from 30 OECD countries 
between 2007 and 2009. The first result of their analysis is that plans which 
were capped in volume were cheaper than unlimited plans, unless the 
customer consumes additional gigabytes above the cap. Second, the authors 
found that residential prices in the US were stable compared to a general 
decline in the rest of the countries looked at over the study period. Although 
average retail prices remained constant in the US, for business plans the high 
speed tiers presented price reductions. They also found that plans with 
contracts are less expensive than plans without them. Another study by 
Wallsten and Mallahan (2010) uses data from the FCC, combined with other 
sources to test the effects of competition on speeds, penetration, and prices in 
the US. Their econometric analysis shows that the presence of a high number 
of fixed broadband providers has a positive effect on transmission speeds and 
reduces prices. However, they also highlight that the dataset they use might 
show some inconsistencies since it does not include bundled plans or 
promotions. 

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Greenstein and McDevitt (2011) analyse the evolution of fixed broadband 
prices in the US during the period 2004 to 2009. The authors construct diverse 
price indexes (Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher) using the tariffs of 1,500 plans. 
This shows that broadband prices fell slightly during this period for stand-
alone plans, but prices remained relatively constant for bundles including 
broadband. These authors conclude that prices for broadband plans declined 
modestly, around three to ten percent, during the study period. 
 
The descriptive paper by Galperin (2012) highlights the high price elasticity for 
the demand of the fixed broadband service; and hence the relevance of 
reducing prices. They find that broadband prices in Latin America, in 
comparison with OECD countries, are above the threshold which would allow 
for saturation of the broadband market.  
 
Related to pricing policies in the mobile sector, Srinuan et al. (2013) analyse in 
detail how operators release “innovative plans”16 which exploit consumer 
heterogeneity, reflect demand needs, and attract and retain subscribers in the 
Thai mobile market between 2002 and 2010. They find that a greater number 
of price plans can increase competition among operators, but that complex 
tariffs might also be confusing. This means customers might end up paying 
more than they actually need to. Finally, they also find that big operators 
introduce more innovative tariff plans than small operators. 
 
 
5. Main contributions of the thesis  
 
This dissertation will shed light on how fixed and mobile operators 
commercialise their broadband plans. It will also demonstrate the effects of 
the market structure and regulation of wholesale access on the prices paid by 
consumers. The common thread throughout the three main chapters of the 
dissertation is an analysis of the hedonic factors that differentiate broadband 
plans and explain differences in prices. The methodology is based on the 
application of econometric techniques on two rich panel datasets of fixed and 
mobile broadband plans. Aside from the basic characteristics of the 

16 Corrocher and Zirulia (2010) define “innovative plans” as a new tariff plan. These authors 
also identified several characteristics of a price plan: pre-paid versus post-paid plans, 
subscription fees, price per unit, time-base charges, on-net versus off-net call, rebates and 
promotions, bundling, etc. 
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broadband service, the second and third chapters study the impact of 
competition and regulation factors on the prices in equilibrium. The 
dissertation applies ordinary least squares (OLS) and also two stage least 
squares (2SLS) to mitigate the endogeneity problems associated with the 
penetration of the broadband service. 
 
 
Chapter 2: “Broadband prices in the European Union: Competition and commercial 
strategies” 
 
This chapter examines the factors that have determined the prices of fixed 
broadband plans in 15 EU countries during the period 2008-2011. First, it 
shows that download speed and bundling are key factors in the level of prices. 
The analysis also shows that, for plans offering the same download speed, 
fibre and cable broadband prices are similar to DSL. Incumbent operators 
charge greater prices than entrants, and customer segmentation also leads to 
higher prices. The most important contribution made by this paper is to 
identify the effect of competition and regulation on prices. Specifically, the 
study shows that prices are higher in markets where entrants exhibit a high 
usage of bitstream access, and are lower in the markets where entrants make 
intensive use of direct access (LLU). In spite of this, inter-platform 
competition (between DSL, cable modem and fibre platforms) does not have a 
strong impact on prices. 
 
I believe the results regarding the regulated access to the incumbent’s network 
might be useful to NRAs when they set the levels of access prices paid by 
entrants to provide the broadband service, as the convenience of promoting 
some facility-based entry policies as a mechanism to obtain larger price 
reductions for end consumers is demonstrated. In this sense, the recent work 
of Bacache et al. (2011) for 15 EU countries shows that the ladder of 
investment approach may facilitate migration from the use of bitstream access 
lines to local loop unbundling (LLU). 
 
 
Chapter 3: “Pricing strategies and competition in the mobile broadband market” 
 
This study analyses in depth the pricing strategies used by mobile operators to 
set prices for mobile broadband plans on smartphone. This chapter uses a 


similar approach to Chapter 2 for a dataset of mobile broadband plans on 
smartphone from 2011 to 2014 all over the world (37 countries in total). The 
research reveals that multi-tier pricing is a common strategy across operators 
who usually set volume limits for Internet usage (data caps) as well as voice 
services (minutes caps), and who apply different types of penalties after the 
customer has exhausted the initial data included with the tariff. These penalties 
might imply a drastic reduction in the download speed (only a few operators 
stop the service completely) or a monetary penalisation (a new volume 
allowance or pay per unit of consumption, pay-as-you-go). Hence, the 
monthly price also depends on the type of penalty included in the plan. On the 
other hand, unlimited data plans are much less common, and are more 
expensive.  
 
Bundling is also a very relevant aspect of mobile plans; apart from including 
allowances of voice minutes and Internet in the same offer, operators also 
bundle mobile broadband plans with diverse types of smartphones and embed 
the cost of handsets in the monthly price, tying customers for a longer period 
of time (i.e. longer contract duration). One of the most insightful results of 
this chapter reveals that some plans offering branded handsets result in 
substantially more expensive tariffs than stand-alone (SIM-only) offers, 
although some brands might not embed additional fees.  
 
This study presents a discussion about how operators might use multi-tier 
pricing to maximise the benefits inherent in commercialising mobile Internet 
services; as well as their incentives of selling the mobile plan with the 
smartphone. Indeed, the results found on these two topics are linked to recent 
research on Internet data caps (Economides et al., 2015) and exclusive 
contracts between mobile operators and handset manufacturers (Sinkinson, 
2014). 
 
Finally, examining a group of 20 EU countries, this chapter assesses the effects 
of market structure and regulation of entry on the level of prices. It is shown 
that mobile operators’ concentration in these 20 countries does not have a 
significant impact on prices. Also, the regulation of termination prices (MTRs) 
that mobile operators charge to their rivals for terminating their telephone 
calls does not appear to affect the level of prices either. Only the entry of 
MVNOs seems to reduce prices slightly, which suggests that there is room for 
more competition in this market. 

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Chapter 4: “Competition in the Spanish mobile broadband market”  
 
The fourth and final chapter of the dissertation focuses on the Spanish case, 
and studies the mobile broadband service in this country, from the start of the 
liberalisation process at the end of the 1990s to December 2014. First, this 
study describes the process of technological innovation that has facilitated the 
emergence of mobile broadband and the launch of this service in Spain. Also, 
it illustrates how the market restructuring experienced in the Spanish mobile 
sector since the end of the 1990s has evolved to a less concentrated market 
and more competition. 
 
The analysis shows the high level of competition and penetration in the 
Spanish market compared to the rest of the communications services. 
Nevertheless, the comparison of the Spanish mobile market with other 
European countries demonstrates that the high rates of mobile broadband 
penetration in Spain cannot be reconciled with the presence of higher prices 
than in many other European countries. With respect to prices, MVNOs seem 
to be pro-competitive, and some concerns arise about the need to facilitate 
MVNOs reaching new agreements with MNOs for the use of 4G 
technologies. Also, fixed-mobile bundles (four and five play bundles) have 
been well-adopted by Spanish consumers due to associated discounts, and also 
because Spanish consumers are keen to pay for all of their communications 
services in a single bill. Overall, communications plans and tariffs in the 
Spanish market evolve rapidly, and to some extent, have had an impact on the 
market structure and new acquisitions which occurred within the Spanish 
telecoms market during 2014.  
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Broadband prices in the European Union: competition and 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, millions of people in the European Union have installed 
broadband in their households
18
, thus enabling them to download information 
and to use sophisticated digital services.19 Broadband Internet access is an 
essential component of inclusiveness in the 21st century, and households 
without broadband access are in risk of becoming marginalised from society 
and economic opportunity. Several papers have analysed the impact that 
technological change and regulation have had on the expansion of Internet. 
However, little attention has been given to how telecommunication operators 
adapt their pricing and commercial strategies to market evolution and 
competition. The analysis of the way in which prices are established is essential 
to orientate regulatory and competition policies in this sector. Moreover, it can 
help shed light on the significant price and quality differences across EU 
Member States. 
 
Effective competition plays a key role in expanding broadband access and in 
ensuring that consumers benefit from lower prices, greater choice and better 
quality services. However, competition can be affected by several problems, 
including the lack of investment in new technologies, price discrimination, 
margin squeeze, or excessive pricing. Competition in the provision of retail 
broadband services also depends on effective competition at the wholesale 
level, or, if this does not exist, on its effective regulation. In Europe, 
telecommunications regulators conduct regular analyses in order to define the 

17 This chapter has been previously published as “Calzada, J. and Martínez-Santos, F., 2014. 
Broadband prices in the European Union: Competition and commercial strategies, Information 
Economics and Policy, 7, 24–38”. 
18 The European Commission deﬁnes broadband Internet access as ‘‘an access assuring an 
always-on service with speeds in excess of 144 kbps. This speed is measured in download 
terms’’ (European Commission, 2009 and 2011b). 
19 During the nineties, broadband was delivered over cable and telephone lines. In the years 
that followed, these technologies were upgraded and some operators began to deploy ﬁbre 
for home delivery as this would support a higher bandwidth. 
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relevant broadband market and to determine which firms have significant 
market power (SMP) and need to be regulated. In this context, price analysis 
is necessary to examine the conduct of operators and to assess the state of 
competition. 
 
This paper analyses the factors that determined fixed broadband Internet 
prices in 15 EU Member States between 2008 and 2011.20 We employ a rich 
data set that contains both the commercial and technical characteristics of 2204 
plans offered to households by incumbent and entrant operators.  By using an 
instrumental variable approach we estimate a pricing equation using three types 
of variables: (1) the technical characteristics of the plans; (2) the operators’ 
commercial strategies; and (3) the patterns of competition in the country. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to use information at the level 
of the operators’ commercial plans to examine the influence of competition 
and regulation on broadband retail prices. 
 
We analyse how operators adjust their prices to the technological 
characteristics of the plans. First, we show that downstream speed has a   
positive and significant non-linear impact on price. And second, we explain 
that cable modem and fibre (FTTx) broadband plans have lower prices per 
Mbps than xDSL plans. This is an interesting result that questions the interest 
that operators might have for deploying Next Generation Access Networks 
(NGAs). 
 
We then examine the importance of several commercial practices typically 
adopted by operators. We  show that flat rate plans are  more expensive than 
metered plans (which limit the downloadable volume), and that plans that 
bundle  broadband Internet access with voice telephony and/or television are  
also more expensive, especially in the case of triple packages. In the last year 
there has been an important debate in the literature and among practitioners 
concerning the motivations of operators’ use of bundling. Our paper 
contributes to this debate by showing the effects of bundling on prices. 
 
The paper also examines how competition and regulation affect operators’ 

20 In spite of their growing relevance, mobile broadband services are not included in our 
analysis. Note that the commercial characteristics of mobile plans differ markedly from 
those of fixed broadband Internet access. For example, download speed is significantly 
slower in the case of mobile offers (although new wireless technologies such as LTE can 
provide speeds similar fixed broadband). 
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pricing strategies. We show that incumbents set prices that are significantly 
higher than those of entrants, which might be a consequence of factors such as 
their wider coverage, reputation, or the incumbents’ concerns about the price-
squeeze tests set by competition authorities. Moreover, we obtain that the 
number of plans offered by each operator in a country has a positive effect on 
their prices. This result suggests that market segmentation and consumer 
confusion about the economic and technical characteristics of plans might 
allow firms to set higher prices. 
 
Finally, the main contribution of the paper is to identify the effects of access 
regulation. We find that prices are higher in countries where entrants make a 
more intensive use of bitstream access, and lower when they rely more 
heavily on direct access (local loop unbundling, LLU). Despite this, we   
observe no significant effect on prices when entrant upgrades their own 
networks, nor do we find a robust effect of inter-platform competition 
between xDSL, cable and FTTx. These results might be interpreted as a 
consequence of the application of the ‘‘ladder of investment’’ approach (LOI), 
whereby in order to promote sector competition regulators initially facilitate 
the access of entrants to incumbents’ network so as to guarantee service-based 
competition, and subsequently, once these entrants have acquired experience 
and reputation they create incentives to entrants to invest in their own infra- 
structure. The objective of this regulation is to reconcile the long-term benefits 
of facility-based competition with short-term price reductions. In spite of this, 
the effectiveness of this strategy has been questioned.

  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic 
literature, so as to highlight the contributions of this paper, and it also 
describes the European broadband market. Section 3 outlines our estimation 
strategy. Section 4 describes the data set. Section 5 presents the empirical 
strategy and results. Section 6 discusses the main contributions of the paper. 
Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
 

 
22 The ‘‘ladder of investment’’ regulatory model was first identified by Cave (2006). See 
Cambini and Jiang (2009) for an extensive review of the literature on this topic and 
Bourreau et al. (2010) for a critical analysis of this regulatory approach. 
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2. Literature review and the European broadband market 
 
2.1. Review of the empirical literature on broadband access 
 
The initial empirical literature on broadband Internet access focused on the 
determinants of its penetration. For example, Distaso et al. (2006) report the 
impact of inter-platform competition on broadband penetration in 14 
European countries from 2000 to 2004. They find that while inter-platform 
competition had a positive effect on penetration, intra-platform competition 
did   not play an important role. Other studies, including Höffler (2007), have 
highlighted the inefficiencies created by the duplication of existing 
platforms.

 
 
More recent papers have analysed the impact of the regulation of wholesale 
prices on the investment decisions of firms and on the diffusion of the 
service.24 Grajek and Röller (2012) examine the effects of access regulation on 
incentives for investment in 20 countries in the period 1997–2006. They 
explain that regulation has discouraged the investment of incumbents and 
individual entrants, and suggest that the European regulatory framework has 
failed to provide incentives for facility-based competition. They also examine 
the regulators’ response to infrastructure investments, concluding that 
whereas access regulation has not been affected by the entrants’ investments, 
regulators have toughened access regulation in response to increased 
investment by incumbents. Bouckaert et al (2010) investigate the influence of 
competition on broadband penetration in a sample of 20 OECD countries. 
They consider three entry patterns adopted by broadband operators: (1)   
inter-platform competition, where the incumbent xDSL operators compete 
with infra-structure-based operators (e.g. cable modem and FTTx); (2) 
facility-based intra-platform competition, in which entrants lease some 
unbundled local loop elements, but have to invest in their own equipment and 
facilities (e.g. LLU and shared lines); and (3) service-based intra-platform 
competition, where entrants resell the incumbent’s services (bitstream 

23 There is a number of papers that have analysed the diffusion of broadband services. See 
for example Cava and Alabau (2006), Lee et al. (2011), Andrés et al. (2010) and Czernich et 
al. (2011). 
24 A detailed review of the theoretical literature on access charges in telecommunications can 
be found in Laffont and Tirole (2000), Armstrong (2002), and Vogelsang (2003). 
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access/resale). According to these authors, only infrastructure-based 
competition increases the penetration of the service, while the other types 
have little effect. Briglauer et al. (2013) examine the effects of infrastructure 
and service- based competition on the deployment of Next Generation 
Access (NGA) networks in a panel data set of the EU 27 Member States. 
They show that whereas infrastructure-based competition affects NGA 
deployment in an inverted U-shaped manner, service-based competition 
negatively affects total NGA investment of both incumbent and entrant 
operators. 
 
Few papers have undertaken specific country studies. Pereira and Ribeiro 
(2010) examine the competition between xDSL and cable operators in 
Portugal. They find that inter-platform competition (mainly between xDSL and 
cable) increases the diffusion of Internet thanks to both the higher coverage of 
broadband access and the existence of lower prices. More recently, Nardotto et 
al. (2012) have analysed the impact of unbundling on broadband penetration in 
the UK during the period 2005–2010 using micro level information. They find 
that LLU had little or no effect on broadband penetration, although it 
increased the quality of the service in terms of average broadband speed. On 
the other hand, they show that inter-platform competition from cable 
increased local broadband penetration. 
 
Many of the above results contrast with those reported by Gruber and 
Koutroumpis (2013) who, using a data set of 167 countries between 2000 and 
2010, find that inter-platform competition is an impediment to broadband 
adoption. They conclude that markets that focus specifically on one type of 
technology typically present a more rapid adoption process than that 
experienced in multi-technology markets. This finding can be justified by the 
fact that full retail unbundling does not require duplication of networks, which 
reduces costs and, ultimately, prices. 
 
The analysis of broadband prices has received much less attention.25 
Explanations for this include the absence of consistent data, and the fact that 
broadband services are highly varied and typically offered jointly with voice 
telephony and television. One major exception is the study conducted by 
Wallsten and Riso (2010), which examines broadband prices in a group of 30 
OECD countries between 2007 and 2009. They find that downstream speed 

25 Galperin (2012) describes the evolution of broadband prices in Latin America. 
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has a positive effect on prices in the study period; that broadband plans with 
bit caps are on average offered at lower prices than unlimited plans; and that 
plans with contracts are typically less expensive than those without. While our 
paper confirms some of these findings, here, additionally, we examine the 
effect on the prices of competition and the impact of alternative entry patterns 
(bitstream, direct access and own networks). 
 
Greenstein and McDevitt (2011) also analyse the economic value created by 
the diffusion of broadband Internet access provided via xDSL and cable in 
the United States. They do not have direct information on prices, but create a 
price index that adjusts prices to the progressive improvement in service 
quality. Taking this into account, they show that broadband prices in the US 
fell slightly during the period 2004–2009. They explain that this is a very 
different evolution to that of the prices of electronic products, including 
laptops and printers, where the quality-adjusted price falls have been 
significant. 
 
 
2.2. The European broadband market 
 
In July 2011, the average penetration level of fixed broadband Internet access 
in the EU Member States was 27.2%.26 However, there were significant 
differences across countries. For example, while the penetration levels in 
Netherlands, Denmark and France were 39.3%, 38.5% and 33.9%, 
respectively, in Romania, Bulgaria and Poland they were 14.6%, 15.6% and 
16.4%, respectively (Fig. 1).27 
 
In recent years, the prices of fixed broadband Internet access have fallen 
significantly, which is quite remarkable if we consider that operators have 
improved the quality of their offers. Often operators allow consumers to 
migrate at no cost to other offers providing higher download speeds. 
Moreover, many offers bundle broadband access with other services such as 
fixed voice, TV, and more recently with mobile telephony. Such packages 
allow operators to attract new consumers (the bundle being cheaper than the 

26 As of the same date, the penetration of large screen mobile broadband subscriptions 
(using dedicated data cards or USB modems) was 7.5%. 
27 See the European Commission Implementation Reports (European Commission 2011a, 
b). 
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sum of the single services) and to gain the loyalty of their subscribers. 
 
This situation has not prevented significant price differences across European 
countries (Fig. 2).
28
 Price differences can be explained by the technical and 
commercial characteristics of the plans, but they might also reflect differences 
in the level of competition in national markets. Thus, while in 2011 the 
incumbent’s market shares (according to the number  of  broadband lines) in  
Cyprus, Luxemburg and Austria were 73%, 72% and 55% respectively, in the 
UK and Bulgaria they were 29% and in Romania just 30%. Many EU 
countries have four or five alternative operators, but other national markets 
are much more fragmented. For example, in Germany there are around 100 
regional entrants, though the incumbent retains a 46% market share. 
 
Figure 1: Fixed broadband and incumbent’s penetrations in 2011 (%) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011a). 
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28 In the EU, retail prices of broadband services are not regulated. However, national 
regulators periodically assess whether there is a ‘‘margin squeeze’’ that reduces the 
proﬁtability of entrants. This occurs, for example, when wholesale access prices make it 
impossible for entrants to match the incumbent’s prices. 
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Figure 2: Fixed broadband prices in 2011 (€ PPP) 
Least expensive offer (all ISPs): Basket 4096 kbps-8192 kbps, 5GB or 20 hours/month 
 
Source: European Commission (2011b). 
 
Broadband access can be provided via several technologies.  In the period we 
study, the most frequently employed system is xDSL followed by cable 
modem, but some operators use FTTx or wireless technologies such as 3G, 
WiMAX and satellite. Around 77% of the fixed access lines in European 
countries use the xDSL technology, which explains why the average speed is 
still quite low (around 10 Mbps) and why there is more intra than inter-
platform competition. 
 
Incumbent fixed telecommunications operators are usually vertically integrated 
(except in Sweden, the UK and Italy, where different types of vertical 
separation are found)29 and use xDSL (although some use cable, which is the 
case, for example, of Denmark). Most entrants use the incumbent’s network to 
provide their services and have to pay a regulated access fee.  Cable operators 
have built their own infrastructure, but they also need to sign interconnection 
agreements with incumbent operators because of their limited national 
coverage. 
 
In the EU, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) set access charges in order 
to guarantee an adequate development of competition. There are two 
mandatory types of access. Entrants can access the incumbent’s network 
directly (direct access or LLU) or indirectly (bitstream).  At the same time, the 
direct access can be of three types: complete unbundling of the local loop, 
where entrants pay to use the incumbent’s access lines without any restriction; 

29 For an analysis of vertical separation in telecommunications see for example Teppayayon 
and Bohlin (2010). 
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shared LLU, where entrants use the high frequencies of the access lines to 
provide broadband and incumbents use the low frequencies to provide voice 
telephony; and, shared LLU without voice telephony (naked ADSL), which is 
similar to the previous service but voice telephony is offered over the Internet 
(VoIP). The main advantage of unbundling is, therefore, to allow entrants to 
offer a differentiated service and to develop their own commercial policy. 
 
In the case of indirect access (bitstream), entrants can access the incumbent’s 
network at two levels: at the ATM level (or Gig-ADSL), where there are 
several geographical interconnections, and at the IP level (or ADSL- IP), 
which is more expensive and has less interconnection points. 
 
Price regulation of all these access services is inessential instrument for 
promoting competition and investment. Regulated access prices determine in 
which part of the incumbent’s network the entrants will invest and influence 
both retail prices and service quality. In the EU, following the ‘‘ladder of 
investment’’ (LOI) regulatory model, NRAs set the prices of bitstream and 
direct access (LLU) in order to provide incentives to entrants to invest 
progressively in their own equipment. In spite of this, the empirical literature 
is still unclear about the effectiveness of this strategy (Hazlett and Bazelon, 
2005; Bourreau and Dögan, 2006; Waverman et al., 2007; Grajek and Röller, 
2012; and Bacache et al., 2014). As Bourreau et al. (2010) explain, the main 
problem of the LOI is that once entrants obtain some profits with bitstream 
access, their incentives to invest may not be so high, creating a ‘‘replacement 
effect’’. Moreover, the simultaneous presence of multiple access levels can 
hinder incentives to access higher rungs on the investment ladder. Our paper 
contributes to the literature on access regulation by assessing how the use of 
each type of entry at the country and at the operator level affects retail prices. 
 
 
3. Estimation strategy 
 
This section examines the prices of broadband Internet access in 15 European 
countries in the period 2008-2011. After adjusting for the hedonic features of 
the operators’ plans, we analyse the impact on prices of several commercial 
strategies frequently used by operators, including bundling and market 
segmentation. Additionally, we assess the effects of the entry patterns 
(bitstream, LLU and own network) that are usually found in national markets. 

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We estimate a model for the prices of broadband residential plans (pmoit), 
where m is the offer, ‘o’ is the operator, ‘i’ is the country, and ‘t’ is the time 
period. The explanatory variables that we use in the estimation can be grouped 
into three blocks: (1) technical characteristics of the service; (2) the operators’ 
commercial strategies and (3) measures of competition and regulation in the 
country. The price equation also includes the penetration of the service in each 
country and country and time fixed effects. Specifically, we estimate the 
following model: 
 Pricing Equation (1):  
 
 
The prices of the plans offered by each operator may vary according to the 
quality of the service and the access technology. In Eq. (1), DownstreamSpeed is 
the downstream speed advertised in the plans’ technical details. The speed of 
the service is one feature usually considered by consumers when they contract 
a plan because it determines how fast they can view web pages, receive e-
mails, or download music, for example. UpstreamSpeed is the upstream speed 
offered in the plan and indicates the speed at which users can upload data to 
the Internet, which might include, for instance, uploading a file to a server, 
sending an email message or using peer-to-peer software. Operators usually 
assign much more downstream than upstream speed.30 To account for a 
possible non-linear relationship between Price and DownstreamSpeed and 
UpstreamSpeed these variables are introduced in the model in logarithms. 
Technology   is the access technology used to provide the service. This might 
be xDSL, cable modem or fibre (FTTx). We expect each technology to have a 
different effect on the price since they require different levels of investment 
and bandwidths, and because consumers might have different ‘‘perceptions’’ 
about their quality. 
 
The price equation also includes the commercial practices that may be adopted 

30 Symmetric connections, such as Symmetric Digital Subscriber Line (SDSL), offer identical 
upstream and downstream rates but our data do not include any plan with this feature. 
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by operators. Bundling refers to the practice in which broadband access is 
provided together with voice telephony and/or television. Our basic 
estimations consider all the plans commercialized by operators and we include 
dummy variables to capture when the broadband service is bundled with other 
services. We have adopted this approach because we believe operators 
consider stand-alone and bundled broadband services to be partly substitutes 
when setting their prices. This is also the approach taken by the European 
Commission when it establishes its principles for analysing the broadband 
wholesale market.
31 
Notice also that bundle subscriptions we assess the effects 
of the entry patterns (bitstream, LLU and own network) that are usually found 
in national markets are especially prevalent in the EU. According to DG 
CONNECT, in 2011 around 75% of all broadband subscriptions in the EU-15 
were for bundled broadband plans.
32
 In our data set, almost 60% of all plans 
are broadband packages. In spite of this, it could still be argued that stand-
alone and bundled broadband are different services. For this reason, in Section 
6 we present separate estimations for each type of plan. 
The commercialization of broadband bundled together with other services 
might represent a cost saving for operators, owing, for example, to the 
existence of scope economies, but it might also imply additional costs that 
justify a price increase. For example, to be able to offer television services, 
operators must first reach agreements with TV channels and pay them a fee. 
In other cases, bundling may be a marketing strategy used by operators to 
segment consumers or to increase their switching costs.
33 
 
The variable VoIP reflects the situation in which the broadband service is 
bundled together with voice telephony but provided over IP, which reduces 
the operators’ costs (naked xDSL). 
UnlimitedVolume is a dummy variable that shows if the plan offers unlimited 
broadband volume or if there is a restriction on the user’s downloadable 

31 For instance, in its Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation on Relevant   
Product and Service Markets (SEC (2007) 1483/2), the European Commission considers 
that ‘‘In most case the individual services in the bundles are not good demand-side 
substitutes for each other yet may be considered to be part of the same retail market if there 
is no more independent demand for individual parts of the bundle’’. 
32 Specifically, broadband and voice, on the one hand, and broadband, voice and TV, on the 
other, accounted on average for 49% and 26% of all subscriptions to broadband plans in the 
EU 15. See http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/scoreboard. 
33 Our data set does not allow us to identify if consumers can subscribe separately to each 
service (“menu à la carte”) or if they are forced to contract the bundle (tying). 
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capacity. VolumeCap measures the volume of data that users can download if 
the plan has a capacity restriction. A priori, we expect capped offers to be 
cheaper than those with unlimited capacity, and also for the price of the plan 
to increase with the download limit. In spite of this, in a recent theoretical 
paper Economides and Hermalin (2013) have shown that operators might 
impose download limits in order to promote competition among content 
providers. This can increase consumer surplus and allow them to charge higher 
prices. 
 
We also examine a group of variables that reflect the level of competition in 
the national markets. Incumbent is a dummy that identifies if incumbents have 
different pricing policies to those adopted by entrants. Incumbents may enjoy 
some market power thanks to reputational advantages or to the existence of    
consumer switching costs. They may also have cost advantages over their 
rivals. Yet, it is important to recall that European operators may be an   
incumbent in one country but an entrant in one or more other countries.  
Hence, operator costs need to be related to their presence in several countries 
and to their bargaining power with equipment providers. Notice also that 
incumbents might set higher retail prices in order to avoid the margin squeeze 
tests implemented by anti-trust authorities. As Carlton (2008) and Sidak (2008) 
argue, a price squeeze ban can act as an incentive to vertically integrated 
incumbents to increase their prices and so reduce the risk of antitrust lawsuits   
being brought by their competitors.
34
 
 
HHIPlat  is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration in terms 
of technology shares. A high HHIPlat would mean a high concentration of a 
particular technology in a given country. As discussed in Section 2, the 
empirical literature is ambiguous with regard to the effect of inter-platform 
competition on the diffusion of the service (see, for example, Bouckaert et al., 
2010 and Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2013). In the price analysis, a factor that 
should be considered is that inter-platform competition allows operators to 
differentiate their services, which might offset price reductions generated with 
platform competition. 
 
NOffers is the number of plans offered by each operator in each country and it 
is introduced in order to measure the effects of market segmentation on the 

34 Gaudin (2012) describes several recent price squeeze cases concerning regulated 
incumbent operators in Europe and the US. 


prices. When competition is strong, operators can offer a large number of 
plans to better target specific groups of consumers, but when they have market 
power they can also segment the market to set higher prices. Hoernig (2001) 
also suggests that operators can release a large number of plans to generate 
some confusion among consumers and so as to be able to increase prices. 
 
Finally, a principal objective of this study is to determine how the prevalence 
of different types of entry in a country (bitstream, direct access or the 
deployment of the entrant’s own network) affects the operators’ pricing 
strategies. Bitstream, Directaccess, and Ownnetwork are explanatory variables that 
reflect the relative importance of these entry patterns in each country with 
respect to the incumbent’s number of lines.35 The inclusion of these variables 
at the country level shows how different types of competition affect the 
operators’ price decisions. In addition to this, the variables BitstreamO and 
DirectaccessO are the number of bitstream and direct access lines that each 
operator has in the country divided by its total number of lines. These 
variables should measure how the specific entry strategy adopted by an   
operator affects its prices. We believe that the use of bitstream and direct 
access by an operator will depend on the regulation of access charges, but also 
on other aspects such as the investment required to deploy the network, the 
operators’ perceptions of consumers’ willingness to pay for high quality 
services, or the regulatory institutions in the country. 
 
In most European countries, broadband services are mainly provided by the 
legacy communication infrastructure, where the incumbent operator 
maintains significant market power. Taking this into account, we seek to 
examine the response of prices to different entry patterns. The variables 
Bitstream, Directaccess, and Ownnetwork are defined at the country level and 
should reflect the responses of operators to the type of competition in the 
country. By contrast, BitstreamO and DirectaccessO are defined at the operator 
level and should capture the influence of their cost structure. 
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35 Notice the differences between Ownnetwork and HHIPlat. While the former identiﬁes an 
entrant that bypasses the incumbent’s network (implying the duplication of networks), the 
latter reﬂects the presence of different technologies in the country, though not necessarily 
the duplication of networks. An example of market segmentation by technology is Belgium 
where the broadband lines in Flanders are usually cable, while in Wallonia there is a more 
intensive use of xDSL. 
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Unfortunately, our data set does not contain any information about the 
number of subscribers to each plan. Yet, the variable Penetration offers details 
of the number of subscribers in   each country for five different speed ranges. 
In the presence of economies of scale, we expect operators to set lower prices 
as they have a larger penetration and more subscribers to their plans. 
However, this effect may be moderated when the increase in penetration is 
achieved as a result of extending service coverage to high cost or low density 
areas. 
 
 
 
 
4. The data 
 
We use a panel data set of residential retail broadband offers in 15 European 
Member States for the period 2008 to 2011. The 15 countries considered 
group more than 80% of the total broadband access lines offered in   the EU-
27 during this period. On average, the data set contains around 550 offers per 
year and an overall total of 2204 observations (Table 1). The   sample includes 
the operators’ plans that group more than 90% of the broadband subscribers 
in each country. Most of our data are drawn from Quantum-Web Ltd. Data for 
the countries’ broadband penetration rates and socio-economic variables are   
provided by the European Commission Directorate General for 
Communications Networks, Content & Technology (DG-CONNECT), 
Eurostat, and the OECD. 
 
The units of the dependent variable Price are euros adjusted by the country’s 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Period 2008-2011
Variable Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum 
Values
Maximum 
Values
Price (euros) 2204 35.8 14.8 7.1 138.5
Price Single Broadband (euros) 909 30.3 12.3 7.3 82.5
Price Broadband and Voice (euros) 699 35.9 12.9 7.1 107.7
Price Broadband and TV (euros) 116 39.7 12.9 15.1 72.2
Price Broadband, Voice and TV (euros) 479 45.2 16.8 13.8 138.5
Price Metered Offers (euros) 410 36.7 14.7 7.1 79.8
Volume Cap (Gb) 410 64.0 135.9 0.4 1000
Download Speed (Mbps) 2204 23.8 32.6 0.1 500
Upstream Speed (Kbps) 2204 784.9 3444 0.1 60000
HHI Inter-platform 2204 63.6 17.2 38.0 100.0
Bitstream Access Index 2204 4.2 8.3 0.0 48.27
Direct Access Index 2204 32.1 44.7 0.2 171.7
Own Network access Index 2204 52.1 76.5 0.0 405.9
Source: Quantum Web-Ltd
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purchasing power parity (PPP). Information about the prices and the technical 
characteristics of the plans is obtained primarily from the operators’ web sites 
by Quantum-Web. The prices announced by operators might differ in some 
cases from those offered by operators via other sales channels (e.g.:  operators’ 
retail shops). Likewise, operators may offer discounts to retain their 
subscribers or to attract consumers away from their rivals.
36
 
 
We have separate information about the monthly prices announced on the 
operators’ websites and the landline rental. The sum of these two components 
is the monthly price of the Internet service considered in our estimations. 
Notice that xDSL operators usually present the monthly price and the landline 
rental separately in their offers, but cable modem and FTTx operators charge a 
single price. 
 
Quantum-Web also offers information about non-recurring charges associated 
with the service (installation costs, routers, antennas, etc.). Customers usually 
pay these charges as a lump-sum payment at the beginning of the contract. 
Operators might use these costs strategically in order to attract consumers. 
Indeed, they may hide the information about the costs of some devices, such 
as routers, or some services, such as roaming. In practice, broadband 
consumers may not learn all the details of the price structure until after they 
have contracted the service.37 
 
The inclusion of non-recurring costs in the price requires the use of some 
assumptions. On the one hand, we consider that all consumers incur these 
non-recurring costs, even those that are already subscribers to the operator. 
On the other hand, we assume an amortization period of 26 months for these 
costs, which is the average duration of the contracts in the EU according to 
the European Commission, 2011b.
38
 Taking into account the effect that these 
assumptions might have on the interpretation of our results, we present 
separate estimations of the model with and without the non-recurring costs. 
 

36 The prices do not include the additional charges that consumers with metered plans have 
to pay when they exceed their capacity limits. 
37 The relevance of this problem is studied in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). 
38 We have also estimated the model considering an amortization period of non-recurring 
costs of 24, 36 and 48 months, obtaining similar results for our key variables. The results of 
these estimations can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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The variables representing the downstream and upstream speeds are in 
logarithms. DowsntreamSpeed is measured in Mbps. The minimum speed in our 
sample is 0.128 Mbps and the maximum is 500 Mbps. However, a significant 
number of plans have a quality between 10 and 30 Mbps (Table 2). 
UpstreamSpeed is measured in Kbps. In our sample it ranges from 0.1 Kbps to 
60,000 Kbps. The difference between downstream and upstream speeds is 
usually great, although it is smaller in FTTx and cable modem plans. On the 
other hand, note that in some cases the speeds promoted by operators might 
differ greatly from the actual speeds obtained by households. These 
differences can depend on various aspects such as the distance of the 
household from the operator’s cabinet. Our data set only contains the 
information included on the operators’ web sites and unfortunately we are 
unable to analyse whether these speeds and those actually offered by 
operators differ significantly. 
 
The model also considers the technology used by the operators to provide the 
service. The variables xDSL, Cable and FTTx are dummy variables that take 
the value 1 when operators use these technologies to offer the service and 0 
otherwise.  It should be stressed that the downstream speed is related to the 
type of technology used to provide the service. Thus, xDSL cannot provide 
more than 30 Mbps, with the sole exception of VDSL which can reach 50 
Mbps. By contrast, cable supports speeds of up to 100 Mbps (DOCSIS3.0) 
and FTTx can attain download speeds of 1 Gbps. The possibility of bundling 
the broadband access with other services also depends on the technology. 
While xDSL is usually bundled with voice telephony, cable modem and FTTx 
are able to support high quality TV services. 
 


 
 
Broadband access can be bundled with other services and commercialized at a 
single price. To identify the effect of this commercial strategy on the price we 
have created four dummy variables: Stand-alone broadband represents single 
broadband plans, Internet and voice indicates when broadband is offered 
together with voice telephony; Internet and tv when it is offered with 
television; and Internet, voice and tv when broadband is bundled with both 
voice and television.39 
 
UnlimitedVolume is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for plans that offer 
unlimited downstream volume, and 0 for plans that have a volume cap.  For 
metered plans, the variable VolumeCap measures the maximum number of GBs 
that can be consumed without paying an extra charge. Consumers pay an 
‘overage charge’ when their consumption exceeds this limit, but as explained 
before we do not consider this charge in our analysis.40 
 
Competition and regulation are essential factors in understanding the 
operators’ pricing policy. Our data set contains information about the number 

39 In contrast with Wallsten and Riso (2010), we have no information about the number of 
channels in triple play packages. 
40 Metered plans charge for the additional capacity consumed. The extra charges are usually 
paid per GB or per a discrete number of extra GB, but some plans establish charges per day, 
hour or minute above the cap limit. In some cases, operators do not charge an extra fee   but   
the service experiences a sharp reduction in download speed once the cap has been exceeded 
(bandwidth throttling). 
 
Table 2: Residential Broadband Plans. Characteristics by Country in 2011
Observa-
tions
Number 
of 
Operators
Average 
Price 
(euros)
Average 
Download 
Speed 
(Mbps)
Average 
Upstream 
Speed 
(Mbps)
Bundling  
(% 
bundled 
plans)
Metered 
Offers 
(%)
Average 
Volume 
Cap 
(Gb)
Bitstream 
market 
share (%)
ULL 
market 
share 
(%)
Own 
Network 
market 
share 
(%)
Austria 71 7 39.6 29.9 2.1 58% 20% 58.4 1.9% 12.9% 24.7%
Belgium 32 5 42.6 20.2 2.1 34% 56% 25.5 4.7% 3.7% 37%
Denmark 12 3 25.9 27.3 2.7 58% 42% 208.3 7.1% 9.6% 21.7%
Finland 26 4 26.4 27.5 1.5 0% 4% 0.1 2.8% 1.9% 63.1%
France 46 5 34.3 52.9 4.9 93% - - 7.6% 43.2% 7%
Germany 55 10 26.6 28.2 1.4 65% 2% 1.8 6.8% 35.7% 12.4%
Greece 33 5 40.3 18.6 0.9 61% - - 1.9% 55.7% 0%
Ireland 38 4 38.1 17.3 1.2 55% 63% 29.2 19.6% 5.1% 25.8%
Italy 26 6 29.1 10.6 0.6 42% 15% 0.1 14.0% 29.5% 3.8%
Luxembourg 19 3 36.3 18.6 0.6 32% 16% 1.4 0.0% 11.2% 19.0%
Netherlands 60 9 39.3 29.6 3.0 53% - - 1.8% 13.1% 39.5%
Portugal 33 5 53.1 69.4 5.2 88% 39% 18.2 2.2% 9.4% 40.1%
Spain 47 7 56.9 20.9 1.1 89% 2% 0.0 5.7% 24.1% 17.6%
Sweden 53 5 28.7 36.9 9.6 32% - - 4.0% 13.7% 38.8%
UK 39 6 30.7 23.4 1.5 67% 31% 7.0 10.7% 37.7% 21.4%
Source: Quantum Web-Ltd
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of lines per operator in each country, classified according to technology and 
type of access. Moreover, the European Commission provides data about the 
different types of access at an aggregated country level. We use this 
information to construct the variables that measure the entry patterns at the 
country and at the operator levels. Bitstream is the entrants’ number of 
bitstream lines (Gig-ADSL or ADSL-IP) in the country divided by the 
incumbent’s number of lines. Direct access is the entrants’ number of direct 
access lines divided by the incumbent’s number of lines. Ownnetwork is the 
entrants’ number of own lines divided by the incumbent’s number of lines. As 
such, these indexes show the relevance of alternative entry patterns in relation 
to incumbent size. On the other hand, BitstreamO is the operator’s number of 
bitstream lines divided by its total number of lines, and DirectaccessO is the 
operator’s number of direct access divided by its total number of lines. 
 
We use other variables to measure the level of competition in each country. 
Incumbent is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the operator is the 
incumbent in the country and 0 otherwise. HHIPlat is the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index for each country, which is estimated by adding the sum of 
the squares of market shares by technology xDSL, cable, FTTx). On the other 
hand, NOffers is the number of offers commercialised by each operator in each 
country and in each year. 
 
Penetration is defined as the number of broadband subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants in a country. For this variable we use EU information for five   
downstream speed ranges: (1) below 2 Mbps, (2) 2–9.99 Mbps, (3) 10–29.99 
Mbps, (4) 30–99.99 Mbps, and (5) above 100 Mbps (ultrafast speed). The last 
two ranges are usually provided by cable or FTTx, although the VDSL can   
also support speeds up to 50 Mbps. 
 
Finally, the pricing equation includes country-fixed effects and year dummies, 
to account for the unobserved heterogeneity in each national market and to 
control for the evolution of prices during the period studied. 
 
For illustrative purposes, Table 2 shows some characteristics of the broadband 
plans for each country in 2011. The table highlights across-country differences 
in terms of price and downloads speed. Direct observation of these statistics 
suggests that price differences may be explained by differences in the 
download speeds, but also by other factors such as bundling and volume caps. 
	
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The econometric analysis conducted in the next section seeks to identify the 
main factors determining the operators’ prices. 
 
 
5. Empirical strategy and results 
 
This section presents an econometric multivariate analysis of the factors 
influencing broadband Internet access prices. We estimated the pricing 
equation using two procedures: ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage 
least squares (2SLS-IV).41 
 
 
5.1. Methodology 
 
The estimation of our model using OLS can result in a problem of endogeneity 
because a country’s broadband prices can influence the number of subscribers. 
Indeed, we verified that the Hausman test for the exogeneity of the variable 
Penetration is rejected at the 1% significance level (Table 3). In such a case, the 
OLS coefficients of Penetration could be biased downwards, and so we might 
erroneously conclude that penetration has a smaller effect on price than it 
actually does. In order to solve this problem we used instrumental variable 
techniques and we examined different socio-economic variables as potential 
instruments for Penetration. The instruments should be variables that are 
correlated with the penetration of the broadband service but uncorrelated with 
the error term in Eq.(1). We considered using the following variables as   
instruments: GDPpc – the gross domestic product per capita; Unemployment – 
the percentage of people unemployed in the country; Density –  the number of  
inhabitants in  the country divided by its  area in  square kilometers; Digitalskills 
– the proportion of  the population having at least low digital skills;42 and PC – 
the percentage of personal computers per household. We also considered using 
the lags of the variable Penetration as instruments. Data for GDP, Unemployment 
and Density were obtained from Eurostat, Digitalskills from the Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard (DG-CONNECT) and PC penetration from the OECD 

41 Our model includes country ﬁxed effects.  We have ruled out the use of a random effects 
model because the unobserved heterogeneity (the unobserved ﬁrm or country 
characteristics) is correlated with the explanatory variables in the pricing equation. 
42 The European Commission defines digital skills as ‘‘the confident analytical use of 
information society technology (IST) for work, leisure, learning and communication’’. 
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broadband statistics. 
 
We expect GDPpc, Density, Digitalskills and PC to have a positive effect on the 
adoption of Internet and Unemployment to have a negative effect. GDPpc should 
be a good instrument because it affects Internet penetration but it should not 
influence the operators’ pricing strategy. In addition, both Price and GDPpc 
were adjusted by the country’s PPP so as to account for differences in the cost 
of living across EU countries. Density should be related to the historical 
deployment of telecommunications networks and should affect the coverage of 
Internet. However, we do not expect the prices set by operators to be affected 
by the density at the national level. As for Digitalskills, we expect the percentage 
of the population with some knowledge in the use of ICTs to be related to 
Internet penetration, but digital skills in the country should not be related to 
the operators’ pricing policies. Similarly, PC should have a positive effect on 
the adoption of Internet but we do not expect an impact of PC on broadband 
prices since computers have other uses aside from accessing the Internet and 
because there are other devices such as laptops, notebooks, tablets and mobile 
phones that can be used to access the Internet. 
 
Table 3 presents the econometric tests that examine the suitability of our 
panel of candidates for instruments. All the specifications considered passed 
Hansen’s J test for over-identifying restrictions. Moreover, we applied the 
instrument suitability tests (the F-statistic in the first stage regression of the 
variable Penetration) to verify that the instruments are strong. In spite of this, 
notice that Hansen’s J test has a lower p-value when we   consider the GDPpc.  
Taking this into account, we eventually chose as instruments Unemployment, 
Density, Digitalskills and PC in order to maintain the efficiency of the model. 
 
Likewise, it should be noted that the competition and regulatory variables 
might also be affected by an endogeneity problem since the entrants’ entry 
patterns could be determined simultaneously with prices. Yet, a high value for   
Bitstream, Directaccess and Ownnetwork might also reflect the greater efficiency of 
entrants, or the fact that consumers consider that entrants offer a better 
service. To account for this situation, the model includes country fixed effects 
to capture the unobserved characteristics that influence the efficiency of 
operators and, eventually, the retail prices. Examples of these unobserved 
effects include investments, administrative constraints, and state aid plans that 
are specific to each country. 

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5.2. Estimation results 
 
Table 4 reports the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the pricing equation. We 
present three specifications for the OLS regression: Specification 1 considers 
the technical characteristics of the offers and the commercial strategies of the 
operators; Specification 2 also includes the competition and regulatory 
variables at the country level and Penetration,43 and Specification 3 adds the 
access variables at the operator level. We also show three specifications of the 
model estimated with 2SLS. Specification 4 considers all the variables except 
the access variables at the operator level, Specification 5 considers all 
variables, and Specification 6 considers all variables when prices include the 
non-recurring costs. All specifications include country fixed effects and year 
dummy variables. 
 
The estimates of the pricing equation are robust to the alternative 
specifications considered. Moreover, most of the coefficients in the 
regressions are significant and their signs are in line with our predictions. In 
the case of Penetration we find that the coefficient is negative and significant, 
except in Specification 4 when we do not include the access variables at the 
operator level.
44
 Observe also that the Penetration coefficient is larger, in 
absolute terms, when we apply 2SLS-IV (Specifications 4 to 6) than in the 
OLS regression (Specifications 1 to 3), which suggests that the OLS Penetration 
coefficient is biased downwards (β̃Penetration-OLS= -0.008 compared to β̃Penetration-
2SLS=-0.011). The 2SLS Penetration coefficient shows that a one percentage 
point increase in the penetration level is followed by a 1.1% fall in price.45 
 

43 Since the dependent variable Price is included in logs, Penetration is interpreted as a semi-
elasticity. 
44 The computed standard errors are robust to any bias from heteroskedasticity and they are 
also clustered according to observations from the same country. We tested for 
multicollinearity using the variance inflator factor (VIF) obtaining values below 3.  
45 We also estimated the model using the lagged Penetration variable as our instrument. We 
found that this instrument mitigates the endogeneity problem although not completely.  
Nevertheless, it confirms that the simultaneity bias of the Penetration coefficient is 
downwards. 
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As expected, DownstreamSpeed increases broadband prices. Specifically, a 10% 
increase in speed raises broadband prices by around 1.3%. On the other hand, 
the coefficient of UpstreamSpeed is not significant. 
 
Table 3: Endogeneity test for Penetration 
Hausman endogeneity test. Ho: 
Penetration  exogenous p-value= 0.0000  
Instruments for Penetration
GDPpc, 
Unemployment, 
Density, 
Digitalskills, PC  
GDPpc, Density, 
Digitalskills, PC  
Unemployment, 
Density, 
Digitalskills, PC
Density, 
Digitalskills, PC  
Test Test Result 1 Test Result 2 Test Result 3 Test Result 4
Hansen J test. Ho: instruments exogenousp-value=0.1079 p-value=0.0578 p-value=0.9263 p-value=0.4993
Validity of Instruments Ho: weak instrump-value=0.0000 p-value=0.0000 p-value= 0.0000 p-value=0.0001
Table 4: Estimation Results (OLS and 2SLS): All Broadband Plans 
Dependent variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6
Log Price (Price) OLS OLS OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Penetration  - -0.006** -0.008*** -0.008 -0.011** -0.011**
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.138) (0.03) (0.023)
Log Speed (DownstreamSpeed) 0.145*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.132*** 0.127*** 0.122***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Upstream (UpstreamSpeed) 0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 -0.006
(0.759) (0.973) (0.857) (0.962) (0.724) (0.776)
Technology dummy  (reference: xDSL)       
     Cable -0.091 -0.111** -0.098 -0.118*** -0.108 -0.087
(0.117) (0.046) (0.266) (0.01) (0.166) (0.27)
     FTTx -0.045 -0.066 -0.074 -0.072** -0.085** -0.073*
(0.263) (0.128) (0.128) (0.044) (0.032) (0.071)
UnlimitedVolume 0.133* 0.143** 0.148** 0.144** 0.150** 0.140**
(0.073) (0.045) (0.036) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017)
VolumeCap 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005* 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0004**
(0.047) (0.034) (0.053) (0.016) (0.028) (0.047)
Bundling (reference: stand-alone broadband)      
     Internet and voice 0.115*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 0.118*** 0.118***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     Internet and tv 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.169*** 0.173***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     Internet, voice and tv 0.323*** 0.304*** 0.310*** 0.304*** 0.310*** 0.313***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
VoIP -0.014 -0.038 -0.060* -0.038 -0.060* -0.068**
(0.727) (0.245) (0.086) (-0.200) (0.046) (0.032)
Incumbent 0.145*** 0.120*** 0.138* 0.118*** 0.136** 0.154**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.071) (0.000) (0.042) (0.023)
HHIPlat - 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.004
 (0.195) (0.373) (0.158) (0.343) (0.339)
Bitstream - 0.482** 0.535** 0.479*** 0.526*** 0.420**
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013)
Directaccess - -0.212** -0.301*** -0.204*** -0.288*** -0.260***
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Ownnetwork - 0.093 -0.089 0.089 -0.107 -0.055
 (0.736) (0.768) (0.735) (0.708) (0.836)
BitstreamO - - 0.067 - 0.066 0.075
  (0.254)  (0.224) (0.188)
DirectaccessO - - -0.014 - -0.010 0.014
  (0.874)  (0.900) (0.861)
NOffers - 0.012** 0.014** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.015***
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 3.283*** 2.855*** 3.142*** 2.882*** 3.200*** 3.195***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R
2
0.556 0.570 0.593 0.569 0.591 0.591
Number of observations (N) 2204 2204 2003 2204 2003 2003
Note: All specifications include country and year dummies which are not reported for brevity.  Year dummies are not statistically significant. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country. P-values are in parenthesis. Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level.  
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As for technologies, xDSL appears to be more expensive than cable modem 
and FTTx, although the coefficient of cable is not significant in Specifications 
5 and 6. Fibre and cable modem technologies can provide higher speeds and 
better quality than xDSL, but this might not be sufficient to enable operators 
to charge higher prices per Mbps. Such a situation might reduce the operators’ 
incentives to invest in New Generation Access Networks (NGAs) and 
constitutes an obstacle to the authorities’ objective of promoting the extension 
of broadband networks. One explanation for this finding is that xDSL is often 
the only available technology in many locations. Operators using xDSL can   
set a higher price per Mbps because they only face competition from cable 
modem and fibre in specific locations, whereas cable modem and fibre 
operators are usually present in densely populated areas where there are   
several competitors. A complementary explanation is that cable and fibre 
operators commercialize plans with a higher downstream speed and cannot   
establish a proportional increase in prices. 
 
As for the operators’ commercial strategies, plans with unlimited download 
capacity have prices that are around 15% higher than those with download 
restrictions. In the case of metered plans, the coefficient of the variable 
VolumeCap is positive and significant but very small. Indeed, one additional 
GB increases the price of the metered plan by 0.05%. We also find that 
bundles of broadband and other services are more expensive than stand-alone 
broadband plans. Plans combining broadband with voice and broadband with 
TV are 13% and 18% more expensive than standalone plans, respectively.46 
On the other hand, plans that combine broadband, voice telephony and 
television are 36% more expensive. By contrast, plans that include broadband 
and voice over IP are about 6% cheaper. 
 
Competition variables also offer interesting results. Incumbents’ plans are 
around 15% more expensive than entrants’ plans, which might be explained by 
the formers’ dominant position in the market and/or by the existence of an 
“umbrella effect”. As explained above, when the regulatory authorities ban 
price squeezes, vertically integrated incumbents might raise their retail prices 
and generate “price umbrellas” for their competitors. Noffers exhibit a positive 
effect on prices, suggesting that firms can set higher prices when they are 

46 The coefficients of dummy variables in semi-logarithms models are interpreted as the 
percentage difference of 100 exponential [(coefficient)-1] with respect to the reference 
(Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). 
 


better able to screen consumers. We also find that technological 
concentration, measured with the variable HHIPlat, has a positive sign but it is 
not significant in any specification.  
 
Specifications 2-6 show that country entry patterns are a factor that explains 
broadband prices. In particular, we find that the intensity in the use of 
Bitstream at the country level has a positive effect on broadband prices and that 
the use of Directaccess (LLU) reduces prices. On the other hand, the estimations 
reveal that Ownetwork does not have a significant statistical effect. It is also 
interesting to highlight that the coefficient associated with Bitstream almost 
doubles that associated with Directaccess. Indeed, with an increase of 0.1 units in 
the Bitstream index there is an increase of 5% in the price of the plan, whereas 
with the same increase in the Directaccess index there is a reduction of 3% in the 
price. This implies that with an equivalent change in these variables there will 
be a greater price reaction with Bitstream. One explanation is that LLU allows 
operators to differentiate their products and to develop their own commercial 
strategies, which may imply smaller price reductions for equivalent levels of 
entry. Finally, the coefficients of BitstreamO and DirectaccessO have the expected 
sign, but they are very small and are not significant. All in all, these results 
imply that the operators’ pricing policies are influenced by the entry patterns 
present in the country, but that they do not respond to their own network 
configuration.  
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Our analysis in the previous section shows that two key factors – operators’ 
bundling strategies and their entry patterns in a country – are essential for 
understanding the way in which operators set their prices. Below we discuss 
them in more detail. 
 
 
6.1. Bundling strategies 
 
A commercial policy widely adopted by telecom operators is that of bundling 
several services together in the same offer. Our estimations in the previous 
section considered all the plans offered to consumers and we included several 
dummy variables in the pricing equation to identify the effects of bundling 

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(Table 4). In spite of this, it could be considered that operators use different 
commercial strategies when setting the prices of standalone and bundled 
plans. For example, they could set the prices taking into account that each 
type of plan is addressed to consumers with different quality preferences or 
different willingness to pay. They could also use different technologies in each 
type of service. In order to analyse this situation, we have re-estimated the 
model in Eq. (1) separating standalone and bundled plans. Below we explain 
that the main results obtained in Table 4 are robust to this alternative 
estimation strategy.
47
 
 
Table 5 shows the estimates of the pricing equation when we separate 
standalone broadband and bundles of broadband and voice telephony.  In the 
2SLS-IV estimations, Penetration is instrumented by the same group of socio-
demographic variables as before, but now we obtain that the coefficient is only 
significant for the case of stand-alone broadband.
48
 By contrast, the coefficient 
of HHIPlat is now significant for standalone plans, indicating that a higher 
concentration of one technological platform (i.e., less inter-platform 
competition) raises prices per Mbps. 
 
As for the variables that reflect the operators’ entry patterns, we obtain similar 
results to those in Table 4. The coefficients associated with Bitstream and 
Directaccess maintain the same sign for both OLS and 2SLS-IV estimations, 
although Directaccess is now not significant for bundled offers. Notice also that 
the variable DirectaccessO is negative and significant for broadband plans, which 
implies that operators that make an intensive use of this type of entry set lower 
prices. 
 
At this point, it is interesting to discuss the factors that might serve as 
incentives to operators to commercialize bundles. The economic literature 
reports that bundling enables operators to price discriminate between 
customers and it allows them to extract a larger part of the consumer 
surplus.
49
 Bundling can also generate cost savings due to the presence of 
economies of scale and scope in the production of the services. Finally, 

47 Wallsten and Riso (2010) adopt a similar approach when analysing bundling. 
48  The penetration information we use is based on the whole sample given that it is not  
possible to  distinguish between penetration rates that depend on bundled plans, on  the  one  
hand, and those that depend on unbundled plans, on the  other. 
49 See for example Adams and Yellen (1976), Evans and Salinger (2005), McAfee, McMillan 
and Whinston (1989), Nalebuff (2004), and Prince and Greenstein (2014). 
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bundling acts as a “lock-in” strategy that increase the operators’ market power. 
From the consumers’ perspective, bundles can also be attractive because they 
might mean lower prices and they might reduce nuisance (i.e., consumers 
receive a single bill and have a unique customer helpline). 
In our data set, stand-alone offers represent 41% of all the plans, bundles that 
combine broadband and voice account for 32% of the plans, and bundles of 
broadband and TV represent only 5% of all the plans, and are mainly sold by 
cable operators or xDSL incumbents. Triple packages (broadband, voice and 
TV) represent 22% of the plans and are the preferred combination of cable 
operators. It would be very useful to know the number of subscribers to each 
type of plan, but as pointed out above, this information is not available. 
The lack of information about the consumption patterns of Internet users in 
each country and about the operators’ costs prevents us from studying the 
bundling decisions of operators in more detail. In spite of this, Table 6 
illustrates the differences in the bundling strategies of incumbents and entrants 
in the 15 countries studied. Direct inspection of the table shows that 
incumbents use xDSL in 92% of their plans, and that 39% of these are 
standalone plans. By contrast, entrants use xDSL in 50% of their plans, cable 
modem in 37% and fibre in the remaining 13%. Interestingly, regardless of the 
technology, around 40% of the entrants’ plans are standalone plans. This 
implies that on aggregate terms incumbents and entrants differ in the type of 
technology offered, but both of them use a similar mix of bundled and 
unbundled plans. 
Finally, we ran different regressions that consider the effect of competition and 
the entry patterns on the percentage of bundled plans offered by firms.
50  
 
While we can certainly not interpret the coefficients of these simple cross-
sectional regressions as causal, we have found that bundling is positively 
related with the intensity in the use of direct access at the operator and country 
level, and this result is robust to different model specifications. This result is in 
line with the intuition that LLU enables entrants to use innovative and 
diversified commercial practices. 
 
 

50 These estimations are restricted to xDSL plans and are available from the authors. First, 
we analysed a linear model that examines the proportion of bundled broadband plans 
offered by each operator and, then, we estimated a logistic model to analyse the factors 
influencing the operators´ decisions to offer bundles. 
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6.2. Entry pattern 
 
One of the main results that emerges from our analysis is that broadband 
prices are higher in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream 
entry and lower in countries where they make a more intensive use of direct 
access. Moreover, each entry pattern has a different effect on broadband 
prices. Thus, for example, in Specification 5 of Table 4, we found that 
β̃Bitstream=0.526 and β̃Directaccess=-0.288, which illustrates the greater sensitivity 
of prices to bitstream access. This result can be accounted for by the fact that 
direct access requires entrants to make major investments and because it 
allows operators to differentiate their products (Nardotto, Valletti and 
Verboven, 2012). Thus, for an equivalent increase in the use of these access 
mechanisms, the prices show a greater reaction to the increase in Bitstream. 
In recent years, access-charge regulations in the EU Member States have been 
designed to acts an incentive to the progressive increase in the investments 
made by entrants, but very little is known about how this regulatory strategy 
affects retail prices. Most NRAs have followed the LOI approach, which 
involves setting higher access prices for bitstream so as to induce entrants to 
use direct access (Cave, 2006; Höffler, 2007; Bourreau et al., 2010). This 
measure has been effective in forcing the migration from bitstream access 
lines to LLU, but it has not been sufficient to encourage entrants to deploy 
their own networks (Bacache et al., 2014). Our paper shows that the 
application of the LOI has also had important implications for broadband 
prices. The LOI implies higher costs for the operators using bitstream, but 
even operators that have a small dependence of the incumbents’ networks can   
set high prices if they observe that in the country there is a high prevalence of 
bitstream access and consider that this weakens competition. This finding 
should be taken into account by the authorities when they regulate the 
wholesale broadband market. 
 
Our results also suggest that, during the period analysed, intra-platform facility-
based-competition was more effective in reducing prices than was intra-
platform service-based-competition. On the other hand, only when we 
analysed stand-alone broadband plans separately did we observe that inter-
platform competition generated lower prices (see the coefficient of HHIPlat in 
Table 5). 
 


Cable modem and FTTx plans involve lower prices per Mbps than those 
charged by xDSL plans, but these technologies also offer more downstream 
speed and additional services such as TV, which increase the final price paid by 
consumers. A further aspect that should be considered when interpreting our 
results is that although we introduced the HHIPlat index at the national level to 
measure the relevance of the inter-platform competition, cable modem and 
fibre are usually only present in certain regions or locations of a country. As a 
consequence, even if the HHIPlat index is low in the country there might be 
little competition between technologies.            
              
 
Table 5: Estimation Results (OLS and 2SLS): Stand-alone Broadband and Bundles
Dependent variable
Log Price (Price) OLS 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Penetration -0.007*** -0.024*  -0.006*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.081)  (0.006) (0.894)
Log Speed (DownloadSpeed) 0.131*** 0.116***  0.132*** 0.142***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)
Log Upstream (UpstreamSpeed) 0.027 0.005  -0.038 -0.033
(0.383) (0.843)  (0.267) (0.259)
Technology dummy  (reference: xDSL)      
     Cable -0.071 -0.123  -0.157** -0.146**
(0.617) (0.341)  (0.022) (0.015)
     FTTx -0.122* -0.185**  -0.049 -0.039
(0.068) (0.028)  (0.45) (0.499)
UnlimitedVolume 0.110 0.115*  0.219* 0.221**
(0.113) (0.096)  (0.062) (0.031)
VolumeCap 0.0002 0.0002  0.0006** 0.0007***
(0.512) (0.585)  (0.015) (0.003)
VoIP - -  -0.091* -0.090**
   (0.071) (0.044)
Incumbent 0.185 0.164  0.088 0.087
(0.150) (0.133)  (0.218) (0.174)
HHIPlat 0.010* 0.010**  0.005 0.005
(0.094) (0.018)  (0.429) (0.454)
Bitstream 0.727** 0.697**  0.404** 0.396***
(0.036) (0.014)  (0.017) (0.008)
Directaccess -0.618*** -0.537***  -0.111 -0.117
(0.008) (0.004)  (0.423) (0.396)
Ownnetwork -0.749 -0.753  0.303 0.354
(0.185) (0.131)  (0.479) (0.389)
BitstreamO 0.199 0.190  -0.071 -0.077
(0.156) (0.141)  (0.403) (0.321)
DirectaccessO 0.078 0.078  -0.122* -0.129**
(0.565) (0.545)  (0.051) (0.017)
NOffers 0.004 0.004  0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.696) (0.651)
Constant 2.854*** 3.087***  3.224*** 3.175***
(0.5527) (0.5099) (0.5361) (0.484)
R
2
0.512 0.440 0.608 0.603
Number of observations (N) 796 796 631 631
Stand-alone Broadband  Broadband + Fixed Voice 
Note: All specifications include country and year dummies which are not reported for brevity.  Year dummies 
are not statistically significant. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country. P-
values are in parenthesis. Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has analysed the determinants of the prices of broadband Internet 
access in 15 countries of the EU between 2008 and 2011. Our econometric 
model focused on three types of variables: (1) the technical characteristics of 
the plans; (2) the operators’ commercial strategies; and (3) the regulation and 
competition in the country. Besides, we controlled for the potential 
endogeneity of broadband penetration by using the instrumental variable 
approach (2SLS-IV) and employed as instruments a group of socio- economic 
variables. 
 
Our analysis reveals that downstream speed is a significant driver of the price 
in broadband plans: a 10% increase in the download speed causes prices to rise 
by around 1.3%. Additionally, the price per Mbps of cable modem and fibre 
technologies is lower than that of xDSL, although the plans that use these 
technologies usually offer higher download speeds and bundle broadband 
access with voice telephony and/or television. In this context, an important   
policy question that emerges is whether consumer willingness to pay for cable 
modem and fibre plans is sufficiently high to encourage operators to invest in 
NGAs. 
 
The operators’ marketing strategies also play an important role in determining 
the prices. When the broadband service is bundled with voice telephony, the 
price increases by more than 10% and when it is bundled with both voice 
telephony and television it increases by around 36%. By contrast, when 
consumers contract the voice service through VoIP they obtain some price 
reductions. An interesting question for future research would be to examine 
the factors that act as an incentive to operators to offer bundled services and 
Bundling (Incumbent/Entrant) xDSL Cable Modem FTTx Total plans  (I/E)
Single Broadband (I/E) * 204 (39%) / 352 (43%) 0/ 257 (42%) 16 (40%) /80 (37%) 220 (39%) / 689 (42%)
Broadband & Voice (I/E) * 148 (28%) / 350 (43%) 0 / 125 (20%) 12 (30%) / 64 (30%) 160 (28%) / 539 (33%)
Broadband and TV (I/E) * 41 (8%) / 6 (1%) 4 (100%) / 46 (8%) 4 (10%) / 19 (9%) 49 (9%) / 67 (4%)
Broadband, Voice and TV (I/E) * 130 (25%) / 105 (13%) 0 / 184 (30%) 8 (20%)/ 53 (25%) 138 (24%) / 342 (21%)
Total Plans  (I/E) ^ 523 (92%) / 813 (50%) 4 (1%)/ 608 (37%) 40 (7%) / 216 (13%) 567 (100%) / 1637 (100%)
Table 6: Number of Plans (Percentanges) by type of  Bundle across Technologies and Incumbent and Entrants (I/E)
* The percentages in brackets for bundles are measured with respect to the number of plans for each technology.                                         
^ The  percentages in brackets  of all plans by technology are calculated with respect to the total number of plans.
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to analyse the effects of these practices on the level of competition. 
 
The paper has also contributed to the literature that analyses the effects of 
access regulation in the broadband market. We show that broadband prices are 
higher in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream access and 
lower in countries making greater use of LLU. We find little evidence that 
inter-platform competition and stand-alone entry (the last rung on the ‘‘ladder 
of investment’’ approach) reduce prices. Operators that rely mainly on their 
own networks might be offering high quality products that are more expensive 
or that experience less competition. All in all, our results confirm the benefits 
of facilitating the migration from bitstream to LLU entry, but they are less 
conclusive regarding the relevance of inter-platform competition for prices. 
 
One limitation of our study is that we have not considered mobile broadband 
plans offered via smartphones or dongles. Mobile broadband demand is 
booming and future research should consider its impact on the prices of fixed 
and mobile broadband plans. For example, a rising number of operators are 
currently offering packages of mobile and fixed broadband services and this 
might modify the pricing strategies of operators and competition. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Pricing strategies and competition in the mobile broadband 
market 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses how mobile operators set the prices of mobile broadband 
plans. Mobile services have experienced an extraordinary growth worldwide. 
In 2012, the number of mobile phone users reached 4.4 billion and the 
penetration rate of mobile lines was 89% (6.6 billion SIM cards). The 
development of mobile contents and mobile applications has produced 
important changes in the communications habits of the population. In 
addition to making phone calls, consumers use smartphones to make video-
conferences, navigate web pages, share files such as pictures and high 
definition videos, and play online games. As a result, nowadays an important 
part of the revenues generated by operators are originated by data traffic 
rather than by phone calls and SMS messages. This increase of data traffic has 
made necessary to deploy 3G and 4G networks in order to offer more 
download capacity to users.51  
 
The transformation of the mobile market has led operators to introduce 
complex tiered pricing schemes with the objective of improving traffic 
management and of extracting the maximum surplus from consumers. Under 
tiered pricing, operators offer a menu of plans with a certain data allowance 
per month at a fixed rate. The plans include overage charges for the case in 
which consumers exceed data caps. They also offer minute allowances to make 
phone calls and might specify the speed of the service. Some operators also 
offer unlimited usage plans for heavy users of broadband services.  
The use of this pricing structure has generated an important debate in the 
sector that has found an audience in antitrust authorities (Lyons, 2013). While 
some consumers associations and large content providers have alerted that 
monthly consumption limits creates artificial scarcity and allow operators to 

51 Indeed, although the first smartphones appeared in the nineties, its widespread adoption 
has been possible with the introduction of new generation wireless networks. 
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reduce future network upgrades, supporters of usage broadband pricing claim 
that this policy align costs to the intensity of use and shifts more network 
costs onto heavier users. Indeed, with a flat rate all users contribute equally to 
cover the network’s costs, although heavier consumers use more of the 
network capacity. By contrast, usage-based tariffs can reduce the cost of 
lighter users and promote Internet adoption. Moreover, it alleviates network 
congestion and promotes an efficient use of broadband capacity. The 
objective of this paper is to contribute to this debate by empirically analyse 
what drives operators pricing strategies and to understand price differences 
across countries (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Average price ($PPP) for smartphone plans with a volume 
allowance between 1GB and 5GB and unlimited voice minutes, year 2013 
 
Note: The monthly all-inclusive price reflects the average price per month, 
including rebates and other fees, but excluding the cost of the device. Brazil, 
Greece and Turkey have been excluded from this figure because their data are 
inconsistent from year to year.  
Source: FCC, 2015. 
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Our study draws on a rich dataset of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) that contains 2,909 plans released by mobile network 
operators (MNOs) in 37 countries around the globe during the period 2011-
2014. We construct a variable for the monthly price of each plan that includes 
activation costs, promotions and rebates. We then analyse the commercial 
strategy of mobile operators by estimating a price equation that takes into 
account several characteristics of the plans such as volume allowances 
(gigabytes), overage charges, download speeds, voice minutes allowances and 
the purchase of smartphones. We use multivariate regression techniques to 
study how operators design their plans. Specifically, we estimate the pricing 
equation by using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least squares 
(2SLS). The instrumental estimation allows us treat for the potential 
endogeneity of mobile broadband penetration in the right hand side of the 
equation. 
 
Consumers’ heterogeneity in preferences over the broadband service, 
telephone calls and smartphones has resulted on a wide array of bundling 
strategies. Our analysis shows that operators use multi-tier pricing schemes to 
segment consumers according to their needs and their willingness to pay for 
data traffic (second degree price discrimination). They offer plans with 
different volume allowances and offer volume discounts to promote 
consumption. We show that an increase in one gigabyte in the data cap would 
have a positive impact of almost 10% on the monthly price paid by the 
customer, but plans with large volume allowances have lower prices per 
gigabyte.
52
 Although most mobile plans limit data traffic to a few gigabytes, 
some operators also offer unlimited data plans at significantly higher prices to 
attract heavy users. Another dimension that differentiates the plans is the 
speed of the service. An increase of 10 Mbps in download speed implies an 
average 2% rise in prices. Interestingly, while in the case of fixed broadband 
plans the main segmentation strategy is the download speed, for mobile 
broadband plans the most relevant feature to segment consumers is the 
volume allowance.53 This may be a consequence of the limitations that 
imposes the wireless technology. 

52 Cisco estimated that in 2012 the average data traffic for smartphones was 342 MB per 
month, although they expect a rapid increase in the next years.  See Cisco Visual Networking 
Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2012-2017, White Paper, February 2013. 
53 The ITU in its report “Measuring the Information Society 2013” analyses mobile 
broadband prices and mentions that data allowances are the main driver for mobile 
broadband plans. 
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In the case of volume metered plans, operators use different types of penalties 
for the consumers that exceed the contracted volume allowance. All 
consumers pay the same flat rate for the service up to the contracted data cap, 
and heavier users have to pay a penalty when they consume beyond the cap. 
The penalty can consist in a reduction in the speed of the service or in the 
interruption of the service until the next month. Quite often, however, 
consumers are switched to a new volume allowance or are billed an overage 
charge for each additional gigabyte consumed. We have found that all these 
types of penalties have similar effects in the monthly price paid by consumers, 
although in the case of monetary penalties heavy users have to pay a 
supplement when they exceed the data cap. Notice that these overage charges 
may cause unexpected high bills for consumers, either because they have a 
poor understanding of the pricing arrangements included in the contract or 
because they are unable to track how charges are accumulating under their 
plans.  
 
Most plans bundle the broadband service with the telephone calls. We 
measure the effect of the inclusion of voice minutes in the price of the plan, 
although we are unable to observe if bundling reduces the prices of telephone 
calls compared to the plans that only offer the stand-alone voice service. It is 
worth mentioning that nowadays most operators use a tier scheme for 
telephone calls, instead of the pay-per-use schemes that were applied a few 
years ago. The plans do not distinguish between on-net and off-net calls, or 
between fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls. This reflects the change 
in the communication habits of the population, and might also be a 
consequence of the regulation of the termination charges. 
  
Another contribution of the paper is to analyse the possibility given by 
operators to acquire a smartphone along with the contract of the broadband 
service. Operators offer consumers different options for financing 
smartphones: they can pay upfront the price of the smartphones at the 
beginning of the contract, or they can pay an extra charge in their monthly bill 
during the life of the contract. In the two cases consumers usually pay a lower 
price for the smartphone than if they were buying it directly from the 
manufacturer or from an independent dealer. In spite of this, our empirical 
model shows that the discounts offered by operators for the smartphones are 
partly compensated with a higher price paid for the broadband service. We 
also show that the monthly price for the broadband service is more expensive 
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if consumers purchase iPhone and Samsung handsets. By contrast, the plans 
that bundle the broadband service with other handsets do not show a 
significant price difference with respect to only SIM plans. This result suggests 
that operators might use the brand of the smartphone to identify the 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the broadband service (third degree price 
discrimination).  Although this can also reflect the higher costs of these 
handsets or the lower bargaining power of operators in front of these 
manufacturers. Indeed, some operators have negotiated exclusivity contracts 
with handset manufacturers, which might result in higher prices for the 
broadband service in equilibrium.54  
 
In the last part of the paper we examine if the structure of the mobile market 
and regulation have affected the prices set by operators. For this objective, we 
consider a sub-sample of 20 EU countries for which we have obtained 
information about the market characteristics from the European Commission 
Directorate General for Communications Networks (DG-CONNECT). 
Nowadays, in the EU the regulation determines the entry conditions of mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNOs) that use the spectrum of MNOs. Our 
analysis shows that the entry of MVNOs in national markets might have 
fostered MNOs to lower their tariffs. National regulators also regulate the 
termination prices (MTRs) that mobile operators charge to their rivals for 
terminating their telephone calls, but we do not find any evidence that this 
regulation has affected the retail prices. We explain that this can be a 
consequence of the new consumption patterns in the mobile market 
(transition from voice to data usage) and to the “glide-path” regulation applied 
to termination charges. Finally, we find that market concentration has a 
positive, but not significant, effect on broadband prices.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
economic literature that analyses the broadband market and the pricing 
strategies of operators. Section 3 outlines our estimation strategy. Section 4 
describes the data set. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy and the results. 
Section 6 discusses the effects of competition and regulation on prices. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes. 

54 Exclusive contracts between mobile operators and smartphone manufacturers can soften 
price competition and pressure prices upward (Sinkinson, 2014). Examples of these types of 
contracts in the US are of the AT&T and iPhone exclusive contract between 2007 and 2011, 
and the exclusive contract between the first touch screen Blackberry with Verizon.  
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2. Literature review 
Our research contributes to the empirical literature analysing broadband 
Internet prices in the telecommunications market. An important part of the 
literature on broadband Internet access has focused on the factors influencing 
the penetration of fixed broadband. Several papers have examined the effect 
of inter-platform and intra-platform competition in the adoption of fixed 
broadband (Distaso, Lupi and Manenti, 2006; Bouckaert, Van Dijk and 
Verboven, 2010; Pereira and Ribeiro, 2010; Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler, 2013; 
Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2013, Grzybowski and Dauvin, 2014). Other 
papers have analysed the effects of regulation of access charges and 
unbundling in the investment decision of fixed telecommunication operators 
(Grajek and Röller, 2012; Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven, 2014; Bacache, M., 
M. Bourreau and G. Gaudin, 2013).  
 
The literature has devoted much less attention to examine the adoption of 
mobile broadband. Westlund and Bohlin (2008) analyse mobile Internet 
adoption and consumption in Sweden and show that user-friendliness and 
transmission speed are important determinants for the development of the 
service. Lee, Marcu and Lee (2011) employ a logistic diffusion model to 
analyse the drivers of broadband diffusion in a group of 26 OECD countries 
in the period 2003-2008. They find that standardization policies and 
population density are essential factors for the initial diffusion of the service. 
They also find that fixed and mobile broadband are complementary services in 
OECD countries. Srinuan, Srinuan and Bohlin (2012a) analyse the mobile 
internet access in Thailand using a binomial logit regression. The authors find 
that age, living area and availability of fixed telephony are amongst the 
significant drivers of mobile internet access. Finally, Srinuan, Srinuan and 
Bohlin (2012b) consider a panel data of Finish households in 2009, and using 
a multinomial logit model find that mobile Internet adoption is more likely 
among male, with a big family size that stays in renting apartment or in a 
cooperative apartment. They also explain that while xDSL customers do not 
perceive wireless technologies as a substitute, cable modem and fibre 
customers do so.55  

55 It is important to take into account that during the period of time considered in these 
studies mobile Internet services were at their infancy. 
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The analysis of broadband prices has also focussed in the fixed broadband 
service. Wallsten and Riso (2010) examine the prices of broadband plans in a 
group of 30 OECD countries between 2007 and 2009. They find that in this 
period downstream speed had a positive effect on prices, that plans with bit 
caps were on average cheaper than unlimited plans with contracts, and that 
plans with contracts were typically less expensive than those without. 
Greenstein and McDevitt (2011b) analyse the economic value created by the 
diffusion of broadband Internet access provided via xDSL and cable modem 
in the United States. They do not have direct information on prices, but create 
a price index that adjusts the price to the progressive improvement in service 
quality between 2004 and 2009. Calzada and Martínez-Santos (2014) analyse 
the determinants of broadband Internet access prices in a group of 15 EU 
countries between 2008 and 2011. They find that downstream speed had a 
positive effect on prices, and that cable modem and fibre technologies were 
available at lower prices per Mbps than xDSL technology. They also show the 
effects of bundling and volume caps. On the other hand, the paper shows that 
in the period examined broadband prices were higher in countries where 
entrants made greater use of bitstream access and lower in countries where 
there was an intensive use of local loop unbundling. Yet, very few papers have 
analysed mobile broadband prices. Srinuan, Srinuan and Bohlin (2013) 
examine the prices of wireless communications in Thailand and show the role 
of demand characteristics in the development of new plans. On the other 
hand, Haucap et al. (2014) analyse the effect of tariff diversity on broadband 
uptake using a dataset of fixed and mobile broadband plans via USB modem 
devices. They find that low prices, higher incomes and the diversity of plans 
are important drivers for broadband adoption. To our knowledge, our paper is 
the first empirical work that examines the design of mobile broadband plans 
for smartphones. 
 
In the last years, a number of theoretical papers that have been elaborated are 
very useful to understand the pricing strategy of mobile operators. There is an 
important literature analysing profit and welfare maximizing pricing structures 
(Tirole, 1988; and Wilson, 1993). A basic assumption of these papers is that 
consumers are rational decision makers that choose the tariff that maximize 
their surplus, but that the pricing structure does not influence their choice. 
Some papers have also considered how demand uncertainty affects the 
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selection of contracts by consumers (Lambrecht, Seim and Skiera, 2007). In 
recent years, a new strand of the literature has analysed how the pricing 
structures established by operators can affect consumers’ usage decisions and 
transform the utility offered by firms (Bertini and Wathieu, 2008; Ascarza, 
Lambrecht and Vilcassim, 2009; and Leider and Sahin, 2014). The underlying 
assumption in these models is that consumers make mistakes while taking 
their decisions because they are uncertain about how much they will consume 
the service and about the utility they can obtain. In this context, it can be 
shown that the pricing structures influence the types of mistakes consumers 
make. For example, some papers have shown that consumers exhibit a biased 
preference for choosing unlimited usage plans over pay-per use contracts, 
which can be related to risk aversion, demand over-estimation, and distaste for 
paying per consumption (Lambrecht and Malmendier, 2006).  
 
Other recent papers have examined the interaction between mobile operators 
and other agents that intervene in the telecommunications market such as 
content providers and smartphones manufactures. Economides and Hermalin 
(2014) analyse the reasons that make carriers to commercialize volume 
metered plans. Traditional responses are that volume caps are part of a 
second-degree price discrimination scheme via quantity discounts and that 
they alleviate congestion externalities. But these authors identify a third reason 
for their use: with volume caps competition among content providers increase 
and they are more likely to lower their prices to attract consumers. When this 
happens, telecommunication operators can increase their prices to capture the 
increase in the consumers’ surplus.  In other words, volume caps allow ISPs to 
capture the surplus created by content providers. Another group of papers 
have analysed the effect of exclusive contracts with handset manufacturers.  
Exclusive contracts restrict manufacturers from engaging in trade with 
competing operators and for this reason they must be compensated for the 
loss of potential market. Exclusive contracts increase the prices of the plans 
that bundle the broadband service with the smartphones, and if prices are 
strategic complements they also increase the prices of the rest of smartphones. 
From the consumers’ perspective, exclusivity increases prices and reduces the 
variety of handsets. Zhu, Liu and Chintagunta (2011) examine the welfare 
effects of Apple’s exclusivity. On the other hand, Sinkinson (2014) analyses 
the effects of exclusive contracts for smartphones using a monthly market-
level dataset of US consumers for the period 2008-2010. The paper proposes 
that the existence of exclusivity may respond to the relative market power of 

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handset manufacturers versus mobile operators. Exclusivity can be a profit-
maximizing strategy as consumers are more price sensitive with respect to 
wireless networks than handsets. 
 
 
3. Empirical model 
We examine the prices of mobile broadband using a dataset containing 
information of 2,909 plans collected by the FCC between 2011 and 2014 in 37 
countries. The paper focuses in the plans offered by MNOs because the FCC 
only collects information for this type of operators. On the other hand, we 
only consider the plans for smartphones, although operators also 
commercialize broadband services for laptops and tablets (big screen devices) 
connected via a USB modem or a MiFi (wireless router).
56
 Nowadays the use 
of mobile broadband through smartphones is much more popular than 
through USB modems. In 2013 the EU-27 average penetration of mobile 
broadband for smartphone was 42.8% compared to 11.3% of mobile 
broadband for a laptop/tablet. Moreover, smartphones can be used as a 
modem in the same way as a USB plan (by using the ‘tethering’ application), 
allowing the access to Internet through other devices such as laptops.  
The aim of the next sections is to analyse how operators design their tariffs in 
order to increase their customer base and extract the maximum surplus from 
them. We want to estimate a model for the monthly price of mobile 
broadband plans, Pmoit, where m is the plan offered by the operator, o is the 
operator, i is the country, and t is the time. The pricing equation includes 
several variables to analyse the operators’ multi-tier schemes and some 
variables that describe the characteristics of the operators. Country and year 
fixed effects iδ  and iη  are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries and years. On the other hand, moite  represents the disturbance 
term. 
  
Pricing model (1): 
     

56 The FCC classifies mobile broadband offers according to the device: smartphone, tablet or 
stick modem.  
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The prices of the plans included in the model are the average monthly prices 
paid by consumers during the period they stay with the operator. The main 
bulk of these prices is the monthly tariff, but we also take into account 
temporary monthly promotion at the beginning of the contract, rebates 
(refunds) and non-recurring costs such as activation fees. We consider the 
total access cost customers bear during the life of the contract. Equation (2) 
shows that the monthly price is constructed as the sum of the promotional 
tariff paid during the months of the promotion plus the regular tariff paid 
during the remaining months in which the consumer is expected to stay with 
the operator, plus activation costs, non-recurring costs paid at the beginning 
of the contract, minus rebates. This quantity is divided by 36, which is the 
expected number of months that consumers will stay with the operator.
57
 The 
European Commission establishes that the maximum duration for a contract 
is 24 months, but in some countries of our sample there are plans of 36 
months.  It is also important to mention that the activations costs and rebates 
are a very small part of the total costs borne by the customer when they 
consume mobile broadband services. For this reason, the results of our 
analysis do not vary much if we consider other permanence periods such as 24 
or 48 months.  
 
Price equation (2): 
DurationContract 
Rebates -Fees  + Promo) without (Months * Tariff + Promo Months *Promo.
moitPrice =
   
 
In order to examine the operators’ pricing structure we consider that they 
commercialize unlimited usage contracts and three-part tariffs. In the later 
case, the tariff includes an access fee, a usage allowance (number of GB that 
consumers can use for free), and a penalty system for the case in which 
consumers exceed the contracted allowance.
58
 In order to reflect these 
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57 In the case of fixed broadband plans, the average duration of the contracts in the EU is 26 
months according to the European Commission (2011). Also note that non-recurring costs 
in mobile plans are usually much smaller than those of fixed broadband plans, which might 
include installation costs and the payment of a router. 
58 According to Lyons (2013), in the US three-tiered pricing plans were introduced by AT&T 
in December 2010. These plans establish some volume allowances and a per-gigabyte 
overage charge. Verizon Wireless adopted a similar pricing scheme in 2011. T-Mobile, by 
contrast, does not set an overage charge on customers who exceed the cap, but reduces the 
speed of the service for the rest of the month. Finally, Sprint commercializes unlimited data 
plans at a flat rate.  
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options, we use the dummy variable LimitedData, which distinguishes between 
usage based and unlimited usage plans. This variable equals one for three part 
tariffs (limited usage) and cero otherwise.   
 
For a number of usage based plans we have information about the penalties 
applied to the consumers that exceed the volume allowance. The penalties can 
be either ‘overage charges’ in the form of pay-per-unit charges (for megabyte) 
or can force consumers to switch to a new usage allowance. They can also 
imply the reduction in the speed or even the interruption of the service until 
the beginning of the next month. We have created four dummy variables that 
identify the use of these penalties. In some specifications of the model, we 
substitute the variable LimitedData for them. EndService means that the 
consumer cannot longer use Internet when the allowance is exceeded. This 
option is used in some countries like Belgium or Korea but has a small 
prevalence in our data set. SpeedReduction represents the case where the speed 
of the service is reduced to very low download speeds (e.g.: 128 kpbs) when 
the volume allowance is exhausted. This situation might prevent consumers 
from using some applications that require higher speeds, such as watching 
videos. Pay-as-you-go is a penalty that forces consumers to pay a per-unit of 
volume (megabyte/kilobyte) when they exceed the allowance contracted. 
Some operators charge a per-unit of time (hour or day), but this is something 
quite infrequent. Finally, New Allowance reflects the case where consumers are 
moved to a new allowance, which allows then to use a larger number of 
gigabytes, but at a higher price. Note that both Pay-as-you-go and New Allowance 
are ‘overage charges’ and might cause an unexpected increase in the bill paid 
by consumers (‘bill shock’). This can occur when consumers have a poor 
understanding of the conditions of their contracts or when they are unaware 
of the volume they have consumed. Operators can also hide these overage 
charges so as to charge a higher bill (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). Our data set 
only contents the information included in the operators’ plans and therefore 
we can’t determine the impact that overage charges have on the final bill paid 
by consumers. In spite of this, we can examine how the design of the plans 
affects the monthly prices. 
 
In the case of three part tariffs, the variable Volume is defined as the volume 
allowance (in gigabytes) specified in the plan. Volume caps are introduced in 
the price equation in a non-linear way, since we expect that the price per unit 
of volume (gigabytes) will decrease with the allowance. An important part of 
the plans of our dataset include volume allowances that restrict the data that 
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can be downloaded by consumers in each month. As we have mentioned 
before, the use of limited usage plans might respond to different reasons. They 
can be considered as a second degree price discrimination mechanism that 
allows charging higher prices to consumers that are willing to pay more for the 
service. Specifically, it allows segmenting consumers according to the intensity 
in the use of the service. Volume caps can also help operators to optimize the 
use of the network and to reduce congestion due to high usage. Finally, 
Economides and Hermalin (2014) have shown that operators can also use 
volume caps to appropriate surplus from upstream content providers. 
According to them, operators can gain from volume caps through the 
following mechanisms: if volume caps are binding (EndService, SpeedReduction) 
consumers will perceive contents and applications as substitutes. This will 
increase the competitive pressures on the content providers, who will respond 
by lowering their prices. In this case, operators can capture the surplus gained 
by consumers via higher prices of their plans. If caps are permeable (Pay-as-you-
go, New Allowance), then the cap acts as a disguised two-part tariffs and the 
additional fee charged by operators’ acts as an excise tax that leads the content 
providers to cut their prices.  
 
The prices might reflect others aspects that affect the quality of the service. 
DownloadSpeed is the maximum speed that can take the broadband service 
according to the information announced by operators in their web sites. Speed 
tiers segment consumers taking into account their willingness to pay for 
quality and for the possibility of using some applications. A high speed allows 
using advanced services such as on-line gaming and video conferencing. Note, 
however, that many mobile operators do not announce the download speeds 
of their plans. This might be because most MNOs use the same technology or 
because they can’t guarantee the quality of the service.
59
 In the case of fixed 
broadband plans, by contrast, operators use different provision technologies 
(xDSL, cable and fibre) and can price discriminate consumers taking into 
account the speed offered. These operators also establish volume allowances, 
but this is not the main determinant of their prices (Calzada and Martínez-
Santos, 2014).  
 

59 According to the FCC (2015), advertising about the speed vary widely across countries. 
Some operators in countries such as Hong Kong, Italy and Poland, advertise the theoretical 
maximum available speeds (i.e. they report 100 Mbps for 4G and 42.2 Mbps for 3G 
HSPA+). In contrast, the highest speed advertised for a 4G plan in the United States is 5-12 
Mbps and for a 3G plan it is 7.2 Mbps. 



The main factor explaining the download speed is the transmission 
technology. For each generation of mobile telephony the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) has approved technological standards that 
have to meet a number of technical requirements, for example regarding the 
download speed or the latency of the service. In the period we analyse, mobile 
operators used several standards such as WCDMA, UMTS, HSPA and LTE. 
We have grouped these standards according to 3G, 3.5/3.75G, and 4G 
technologies and we have created a dummy variable for each of them.
60
 We 
use these Technology variables to analyse if operators have been able to charge 
higher prices for 4G plans than for the previous technologies, or if 
competition has been sufficiently intense as to force them to upgrade the 
quality of the service at no extra cost.61 For instance, in the UK the operator 
Three decided to offer 4G plans at the same price as 3G plans and this put 
competitive pressure on the other operators. In Spain, Vodafone was the first 
operator to offer 4G and initially it charged higher prices for this service, but it 
quickly eliminated the price difference between 3G and 4G plans when its 
competitors started to offer the same product. 
 
Many plans combine data allowances with voice minutes and/or text messages 
allowances. The popularization of smartphones has modified importantly the 
way in which the population communicates and nowadays an important part 
of the wireless traffic is generated by Internet contents and applications. 
Moreover, a part of the voice traffic has been substituted by applications like 
WhatsApp or Line for messages and Skype for voice. Operators have reacted to 
this situation by modifying the way they bill telephone calls. Some plans offers 
exclusively mobile broadband, but most of them also include voice minutes 
and/or text messages allowances. We reflect this situation in our model by 
including the dummy variable LimitedVoice, which takes value one if the plan 
includes voice minutes allowances and zero if the plan includes unlimited 
phone calls. For those plans with voice minutes allowances, the variable 
MinutesVoice reflects the minutes cap. According to the FCC (2015), in some 
countries operators may use phone calls to cross-subsidize their data plans. 
Unfortunately, we can’t identify this strategy because we do not have 
information about the plans that only offer telephone calls, but we can 
measure the impact of the inclusion of voice minutes allowances on the price 

60 The FCC dataset has less than ten plans that use 1G or 2G technologies. We do not 
consider these in our analysis. 
61 OFCOM (2014) compares the performance of 3G and 4G networks in the UK. It presents 
a general analysis and also compares the service offered by the mobile networks. 



of the plans. 
 
Another interesting feature of our dataset is that it allows identifying if the 
plan only offers a SIM card or if it also includes the purchase of a smartphone. 
The consumers that purchase the smartphone from the mobile operator 
usually have to choose between paying the smartphone at the beginning of the 
contract or paying an additional fee during the life of the contract. In order to 
know how the purchase of the smartphone affects the price of the service we 
include several dummy variables in the pricing equation. Specifically, we have 
introduced four dummies for Smartphone in our model. One of the dummies 
represent only SIM card plans and the three other show if the plan includes an 
iPhone, a Samsung, or other smartphone brands (Nokia, HTC, Blackberry, 
Sony, etc.), which are much less representative in our dataset and less 
demanded worldwide by consumers.62 
 
The effect that the inclusion of the smartphone has on the price of the plan is 
unclear. As a matter of fact, mobile operators provide smartphones to millions 
of consumers and some operators are present in several countries. This should 
give them some bargaining power in front of manufacturers and they may be 
able to negotiate discounts in the prices. If there is enough competition in the 
market these discounts should be passed-through to the consumers. In spite 
of this, smartphones are a differentiated product and some of them are more 
sophisticated and expensive than others. Taking this into account, operators 
can use smartphones to identify consumers with a higher willingness to pay 
for the service and can charge them a higher monthly tariff. 
 
The monthly price of the service is also related with the duration of the 
contract. The variable DurationContract represents the length in months of the 
contract subscribed by the customer. Operators might be keen to reduce the 
monthly price of the service when customers engage for longer periods of 
time. Also, the duration of the contract is related with the acquisition of a 
smartphone. Operators tie consumers to long contracts when the price of the 
smartphone is paid through the monthly bill, and consumers have to pay a 
penalization if they abandon the plan before the contract expires. Hence, we 
expect that the duration of the contract should have a negative effect in the 
price, and we also expect that the variables Smartphone and DurationContract will 
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62 According to IDC Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone Tracker, in the fourth quarter of 
2014 the 28.9% of mobile phones shipped were Samsung and 17.5% were iPhone. 
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be correlated. 
 
We still consider another group of control variables that can affect the level of 
prices and the structure of the tariffs set by operators. The variable Nplans is 
the number of plans released by all MNOs in the year in which the 
information was collected. The effect of the number of plans on the price is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, operators might release a large number of plans 
to price discriminate consumers or to generate confusion or 
misunderstandings (Hoerning, 2001). But on the other hand, the release of 
more plans can also reflect the intensity of competition. For instance, the entry 
of MVNOs might foster MNOs to release specific plans for low 
income/lighter consumers in order to fight competitors (Calzada and 
Martínez-Santos, 2014). HistoricalOperator is a dummy that takes value one 
when the operator that commercializes the plan is the incumbent firm in the 
country (or the first historic mobile operator). Mobile operators that entered 
the market at the end of the nineties acquired an important presence in the 
market and have been able to build a reputation in front of consumers. We 
want to know if this “first mover advantage” has a persistent effect in the 
prices or if the strengthening of competition and the arrival of MVNOs has 
dissipated it.  
 
Finally, our empirical model also includes the level of penetration of mobile 
broadband in the country. Specifically, Penetration is defined as the percentage 
of mobile broadband lines in each country. Unfortunately we do not hold data 
on the number of subscribers to each plan, nor on the number of lines per 
operator. Nevertheless, we expect that a large penetration level in a country 
should have a negative effect on prices due to the presence of scale and scope 
economies and to the intensification of competition in mature markets. It is 
important to take into account that lower prices could also have a positive 
effect on service adoption. This generates a potential endogeneity problem 
that we try to solve by estimating our pricing model with two-stage least 
squares estimation.  
 
 
4. The data  
Information about mobile broadband plans has been obtained from the 
“International Broadband Data Report” of the Federal Communications 
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Commission (FCC).
63
 The dataset contains 2,909 residential retail mobile 
broadband plans for smartphones collected from 37 countries around the 
globe, including all OECD countries.
64
 In total, the assembled dataset include 
579 plans for 2011, 1,102 plans for 2012, 429 for 2013 and 799 for 2014.
65
 
Information about the level of fixed and mobile broadband penetration, usage 
of Internet and other indicators about the broadband sector have been 
obtained from the “Measuring the Information Society” report of the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The European Commission 
Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content & Technology 
(DG-CONNECT) publishes information about the regulation of the mobile 
markets and the measures of the competition level in the EU-28. Finally, 
Eurostat, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
information about socio-demographic variables, exchange rates and power 
parity indexes.  
 
We have obtained information about the prices and the characteristics of the 
plans from the FCC dataset. The FCC has obtained this information through 
the operators’ websites, but operators might offer different plans and 
promotions through other sale channels aside from the Internet. All retail 
broadband prices are converted to US dollars using the Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPP) currency conversions published by the World Bank to facilitate 
comparability.66 Over the life of a contract, customers pay recurring costs (the 
monthly tariff) and other non-recurring fees, such as activation costs paid at 
the beginning of the contract,67 promotions and rebates applied to the bill.68 
The prices used in our analysis do not include the device price that 
accompanies the costs of the plan (data, voice and SMS). Hence, if a plan 
includes the cost of the device into the monthly charge, the price for the 
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63 Our dataset has used the third and fourth releases of the FCC report. See: 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fourth-international-broadband-data-report-2015. 
64  The original dataset contains information for 40 countries (including all OECD countries) 
but the FCC signals in the methodology of its “Fourth International Broadband Data 
Report” that data for Greece, Brazil, and Turkey is inconsistent from year to year. For this 
reason, we do not use information for these countries. 
65 There are 90 plans with contract duration of less than one month that have not been 
included in our analysis. Also, the information for some plans presents missing values for the 
tariffs and for some other relevant characteristics. 
66 Similar results are obtained when we do not use this transformation. 
67 Non-recurring costs in the mobile sector are much smaller than in the fixed broadband 
services, where consumers may need to pay an installation costs and the payment of a router. 
68 Some operators use promotions that increase the usage limits. This measure modifies the 
price of the offer. 
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service will appear to be more expensive than a plan that charges the customer 
a flat fee upfront for the device. Table 1 shows some basic statistics of the 
main components of the prices and of the plans. Around 85% of the plans 
considered in the analysis bundle several services such as Internet, telephone 
calls and texts messages.69 Most plans are volume metered: only 10% of the 
plans offer unlimited volume allowances and around 30% of bundled plans 
have unlimited minutes of telephone calls. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the plans offered in each country 
during the period 2013-2014. In this period, only operators in 8 countries 
offered unlimited data plans, while in the period 2011-2012 there were 17. On 
the other hand, in the last years there has been an increase in the volume 
allowances. While in the period 2011-2012 the average volume allowance was 
around 2.5 GB, in the 2013-2014 it increased to 4 GB. Finland is the country 
with the highest number of unlimited plans (71% out of the total) and Sweden 
is the country with the plan with the highest data allowance (80 GB). 
Moreover, the number of telephone calls in plans with limited voice caps has 
more than doubled on average since 2011 and has reached around one 
thousand minutes in 2014. However, the average prices in our sample have 
stayed constant across the study period at around $50 ($PPP). 
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69 The dataset does not include multi-play plans which combine fixed and mobile services.   
Table 1: Summary statistics FCC dataset of mobile broadband plans (37 countries) 
Variable
Number of 
plans Average 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Price ($PPP)* 2909 48.6 37.1 0.4 271.2
Monthly tariff ($PPP) 2909 50.0 37.4 1.1 271.2
Monthly promotion ($PPP) 2909 4.8 17.8 0.0 215.0
Activation costs ($PPP) 2909 6.6 16.3 0.0 225.1
Rebate ($PPP) 2909 8.7 51.1 0.0 449.0
Highest download speed (Mbps) 2126 30.1 36.1 0.1 150.0
Volume allowance (GB)** 2579 3.5 6.4 0.0 80.0
Voice allowance (minutes)*** 1448 663 1434 0 10000
Contract duration (months) 2717 18.5 8.0 1 36
*** There are 794 bundles with unlimited minutes and 259 plans that do not include minutes allowances.
** There are 209 plans with unlimited data.
* Price is defined as the monthly price paid by a customer that stays 36 months with the operator (see calculation of 
price in section 3).
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The penalties faced by consumers when they exceed the contracted data 
allowance vary importantly across countries.
70
 Table 3 shows that in many 
countries such as Bulgaria, Spain, Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Sweden or 
Austria operators frequently use speed reductions (the speed is usually reduced 
to 56/128 kpbs). By contrast, in New Zealand, Australia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Norway or India it is much frequent that consumers jump to pay-as-you-go. In 
this case, some operators charge per unit of volume (megabyte/kilobyte) and 
in a very few cases operators charge per unit of time (hour or day). Finally, in 
Iceland, United Kingdom, Mexico, Singapore, Canada, the Netherlands or 
Japan consumers are automatically changed to a new allowance (they contract 
a larger number of GB). 
Many plans offer consumers the possibility to buy a smartphone in addition to 
contract the SIM card. Table 4 shows for each country the percentage of plans 
that include a smartphone, which can be an iPhone, a Samsung or another 
brand (Blackberry, Nokia, HTC, LG, Sony, etc). In the data set there are 
several countries were operators do not offer SIM only plans. Also notice that 
a large percentage of plans include an iPhone or a Samsung. 
The length of the contract is usually related to the type of smartphone 
included in the offer. Table 5 shows that while SIM-only contracts last on 
average 16 months, contracts providing an iPhone or a Samsung last 20 
months, and contracts for Other Brands last on average 18 months. The 
median duration of the contracts is even shorter for SIM-only plans compared 
to smartphone plans, 12 versus 24 months.  
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70 In the case of unlimited data plans, there might be penalizations when customer makes a 
too intensive or inappropriate use of the service (fair usage policy). We do not analyse this 
situation. 
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Table 2:  Mobile broadband Plans 2013/2014. Average values of characteristics by country 
Number 
of plans
Number of 
mobile 
operators
Price 
($PPP)*
Monthly 
tariff 
($PPP)
Maximum 
download 
speed 
(Mbps)
Ratio 4G 
plans 
over 3G 
(%)
Unlimited 
data 
plans (%)
 Volume 
cap (GB)
Bundled 
plans with 
minutes 
of voice 
(%)
Bundles 
with 
unlimited  
minutes (%)
Voice cap 
(minutes)
Australia 20 2 44.3 44.3 15.4 50.0 0.0 2.5 100.0 60.0 427.3
Austria 18 3 42.2 41.2 26.6 100.0 5.6 3.2 100.0 44.4 1300.0
Belgium 30 4 42.9 43.8 38.0 100.0 0.0 2.4 100.0 70.0 197.6
Bulgaria 19 3 42.4 42.4 42.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 100.0 100.0 1600.5
Canada 74 3 34.0 35.3 131.8 100.0 0.0 5.1 100.0 0.0 -
Chile 20 3 129.3 129.3 9.2 50.0 0.0 4.4 100.0 100.0 666.0
Czech Republic 69 3 52.2 52.2 74.9 100.0 0.0 2.9 100.0 0.0 -
Denmark 37 3 21.8 21.7 66.9 91.9 0.0 4.8 100.0 42.4 203.6
Estonia 9 2 26.8 26.8 35.3 33.3 0.0 8.4 100.0 87.5 411.4
Finland 7 3 16.3 16.3 37.4 42.9 71.4 0.2 42.9 100.0 42.9
France 62 4 49.2 49.8 87.1 93.5 0.0 4.0 100.0 25.8 120.0
Germany 44 3 61.3 61.0 45.2 90.9 0.0 4.8 100.0 27.3 125.0
Hong Kong 34 5 49.7 49.7 31.2 52.9 21.9 3.1 100.0 89.7 2007.7
Hungary 14 2 62.4 62.4 76.2 64.3 0.0 1.1 85.7 64.3 190.0
Iceland 17 2 32.4 32.4 14.9 47.1 0.0 3.0 100.0 60.0 122.2
India 51 4 39.1 40.8 21.5 11.8 0.0 3.9 100.0 100.0 6965.7
Ireland 39 3 54.4 54.4 21.0 25.6 0.0 4.1 100.0 69.2 298.1
Israel 5 2 21.1 21.1 4.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 100.0 20.0 300.0
Italy 28 4 41.3 44.5 52.5 32.1 3.6 2.3 100.0 50.0 347.7
Japan 17 3 32.2 32.2 75.0 92.3 37.5 4.4 - - -
Korea (South) 16 3 47.5 47.5 - 100.0 0.0 2.2 100.0 100.0 110.0
Lithuania 23 3 9.1 8.9 18.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 100.0 92.3 730.0
Luxembourg 9 3 8.0 17.8 29.5 66.7 0.0 12.4 100.0 100.0 86.7
Mexico 29 2 69.9 69.9 18.4 100.0 0.0 1.7 100.0 100.0 566.9
New Zealand 19 1 53.5 53.5 7.2 26.3 0.0 1.4 100.0 68.4 336.9
Norway 13 1 35.2 35.2 19.4 100.0 0.0 2.2 100.0 0.0 -
Poland 39 3 36.3 36.3 - 12.8 0.0 1.3 100.0 57.7 400.0
Portugal 17 3 54.2 54.5 39.0 70.6 17.6 1.3 82.4 70.6 909.2
Singapore 20 3 87.6 87.5 86.6 100.0 0.0 5.4 100.0 80.0 377.5
Slovakia 6 3 48.4 48.4 33.8 33.3 0.0 1.6 100.0 33.3 125.0
Slovenia 37 4 10.3 20.1 42.0 13.9 0.0 1.9 100.0 100.0 598.5
Spain 29 5 40.0 43.7 9.0 58.6 0.0 1.4 88.9 66.7 172.2
Sweden 39 3 42.1 42.0 42.6 53.8 0.0 8.7 28.6 100.0 626.2
Switzerland 11 3 22.7 27.4 100.0 100.0 0.0 4.1 37.5 100.0 22.5
The Netherlands 32 4 54.6 64.8 30.4 81.3 0.0 1.9 96.9 71.9 189.1
United Kingdom 22 5 52.2 52.8 - 36.4 18.2 3.5 100.0 31.8 1014.3
United States 161 7 84.1 85.8 17.4 99.4 3.7 8.2 100.0 0.0 -
* Price is defined as the monthly price paid by a customer that stays 36 months with the operator (see calculation of price in section 3).
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Table 3:  Internet usage penalties by country
Number 
of plans
No 
penalization 
(unlimited 
plans)
Speed 
reduction
Jump to 
pay as you 
go
Jump to 
new 
allowance
End of 
service
Australia 82 0% 0% 91% 9% 0%
Austria 40 3% 85% 0% 10% 3%
Belgium 49 2% 24% 49% 0% 24%
Bulgaria 62 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Canada 93 0% 0% 47% 53% 0%
Chile 37 3% 59% 30% 8% 0%
Czech Republic 26 0% 65% 0% 35% 0%
Denmark 54 0% 89% 4% 7% 0%
Estonia 21 29% 71% 0% 0% 0%
Finland 21 52% 48% 0% 0% 0%
France 136 0% 76% 3% 21% 0%
Germany 68 10% 88% 1% 0% 0%
Hong Kong 80 39% 15% 34% 13% 0%
Hungary 57 2% 93% 0% 5% 0%
Iceland 29 0% 0% 14% 86% 0%
India 76 0% 24% 68% 8% 0%
Ireland 103 15% 6% 50% 29% 0%
Israel 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Italy 57 16% 35% 11% 39% 0%
Japan 56 29% 14% 11% 46% 0%
Korea (South) 141 17% 0% 60% 0% 23%
Lithuania 59 5% 0% 86% 8% 0%
Luxembourg 39 5% 10% 67% 18% 0%
Mexico 64 0% 6% 20% 70% 3%
New Zealand 62 0% 0% 97% 3% 0%
Norway 33 0% 30% 70% 0% 0%
Poland 55 5% 84% 7% 4% 0%
Portugal 33 18% 6% 52% 24% 0%
Singapore 38 0% 24% 16% 61% 0%
Slovakia 24 29% 63% 8% 0% 0%
Slovenia 65 0% 14% 71% 15% 0%
Spain 84 2% 98% 0% 0% 0%
Sweden 65 9% 86% 0% 5% 0%
Switzerland 54 37% 41% 20% 2% 0%
The Netherlands 85 0% 24% 27% 49% 0%
United Kingdom 84 15% 5% 0% 80% 0%
United States 273 9% 29% 17% 42% 4%
Total 2,406 9% 36% 30% 23% 2%
Table 4: Summary of contract duration (months) for SIM only plans and by smartphone brand
 Number of
plans
Average  
contract 
(months) 
Median 
contract 
(months)
Minimum 
contract 
(months)
Maximun 
contract 
(months)
SIM only 238 16.5 12 1 36
iPhone 1,029 19.1 24 1 36
Samsung 705 19.4 24 1 36
Other brands 590 18.0 24 1 36
Total 2,562 18.7 24 1 36
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5. Estimation and Results 
This section presents the econometric model that we use to analyse how 
mobile operators set their prices. We first estimate the pricing equation in (1) 
using OLS. Notice that this estimation might be affected by the potential 
endogeneity of the variable Penetration since the causality between prices and 
mobile broadband take-up should be bidirectional. One way to address this 
problem is to use the 2SLS-IV approach. To do this, we need some 
instruments that are correlated with the variable penetration but that do not 
affect the prices of the plans other than indirectly through its impact on 
penetration. Our candidates to instrument Penetration are the variables 
Table 5: Summary of SIM-only and plans with a smartphone by country
Number of 
plans
SIM only plans 
(%)
Plan includes 
an iPhone  (%)
Plan includes 
a Samsung  
(%)
Plan includes 
Other brands  
(%)
Average 
contract 
duration 
( h )Australia 80 26% 68% 0% 6% 19
Austria 40 28% 60% 0% 13% 24
Belgium 44 39% 30% 18% 14% 12
Bulgaria 42 12% 21% 67% 0% 18
Canada 93 8% 52% 33% 8% 18
Chile 40 3% 85% 13% 0% 17
Czech Republic 93 0% 23% 70% 8% 19
Denmark 58 0% 86% 0% 14% 17
Estonia 24 17% 0% 75% 8% 24
Finland 21 0% 76% 0% 24% 21
France 186 9% 31% 16% 45% 19
Germany 76 0% 47% 32% 21% 23
Hong Kong 77 22% 32% 21% 25% 19
Hungary 60 2% 32% 32% 35% 24
Iceland 34 0% 65% 35% 0% 11
India 75 9% 11% 11% 69% 10
Ireland 139 4% 27% 19% 50% 14
Israel 16 0% 38% 25% 38% 13
Italy 71 10% 39% 34% 17% 22
Japan 32 0% 78% 22% 0% 24
Korea (South) 97 45% 14% 32% 8% 23
Lithuania 52 2% 52% 25% 21% 23
Luxembourg 30 17% 30% 10% 43% 19
Mexico 60 0% 67% 12% 22% 19
New Zealand 62 5% 58% 11% 26% 18
Norway 33 0% 73% 0% 27% 12
Poland 71 0% 13% 44% 44% 21
Portugal 40 0% 75% 0% 25% 16
Singapore 32 13% 28% 47% 13% 24
Slovakia 24 17% 25% 21% 38% 19
Slovenia 97 13% 10% 64% 12% 22
Spain 89 11% 46% 11% 31% 22
Sweden 89 3% 79% 7% 11% 18
Switzerland 62 19% 63% 5% 13% 15
The Netherlands 111 14% 24% 50% 12% 20
United Kingdom 105 5% 35% 21% 39% 23
United States 275 0% 40% 46% 14% 14
Total 2,630 9% 41% 27% 23% 19
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Education, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Percentage of Household with a 
Computer (PC): Information for Education has been obtained from the 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and it is defined as the percentage of 
inhabitants with tertiary education skills (at least a bachelor degree).
71
 This 
variable is expected to have a positive impact on the adoption of mobile 
Internet as high skilled individuals should be able and more interested on the 
mobile Internet while these skills should not impact on the prices; GDP has 
been collected from the IMF and represents the gross domestic product per 
capita in dollars and adjusted by the purchasing power parity ($PPP) in each 
country. We expect that people living in countries with a higher GDP per 
capita should be more likely to contract mobile broadband Internet. Finally, 
PC is the percentage of households in the country that have a computer. This 
variable should be positively correlated with Internet adoption, but not with 
the price of wireless broadband plans.  
We have verified that the selected instruments are valid to solve the 
endogeneity problem.  Specifically, we have found that they pass the Hansen’s 
J test for over identifying restrictions. Moreover, we have considered the 
instruments suitability test (first stage F-statistic of the variable Penetration over 
the socioeconomic instruments) to measure the strength of our instruments. 
We have also analysed other instruments such as the population density and 
the unemployment rate in each country but we have found that the best set of 
instruments that fulfill the orthogonality condition are the ones described 
above.  
 
Table 6 shows the reduced form regressions for the pricing equation when the 
whole sample of countries is considered. We present four specifications for 
the OLS estimates and three for 2SLS estimates. Most of the results obtained 
are in line with the hypothesis that we have formulated in the previous section 
and they are robust to different specifications of the model. The coefficient of 
the variable Penetration is not significant in any case, but while the sign in the 
OLS specifications is positive it takes negative values in the 2SLS regression. 
The lack of significance of this variable might be due to the fact that it 
considers the penetration of the service at the country level and not the 
number of subscribers to each plan. This situation might soften the causality 
effect between penetration and price. 
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71 Note that the variable Penetration is defined at the country level and for this reason it 
could be a collinearity problem between this variable and the country fixed effect.  
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The variable LimitedData (Volume Allowances) shows that usage-based plans are 
substantially cheaper than unlimited plans. The magnitude of the coefficients 
in specifications 3 and 5 are quite similar, although with 2SLS the coefficient is 
a bit smaller. As we have explained before, volume caps act as a second price 
discrimination mechanism to extract consumer surplus and to avoid 
congestion. This price design allows lighter consumers to pay less for the 
service than with unlimited data plans.  
 
Mobile operators can establish different types of penalizations in the plans that 
include volume allowances. The penalties are applied to the consumers that 
exceed the number of gigabytes specified in their plan, and can consist in a 
quality reduction or in an overage charge. In specifications 4, 6 and 7 we have 
disaggregated the variable LimitedData in four dummy variables that reflect the 
type of Penalty that can suffer the consumers. In all the specifications the 
dummies have negative and significant coefficients, meaning that usage based 
plans are always cheaper than unlimited plans. SpeedReduction is the penalty that 
has a smaller impact on the price of the plans. Recall that in this case, 
consumers are still able to use the services and applications that require low 
speeds such as e-mails and other instant messaging services. The penalties that 
force consumers to switch to pay-as-you-go or to a new allowance have a similar 
impact on the monthly tariff as SpeedReduction, although in this case consumers 
have to incur in an additional fee that we can’t observe. Finally, plans that 
imply the end of service are the cheapest, although in our sample these plans 
are the most uncommon and are used only in a few countries (basically 
Belgium and South Korea).  
 
The variables Volume and Volume2 reflect the impact of volume caps on usage-
based plans. The coefficients of these variables are significant in all 
specifications and have the expected sign. The coefficient of the variable 
Volume shows that an increase in one additional gigabyte in the cap would 
have a positive impact of almost 10% on the monthly price paid by the 
customer (specifications 4 and 7). On the other hand, the negative coefficient 
of Volume
2
 shows that operators apply volume discounts.  
 
Regarding the technology, only the variable 4G is significant in specifications 
1, 2 and 7. This might indicate that operators are better able to set high prices 
by announcing high speeds than by announcing the use of a new wireless 
technology. Indeed, the comparison of specifications 6 and 7 show that 


Technology losses its significance when Speed is included in the model. Operators 
might not be able to charge a premium for 4G plans when other operators 
also offer them. In specification 2 to 6 the coefficient for Speed is positive and 
significant, showing that prices increase with the quality of the service. The 
coefficient of Speed should be interpreted in the sense that an increase of 10 
Mbps in the download speed increases the price of the plan by around 2%.
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Notice that the inclusion of Speed in the model produces an important 
reduction in the number of observations because quite often operators do not 
mention the speed of the plans in their web sites.  In spite of this, we have 
included this variable in our analysis because it is a relevant characteristic of 
the service. 
 
Specifications 3 to 7 include two variables that reflect how operators adjust the 
prices in the plans that bundle the broadband and the voice services. The 
variable LimitedVoice is negative and significant in all specifications, showing 
that plans that offer a limited number of telephone calls are cheaper than 
those that offer unlimited calls. On the other hand, the coefficient of the 
variable MinutesVoice is positive and almost zero (due to the unit ‘minutes’) and 
not significant. Hence, the inclusion of additional minutes of voice in the plan 
does not have a strong effect in the prices, but it has a positive effect as 
expected. 
 
The other aspect of interest in our analysis is to determine how the inclusion 
of a smartphone in the plan changes the tariff design. The information 
available in our data set does not allow identifying which is the part of the 
monthly bill that is dedicated to finance the price of the smartphone. In spite 
of this, we can observe that the brand of the handset have an impact on the 
monthly tariff. The variable Smartphone uses as reference the SIM-only plans 
and shows that the plans that include an iPhone or a Samsung might be over 
35% more expensive than SIM-only plans. Also, the coefficients of these 
dummies show that plans with iPhone are more expensive than plans with 
Samsung devices. Interestingly, the dummy representing the rest of brands, 
Other Brands, is positive but not significant. Operators may set higher prices for 
the plans with an iPhone or a Samsung because this choice denotes a higher 
willingness to pay. The extra-charge may also reflect the higher production 
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72 For the dummy variables we follow the interpretation of Halvrosen and Palmquist, 1980 in 
semi-logarithm models coefficients are interpreted in the following way 100*[exponential 
(coefficient)-1] with respect to the reference. 
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costs of these brands (iPhone and Samsung are leaders in launching newest 
technologies), or either because operators have a small bargaining power in 
front of manufacturers or because they sign exclusive contracts with these 
manufacturer.
73
 By contrast, the purchase of a smartphone with another brand 
does not imply an extra charge in the price.74  
 
Another question that is relevant for our analysis is to determine how 
operators use the discounts in the price of smartphones to attract consumers. 
Unfortunately, our data set has many less observations (N=630) that contain 
information about the discounts granted by operators for the smartphone. In 
spite of this, we have repeated the estimations of Table 6 to analyse the effect 
of the Discount. Results show that discounts have a positive and significant 
effect on prices, which implies that operators cross-subsidize the handsets 
with the price of the broadband plan to attract consumers (see Table 2A in the 
Appendix).  
 
Finally, we consider another group of variables that are related to the 
operator’s commercial policy. The variable Contract Duration shows a positive 
relation with the price but is not significant in any of the specifications 
considered. The duration of the contract should have a negative impact on the 
price, but as we have explained before the duration of the contract is 
correlated with the acquisition of a smartphone, which has the effect of 
increasing the monthly price. On the other hand, the variables HistoricOperator 
and Nplans are not significant in any specification. This suggests that historical 
operators do not have a different pricing strategy or a first-mover advantage 
with respect to the other MNOs. Moreover, we cannot conclude that 
operators use the number of plans to screen consumers or to moderate 
competition.  
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73 Sinkinson (2014) analyses exclusive contract that AT&T signed with iPhone in the US 
between 2007 and 2011. Lyons (2013) reports that according to some reports, after the 
adoption of this agreement the average iPhone user consumed ten times more bandwidth 
than a typical smartphone user. This could have motivated the introduction of three-part 
tariffs by AT&T.  
74 A number of manufacturers now offer budget versions of smartphones, usually with 
reduced functionality, a smaller internal memory or less popular operating system (eg: 
Windows phone). 
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6. Effects of competition on prices 
This section introduces a new group of variables in the pricing model to 
examine how operators adjust the tariffs to the regulation and the intensity of 
competition. The FCC data set does not include information about the 
characteristics of national markets and their regulation. In order to address this 
limitation, we re-estimate the model for a sub-sample of 20 European 
countries for which we have additional information from DG-CONNECT.
75
 
 
DG-CONNECT provides information about the market shares in terms of 
subscribers of the leading and the second operator in EU countries. This has 
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75 Due to the lack of information, we have excluded from the analysis Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland.  
 
Table 6: Estimation Results: Mobile Broadband and Voice on Smartphone: All plans.
Dependent variable  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 Specification 7
Log Price (price) OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Penetration 0.002* 0.001 0.005 0.004 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024)
Download Speed  0.002*** 0.002* 0.002**  0.002**                
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Technology (reference: 3G)        
                 3.5G/3.75G -0.08 -0.131 -0.021 -0.143 0.122 -0.124 -0.088
(0.123) (0.132) (0.221) (0.185) (0.232) (0.186) (0.193)
                 4G 0.164*** 0.083* 0.045 0.119 0.103 0.098 0.120** 
(0.034) (0.045) (0.088) (0.09) (0.065) (0.085) (0.058)
Volume 0.103*** 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.097***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
Volume² -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Limited Data -0.545*** -0.526*** -0.440*** -0.439***                
(0.05) (0.066) (0.141)  (0.101)   
Penalty (reference: Unlimited data)        
          Speed reduction -0.489*** -0.481*** -0.439***
(0.142) (0.139) (0.116)
          Jump to pay as you go -0.574*** -0.525*** -0.490***
(0.172) (0.186) (0.125)
          Jump to new allowance -0.454*** -0.454*** -0.437***
(0.141) (0.145) (0.113)
          End of service -0.734*** -0.776*** -0.673***
(0.155) (0.148) (0.121)
Limited Voice Minutes -0.461*** -0.449*** -0.441*** -0.448*** -0.406***
(0.093) (0.095) (0.083) (0.095) (0.083)
Minutes of Voice 0.00900 0.01100 0.00500 0.00400 0.00500
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Smartphone (reference: SIM only)        
                iPhone 0.306** 0.360** 0.244*** 0.373*** 0.248** 
   (0.129) (0.146) (0.082) (0.136) (0.097)
                Samsung 0.233 0.325* 0.225** 0.347** 0.266***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.091) (0.151) (0.101)
                Other brands 0.063 0.125 0.102 0.126 0.079
(0.15) (0.177) (0.12) (0.16) (0.122)
Contract Duration 0.004 0.003                
(0.003) (0.003)   
Historic Operator 0.06 0.099 0.047 0.09 0.096
(0.08) (0.098) (0.07) (0.092) (0.086)
Nplans -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Time Dummy (reference: year 2011)
year 2012 -0.070* 0.046 -0.093 -0.038 0.119 0.262 0.144
(0.042) (0.049) (0.115) (0.123) (0.508) (0.418) (0.423)
year 2013 -0.143** -0.027 -0.168 -0.319** 0.282 0.256 0.161
(0.062) (0.074) (0.126) (0.154) (0.897) (0.785) (0.789)
year 2014 -0.311*** -0.12 -0.406*** -0.468** 0.022 0.180 0.110
(0.063) (0.073) (0.146) (0.221) (0.976) (0.832) (0.885)
Constant 3.866*** 3.935*** 3.970*** 3.902*** 4.645*** 4.574*** 4.615***
(0.092) (0.104) (0.164) (0.212) (1.254) (0.906) (1.031)
R 2 0.46 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.54
Number of observations (N) 2726 1998 1605 1397 2091 1397 1803
p-value Hansen J-test 0.1930 0.1930 0.1930 0.1930
p-value F-test (Ho: weak instruments) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All specifications include country dummies which are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country. Standard errors
are in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients are in bold. Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level.
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allowed us to construct the variable HHI Operator, which is a Hirschman 
Herfindahl Index constructed as the sum of the squares of the market shares 
of the leading, the second and the rest of operators in each country.
76
 We 
expect that markets with a high concentration exhibit higher prices. In spite of 
this, market concentration can also be related with the efficiency of leading 
operators, which can benefit of scale and scope economies, and this should 
have a negative effect on prices. The inclusion of country fixed effects should 
mitigate the endogeneity problem associated with HHI Operators as the fixed 
effects can capture unobserved “operators’ efficiencies” in each country. Table 
7 shows that all countries in our sub-sample have a concentration level 
between 33.5 and 38, with the exception of Luxemburg, which has a higher 
concentrated market.  
 
The FCC dataset does not include information about the plans of MVNOs. 
But we can study if the presence of this type of operators affects competition 
and the prices of MNOs. For this objective, we use the variable MVNO, 
which is defined as the number of this type of operators in the country.  
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76 The HHI Operators is calculated first as the sum of squares of the proportion of subscribers 
for the incumbent, the second largest operator, and the rest of operators. This summation is 
then multiplied by one hundred; hence the HHI Operator can take values above cero and 
below one hundred. 
Table 7:  Competition and Regulation Indicators EU-20, year 2013
HHI Operator MVNOs MTR ($PPP)
Austria 34.0 16 2.43
Belgium 34.2 2 1.42
Czech Republic 35.0 58 0.12
Denmark 35.5 2 0.12
Estonia 34.1 1 2.79
Finland 34.2 17 3.10
France 33.7 37 1.01
Germany 33.7 3 2.46
Hungary 36.1 4 0.02
Ireland 33.9 5 3.14
Italy 33.5 16 2.02
Lithuania 34.8 9 1.18
Luxembourg 41.1 2 9.47
Poland 34.1 15 1.06
Portugal 37.7 4 2.11
Slovenia 37.9 3 5.38
Spain 34.0 21 4.68
Sweden 33.9 34 0.21
The Netherlands 37.4 52 2.90
United Kingdom 34.5 13 2.64
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Table 7 shows that the number of MVNOs differs importantly across 
countries and it is especially high in Czech Republic, The Netherlands, France 
and Sweden. It is expected that the number of MVNOs will have a negative 
impact on the broadband prices since these operators usually adopt aggressive 
commercial policies to attract low income/light volume consumers. In spite of 
this, many MVNOs have entered in niche markets and in some cases they are 
low-cost subsidiaries of MNOs. Another important aspect to be considered is 
that in many countries MVNOs have still not reached any agreement with 
MNOs in order to provide 4G services. 
 
Finally, the variable MTR represents the regulated mobile termination rates 
($PPP) set by NRAs in each EU country. The termination rates are the prices 
that mobile operators charge for terminating the telephone calls of their rivals 
in their own network.77 These rates do not directly affect the cost of the 
broadband service but they do affect the cost of plans that include minute 
allowances. Termination rates increase the costs of off-net calls and should 
affect more those operators with a larger proportion of outgoing calls. In the 
last year, the European authorities have recommended NRAs to implement a 
“glide-path” to gradually reduce termination fees towards the interconnection 
costs and to eliminate rates asymmetries between operators.
78
 This policy has 
favored the convergence in prices of on-net and off-net calls and might have 
favored the change from usage based prices to non-linear prices. Table 7 
shows the level of MTRs in 2013 in the group of EU countries analysed. 
 
Table 8 shows the estimation results when we add the new variables in the 
pricing equation. In most specifications, results for the variables Speed, Volume, 
Limited Data, Limited Voice Minutes and Smartphone are similar to those of Table 
6. This suggests that the pricing structure of the European operators is similar 
to the one we have found in the previous analysis. In the case of the variable 
Penalty, we obtain negative coefficients as before, although now the 
coefficients of specification 4 and 6 are not significant.  
 
Focusing now on the variables reflecting the level of competition and 
regulation in the market we observe that HHI Operator and MTR are not 
significant in any specification. This would suggest that market concentration 

77 Armstrong (2002), Vogelsang (2003), and Calzada and Trillas (2005) review the literature 
on interconnection prices. 
78 See for example Kaugant and Bohlin (2014) and Genakos and Valletti (2014). 
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and the regulation of termination charges do not affect the design of mobile 
broadband plans. In the first case, the result could be a consequence of the 
way in which we have constructed the variable HHI Operator, since we have 
grouped the market shares of all operators that are not the leader and its main 
competitor in the market. Therefore, this variable does not reflect well the 
presence of small operators that use alternative commercialization strategies 
and target specific groups of consumers. In the case of MTR, the absence of a 
clear relationship between the regulation and the retail prices reflect a change 
in the way operators establish their tariffs. Although termination charges affect 
the operators’ costs of telephone calls, this does not seem to have a clear 
effect on the pricing structure. 
 
 
Table 8: Estimation Results: Mobile Broadband and Voice on Smartphone: Plans EU-20.
Dependent variable  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 Specification 7
Log Price (price) OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Penetration 0.004 0.002 0.015 0.010 -0.014 -0.016 -0.021
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019)
Download Speed  0.003* 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***                
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Technology (reference: 3G)        
                 3.5G/3.75G -0.087 -0.148 -0.153 -0.198 -0.161 -0.206 -0.105
(0.191) (0.194) (0.219) (0.209) (0.205) (0.195) (0.197)
                 4G 0.199*** 0.007 -0.03 -0.011 0.001 0.021 0.131
(0.065) (0.087) (0.122) (0.102) (0.122) (0.104) (0.085)
Volume 0.119*** 0.100*** 0.090*** 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.081*** 0.091***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Volume² -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Limited Data -0.441*** -0.423*** -0.326* -0.324**                
(0.124) (0.141) (0.159)  (0.13)   
Penalty (reference: Unlimited data)        
          Speed reduction -0.329* -0.343** -0.454***
(0.181) (0.157) (0.152)
          Jump to pay as you go -0.407 -0.414* -0.463***
(0.245) (0.226) (0.16)
          Jump to new allowance -0.301* -0.300** -0.298** 
(0.167) (0.14) (0.122)
          End of service -0.014* -0.015* -0.013 -0.012
(0.202)  (0.183) (0.14)
Limited Voice Minutes  -0.629*** -0.633*** -0.613*** -0.616*** -0.578***
(0.074) (0.081) (0.067) (0.074) (0.071)
Minutes of Voice 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Smartphone (reference: SIM only)        
                iPhone 0.371** 0.358** 0.345** 0.344** 0.238** 
   (0.143) (0.145) (0.134) (0.143) (0.094)
                Samsung 0.312** 0.335*** 0.268** 0.303** 0.211***
(0.121) (0.114) (0.123) (0.127) (0.067)
                Other brands  0.183  0.163 0.166
(0.201) (0.231) (0.19) (0.223) (0.134)
Historic Operator 0.064 0.114 0.041 0.094 0.069
(0.1) (0.127) (0.101) (0.124) (0.133)
Nplans 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.005
(0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
HHI Operator 0.135 0.251 0.273 0.303 0.003
 (0.152) (0.162) (0.184) (0.179) (0.117)
MVNO -0.017* -0.014* -0.015* -0.013 -0.012
(0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.022) (0.015)
MTR -0.001 0.008 -0.052 -0.037 -0.049
(0.032) (0.033) (0.044) (0.051) (0.041)
Time Dummy (reference: year 2011)
year 2012 0.003 0.105 -0.610*** -0.458*** -0.328 -0.194 -0.252
(0.125) (0.136) (0.092) (0.143) (0.226) (0.261) (0.225)
year 2013 -0.153 -0.111 -0.864*** -0.744*** -0.253 -0.203 -0.281
(0.155) (0.188) (0.258) (0.253) (0.472) (0.429) (0.356)
year 2014 -0.470* -0.202 -1.206*** -0.949** -0.358 -0.188 -0.173
(0.267) (0.312) (0.344) (0.363) (0.641) (0.655) (0.581)
Constant 3.382*** 3.472*** 1.128 2.096 0.361 1.463 3.499*  
(0.28) (0.304) (1.758) (2.341) (1.759) (2.452) (2.003)
R 2 0.45 0.35 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.57
Number of observations (N) 1415 1041 822 643 822 643 862
p-value Hansen J-test 0.3487 0.3487 0.3487 0.3487
p-value F-test (Ho: weak instruments) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All specifications include country dummies which are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are
clustered by country. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients are in bold.  Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level.
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Finally, the variable MVNO is negative and significant in specifications 3 to 5. 
The interpretation of the coefficient is that the entry of an additional MVNO 
into the market might produce a decrease in the price of up to 1.5%. Although 
MVNOs have to pay compensation to MNOs in order to use their networks, 
they contribute substantially to increase competition and to reduce prices.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has used a rich dataset of smartphone broadband plans in 37 
countries to study the pricing structure of mobile operators in the period 
2011-2014. The main contribution of the paper is to explain how operators     
design their multi-tier tariffs to segment consumers and to adapt to 
competition. The plans are characterised by data and voice minutes allowances 
that allow operators to segment customers according to their needs (second 
degree price discrimination) and to reduce congestion. Most mobile plans limit 
Internet usage to a few gigabytes per month. As a result, consumers can 
contract the plan than better suits their needs. In addition to this, some 
operators offer unlimited data plans at a significantly higher price. Metered 
plans include different types of penalties that are applied to the consumers that 
exceed the contracted volume allowances. These penalties can consist in a 
drastic reduction of the data transmission speeds (‘bandwidth throttling’) or in 
monetary penalties such as moving consumers to a plan with a higher 
allowance or setting ‘overage charges’. We have identified the impact that 
these data caps have on the monthly tariff regarding unlimited usage plans. In 
addition to this, overage charges imply an additional payment to the 
consumers that exceed the cap, which can result in an unexpected high bill if 
consumers are unaware of the conditions of their contracts. 
 
Another dimension that differentiates mobile plans is the download speed of 
the Internet service. But in contrast to the situation for fixed communications, 
the most relevant feature of mobile broadband plans is the volume allowance 
and the download speed has a much smaller effect in the price.
79
 It is possible 
that the technological limitations of the wireless communications makes 
difficult for operators to differentiate their plans according to the download 

79 The ITU in its report “Measuring the Information Society 2013” analyses mobile 
broadband prices and mentions that data allowances are the main driver for mobile 
broadband plans. 
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speed. The technology used to provide the service also has an impact on 
broadband prices. After controlling for speed, we have found that during the 
first stages of the transition from 3G to 4G operators have been able to 
commercialize 4G plans as a premium service. But when we consider the 
whole sample of plans in our data set, we only find slight evidence that the 
provision technology affects prices through other channels than the download 
speed. 
 
Most plans include voice minutes allowances, which are usually quite high. 
The pricing structure of the voice service is similar to those of the broadband 
service. Consumers contract voice minutes allowances, and have to pay a per-
minute price if they exceed the cap. Many plans offer unlimited voice at a 
significantly higher price. Another interesting feature of the tariff is that 
operators do not longer distinguish between on-net and off-net calls, or 
between mobile to mobile and mobile to fixed calls. As we have argued, this is 
possibly a consequence of the regulation of mobile termination charges 
(MTRs).  
 
The second most important contribution of the paper is to explain how 
operators modify their prices when they bundle the broadband service 
together with a smartphone. We have shown that smartphone discounts are 
partly subsidized with higher prices of the broadband service. Indeed, 
operators distribute the cost of the handset along the length of the contract, 
allowing customers to finance the smartphones and tying them for a longer 
period of time. We have also shown that the price of the broadband service 
varies depending on the smartphone brand bundled in the plan. While the 
plans that include iPhone and Samsung smartphones are more expensive than 
SIM-only plans, the plans that bundle other brands do not show a significant 
difference in the price with respect to SIM-only plans. This result suggests that 
operators might use the information revealed by consumers about their 
willingness to pay for some brands to set higher prices (third degree price 
discrimination). Although this situation might also reflect the higher price that 
operators have to pay for some handsets to the manufacturer, due for example 
to the existence of exclusivity agreements.  
 
The last part of the paper conducts a separate analysis of the pricing policies 
of mobile operators in a group of 20 EU countries. For these countries we can 
consider additional variables reflecting the market structure and the regulation 

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of the country. Our analysis shows that the operators in these countries use a 
similar multi-tier pricing system than the one found for the whole sample. But 
we have not found a relation between market concentration and broadband 
prices. Moreover, the regulation of MTRs does not appear to drive the level of 
broadband tariffs. This can reflect the application of the “glide path” 
mechanism in the EU and the small impact of off-net calls on the costs of 
mobile operators. On the other hand, we have found that the intensity in the 
entry of MVNOs does have a pro-competitive effect and pushes down 
MNOs’ prices. 
 
One recent aspect that affects the pricing of communications services and that 
has not been considered in this work is the bundling of fixed and mobile voice 
and data services, and sometimes also of pay-per-view TV.
80
 This type of plans 
is becoming very popular because it facilitates the control of the expenditure 
on communication services and offer important discounts. In some countries 
the popularization of these plans has forced the restructuring of the 
telecommunications market toward “platform-converged market players” that 
are able to provide all core communications services. In the years to come it 
would be interesting to study the effects of these changes in competition and 
in the operators’ pricing strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

80 Grzybowski and Liang (2014) estimate demand for quadruple play mobile tariffs. 
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Annex 2: Average discounts ($PPP) on smartphone when bundled with tariff by country.
Plans iPhone Samsung Rest brands
Australia 0 - - -
Austria 0 - - -
Belgium 17 335.9 327.2 -
Brazil 0 - - -
Bulgaria 0 - - -
Canada 32 374.5 253.5 -
Chile 3 726.8 - -
Czech Republic 10 198.8 177.0 -
Denmark 4 154.0 - -
Estonia 9 - 149.4 -
Finland 0 - - -
France 51 343.0 156.9 -
Germany 36 547.2 459.7 -
Greece - - - -
Hong Kong 12 589.9 394.2 -
Hungary 20 604.5 681.7 -
Iceland 23 92.3 - -
India 9 64.0 - 231.5
Ireland 68 440.6 589.1 371.9
Israel 1 - 179.5 -
Italy 6 591.3 - -
Japan 7 - 479.2 -
Korea 13 107.5 - -
Lithuania 16 1247.4 389.3 212.6
Luxembourg 2 - 527.6 275.7
Mexico 5 1019.3 891.5 -
New Zealand 22 219.0 136.0 -
Norway 22 388.0 - -
Poland 5 534.1 754.2 -
Portugal 9 16.4 - -
Singapore 4 - 572.0 -
Slovakia 7 531.6 201.7 -
Slovenia 19 189.9 - -
Spain 14 225.0 - -
Sweden 12 563.4 - -
Switzerland 41 166.9 305.3 77.5
The Netherlands 36 452.1 290.4 -
Turkey - - - -
United Kingdom 25 439.5 413.2 385.2
United States 136 451.8 407.8 -
Total 696 358.2 391.1 327.0
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Dependent variable  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Log Price (price) 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Discount 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.121***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
Penetration -0.022 -0.027 -0.025
(0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
Download Speed    
 
Technology (reference: 3G)    
                 3.5G/3.75G - - -
                 4G 0.044 0.007 0.06
(0.266) (0.202) (0.199)
Volume 0.134*** 0.122*** 0.123***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Volume² -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Limited Voice Minutes -0.531*** -0.483*** -0.452***
(0.127) (0.106) (0.108)
Minutes of Voice 0.026* 0.011 0.012
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
Smartphone (reference: SIM only)    
                iPhone 0.105
(0.166)
                Samsung 0.026
(0.173)
                Other brands -
Contract Duration -0.007 -0.011
(0.005)  (0.008)
Historic Operator 0.074 0.125 0.132*  
(0.075) (0.081) (0.079)
Nplans 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 5.641*** 5.556*** 5.437***
(1.811) (2.157) (2.07)
R 2 0.68 0.65 0.65
Number of observations (N) 507 630 630
p-value Hansen J-test 0.1930 0.1930 0.1930
p-value F-test (Ho: weak instruments) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Annex 3: Estimation Results: Pass-through of discount on smartphone to the price
of the plan.
All specifications include country and time dummies which are not reported for brevity.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country. Standard
errors are in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients are in bold. Significance at * 10%, **
5%, *** 1% level.
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Chapter 4 
Competition in the Spanish mobile broadband market
81
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Telecommunications and information society services have established 
themselves as one of the main drivers of economic development and social 
cohesion. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that broadband access has a 
positive impact on such macroeconomic factors as GDP, employment and 
productivity.
82
 
 
In 2010, the European Commission (EC) launched the European Digital 
Agenda 2020 with the primary objective of creating a European Digital Single 
Market. The Digital Agenda also established several short- and mid-term goals. 
The most immediate of these was that all EU citizens should have the 
possibility of accessing the Internet by 2013. This objective was in fact met 
months before the end of 2013, with more than 95 and 99 percent fixed and 
mobile broadband coverage respectively, reaching 100 percent Internet 
coverage thanks to satellite access for more remote areas. In Spain, fixed 
broadband reaches over 95 percent of households, and mobile broadband 
covers 98 percent of the territory. 
 
A further objective established by the Digital Agenda is to ensure that by 2020 
the entire EU population has broadband service access with speeds of at least 
30 Mbps, and that at least half of all households can surf at speeds exceeding 
100 Mbps. For this reason, the EC and National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) are currently promoting investment in the next generation access 
networks of fixed fibre networks (FTTx) and fourth generation (4G) mobile 
technology. 
 
These efforts to promote broadband have been made in a context of deep 

81 This chapter has been previously published as “Calzada, J. and Martínez-Santos, F., 2014. 
Competencia en el Mercado de banda ancha móvil en España, Cuadernos Económicos del ICE, 
88, 97-129”. 
82 Crandall et al. (2007) find a positive and significant impact of broadband penetration on 
employment in the United States. Czernich et al. (2011) estimate that a 10% increase in 
broadband penetration leads to a GDP growth of between 0.9 and 1.5%. 
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economic crisis and a marked rise in competition, which has significantly cut 
into telecom operators’ revenues. In the EU, these reductions occurred mainly 
in fixed and mobile voice services, which have traditionally enjoyed a greater 
weight among operators. At the same time, however, fixed and, especially, 
mobile broadband have recorded positive growth rates. In Spain, the total 
revenue generated by the country’s telecommunications services has not 
stopped falling since 2008 (Figure 1). Most notably, there was a significant 
revenue reduction in mobile and fixed voice traffic in 2013, with reductions of 
20.1 and 13.3 percent, respectively. In contrast, the revenue of fixed 
broadband fell by just 2.2 percent, while mobile broadband revenue rose by 
19.7 percent in 2013. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of annual revenues changes (percentage) in the Spanish 
Telecoms market 
 
Source: CNMC, annual reports 
 
The healthy financial results posted by mobile broadband services reflect the 
major expansion of this service in Spain. Thus, between January 2013 and 
January 2014 penetration increased from 58 to 73 percent, leaving Spain 
ranked eighth among the EU-28 in terms of take-up levels. In contrast, access 
to fixed broadband was just 26 percent in 2014, which left Spain ranked tenth 

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from bottom among the EU-28 country in terms of penetration and below the 
30 percent European average. 
 
Mobile broadband services facilitate the use of calling and messaging 
applications that are transforming users’ previous communication habits, with 
a particular impact on fixed and mobile voice services. However, the diffusion 
of fixed-mobile bundles that include voice services and fixed and mobile 
broadband means that consumers are not so greatly conditioned by the prices 
of separate communication services and are making more frequent use of 
mobile devices to access the Internet.83  
 
Interestingly, in Spain the rapid diffusion of mobile broadband has occurred in 
spite of relatively low Internet usage. According to Eurostat
84
, at the beginning 
of 2013 the proportion of people aged 16 to 74 who accessed the Internet at 
least once a month was 66 percent in Spain, a significantly lower percentage 
than that reported in other European countries including France (78 percent), 
Germany (80 percent) and the United Kingdom (87 percent). Furthermore, 24 
percent of the Spanish population was reported as never having used the 
Internet. Similarly, in Spain only 32 percent of the population reported having 
bought products or services online in the previous 12 months – a figure that 
fell well short of the corresponding percentages in France (59 percent), 
Germany (68 percent) and the UK (77 percent). Given these results, it is 
interesting to analyse the causes of the low rate of Internet use in Spain 
compared to that of other EU countries and to determine whether the 
diffusion of mobile broadband might change this situation. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
technological changes that have facilitated the emergence of new mobile 
broadband standards and charts the adoption of 4G technology in Spain. 
Section 3 examines the evolution of mobile broadband penetration in Spain 
and compares the process with that of other EU countries. It also analyses 
changes in market structure. Finally, section 4 explains the emergence of new 

83 Several studies have analysed the determinants of substitution of fixed for mobile 
telephony, leading to ambiguous conclusions. For a review see Vogelsang (2010) and 
Grzybowski (2012). 
84  See Eurostat, Community Survey on ICT Usage in Households and by Individuals (2013). The EC 
(2013) reports that among the EU-27 countries, 27 percent of people often use their 
smartphones to access the Internet while 36 percent do so via laptops or tablets. According 
to this study, age, a lack of skills and price are the main reasons for not using mobile 
broadband. 
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business practices in the market, specifically fixed-mobile bundles, and 
examines in detail Spanish operators’ commercial plans in 2014.85 
 
 
2. The technological development of mobile broadband 
 
Technological progress and competition have clearly been two essential 
factors in the diffusion of mobile voice telephony and, today, they continue to 
be the key drivers of mobile broadband penetration. In this section, the 
process of technological innovation that has facilitated the development of 
mobile broadband services is analysed and the difficulties Spain has 
encountered in deploying 4G services are examined.  
 
 
2.1. The birth of mobile broadband 
 
Mobile data services have developed progressively through a series of 
technological standards. The first generation (1G) commercial mobile network 
was launched in Japan in 197986 using analog technology. The service quickly 
spread around the globe supported by seven incompatible standards. In the 
US, a single standard, the Analogue Mobile Phone System, was implemented. 
This service was rapidly diffused by reducing equipment costs and by 
facilitating national roaming. In Europe, by contrast, the existence of a 
number of incompatible national systems led to market fragmentation. This, 
combined with a costly service and handsets (which could only be used at that 
time for voice service), meant the number of users never rose above a few 
million.  
 
The market situation underwent a radical change with the introduction of 
second generation technology (2G) in the second half of the nineties. In 1982, 
the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations 
recognized the need to develop a European mobile telephone system that 

85 Very few articles have studied the prices of mobile telephony. Grzybowski (2005 and 
2008) and Sung and Kwon (2011) show the effect of regulation, costs and market 
concentration on prices. Calzada and Martínez Santos (2014) analyse the prices of fixed 
broadband in the EU. 
86 According to Gruber and Valletti (2003), mobile telephony was developed in 1973 by 
Martin Cooper in Motorola and started to be commercialized by NTT DoCoMO in Tokyo 
in 1979. 
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would prevent the 900 Mhz band from being occupied by incompatible 
national systems. But instead of harmonizing national systems, the decision 
was taken to create a new technology. Thus, the Groupe Spécial Mobile, formed 
by European operators, designed its own digital mobile telephone system 
(Hillebrand, 2013). In 1987, the parties involved in the standard defined the 
basic technical specifications that would characterise 2G technology. The 
standard thus adopted received the name of Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) and to formalize the agreement operators in 14 
countries, including Spain’s Telefónica, signed the GSM Memorandum of 
Understanding. The signatories undertook to adopt the GSM in their 
respective countries in 1991, and to ensure the interoperability of 
infrastructures. In 1989, the GSM was transferred to the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the standard became 
mandatory within Europe.  
 
The GSM was launched in Finland in 1991 and quickly spread worldwide. In 
Spain, GSM-900 licenses were issued to Movistar (Telefónica) and Airtel (later 
Vodafone) in 1995, and later, in 1998, GSM-1800 licenses were granted to 
Movistar, Airtel and Amena (later Orange) (Calzada and Estruch, 2011).  
 
Meanwhile, in the USA, Australia, China and India, the choice of standard was 
left to the individual operators. In the USA, a version of GSM was introduced, 
but soon other incompatible standards were adopted, hindering national 
roaming (Gandal et al., 2003). Globally, four 2G standards were deployed, 
although almost 80 percent of the world population ended up using the GSM 
while more than 15 percent used the US standard IS-95 (Interim Standard 
95)87. The literature stresses that market fragmentation in different standards 
and the obligation to pay to receive calls (“receiving party pays”) were factors 
that delayed the expansion of mobile telephony in America (Gruber and 
Verboven, 2001; Koski and Kretschmer, 2004). 
 
The chief advantages of 2G were that these networks had lower deployment 
costs and could withstand a more intensive use of the service. This facilitated 
the issuing of multiple licenses in each country and helped to foster 
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87 The GSM and IS-95 were differentiated by their access systems. The GSM used Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA), which divided the frequency in slots and allocated one to 
each user. In contrast, the IS-95 used Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology 
that enabled all users to share the frequency channel, but the signals had a code to 
distinguish each of the users. 
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competition
88
. However, 2G had little capacity for data transmission, and 
could only offer such services as the sending of text messages and voicemail.  
 
In the years that followed, many working groups contributed to improving the 
standard. The General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) was an evolution of the 
GSM which allowed packets of information to be sent by performing a simple 
upgrade of the existing networks. This 2.5G system used Internet Protocol 
(IP) technology to access Internet content providers. Moreover, consumers 
could remain connected to the Internet and make calls at the same time. Other 
2.5G technologies included Enhanced Data Rates for Global Evolution 
(EDGE) and CDMA2000. These technologies provided speeds between 40 
kbps and 384 kbps, but were still insufficient to support mobile broadband.  
 
In the mid-nineties, the aim of boosting high speed data transmission led the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to propose a global standard 
for third generation technology (3G) with higher requirements. It opted for 
the IMT-2000 (International Mobile Telecommunications 2000), which was 
based on the CDMA2000 standard developed by Qualcomm. Some of the 
most salient features of the IMT-2000 were its capacity to enable global 
roaming through a single terminal and its ability to increase more than 40-fold 
the transmission speed rates of 2G services.  
 
In Europe, the IMT-2000 gave rise to fears that the GSM would be unable to 
evolve to meet these new requirements. Thus, the Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) Forum sought an alternative for the 
European 3G. Based on the UMTS Task Force’s recommendations, technical 
specifications for a new standard were established in 1997. A key aspect in this 
process was that several manufacturers belonging to the ETSI proposed a 
variation of CDMA2000. This became known as Wideband Code Division 
Multiple Access (WCDMA) and was incompatible with the North American 
system,89 which meant that the handsets and cards that worked with different 
standards were not compatible.  
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88 In 1996, the EC approved Directive 96/2/EC, which liberalized the market and 
established the first of January 1998 as the deadline for issuing the new GSM-1800 licenses 
(Bekkers, 2001). 
89 According to Cabral and Salant (2013), the US obliged the EU to revoke the ETSI 
decision requiring the NRAs to use the GSM, on the grounds that this violated the 
competition policy treaties between the US and the EU. Nonetheless, the European 
regulatory bodies undertook a reallocation of the spectrum so as to avoid the deployment of 
CDMA2000. 
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ETSI’s support for WCDMA made it quite clear that it would not be possible 
to create a single standard for IMT-2000. The EU, US and Japan wanted 3G 
to give continuity to their 2G standards. At this point it should perhaps be 
stressed that while the ITU is responsible for establishing the characteristics of 
international standards, various consortia – comprising different companies 
and institutions – eventually define the rules that the operators must adhere to 
in order to comply with the standards. In 1997, taking into account existing 
interests, ITU finally approved five systems for the IMT-2000 family 
standards. In the EU, all countries finally adopted the WCDMA, also known 
as UMTS. 
 
In 1998, participants in the GSM and IS-95 standards created two global 
projects with the aim of developing 3G standards based on the IMT-2000 
requirements. The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) was the 
association responsible for developing UMTS, and is in charge of maintaining 
the GSM, EDGE, WCDMA and High Speed Packet Access (HSPA) 
standards, as well as for developing the new Long Term Evolution (LTE) 
standard. At the same time, the Third Generation Partnership Project 2 
(3GPP2) was the association responsible for developing the CDMA2000, the 
successor to IS-95. Based on the specifications recommended by the ITU, 
UMTS and CDMA2000 evolved in parallel.  
 
The UMTS offered a similar voice quality to that offered by fixed telephony 
and allowed consumers to use multimedia applications and other services that 
required higher bandwidth, such as teleconferencing or streaming. 
Additionally, it allowed operators to launch exclusive 3G offers for Internet 
access via tablets and laptops.  
 
The 3G standard that has enjoyed most success is the UMTS, used by more 
than 70 percent of subscribers worldwide. However, the diffusion of the 
UMTS suffered significant delays at the outset (Gruber, 2007). When the 
licenses were first awarded, neither handsets with 3G capabilities nor many 
technical specifications for installing the new networks were yet available. It 
might have been the case that the advances in 3G already made in Japan and 
the US led the EU to launch its standard when its technology was not yet fully 
developed. Additionally, the issuing of UMTS licenses coincided with the 
“dotcom crash” of 2001, at a time when the expectations that the financial 
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markets had placed on telecommunications, especially on the Internet, had 
been scuppered. This situation, combined with the large amounts of money 
that operators paid for their licenses at auction, impeded investment in new 
infrastructure. All in all, carriers preferred to update their current networks 
rather than to invest in new ones.90  
 
On 13 May 2000, the Spanish Government issued four UMTS licenses, 
becoming the second European country to do so after Finland. A license was 
granted to each of the existing GSM operators and a fourth license was issued 
to Xfera (later Yoigo). However, delays in the launch of this technology meant 
that the Spanish Telecom Regulatory Authority (Comisión del Mercado de las 
Telecomunicaciones, CMT) was forced to recommend the temporary use of the 
GPRS system. Its objective in doing so was to create demand for new mobile 
applications. Thus, the first dual UMTS/GPRS SIM cards were put on sale by 
Vodafone in February 2004 (switching between the two systems according to 
available coverage), but initially they could only be used on computers as it 
would take several months for the UMTS handsets to become available.  
  
The new 3G handsets offered a greater number of services, types of 
application and content display; however, the new features also required more 
data traffic. To meet the new demand, 3GPP made constant improvements to 
the UMTS through updates that included 3.5G, 3.75G, and 3.9G. Above all, 
standards such as HSPA+ were introduced, which could compete in terms of 
performance with 4G standards such as LTE-Advanced. However, the high 
3G latency (response time) and demand for higher transmission speeds, 
especially after the popularization of smartphones and tablets, meant a new 
standard had to be introduced.  
  
The transition from 3G to 4G was launched in 2008 when ITU presented a set 
of requirements known as IMT-Advanced for the implementation of mobile 
broadband.91 In the EU, the 4G standard developed by 3GPP is the LTE-
Advanced. The first commercial LTE network was launched in late 2009, 
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90 See Prat and Valletti (2003) for an analysis of the issuing of 3G licenses in the EU.  
91 4G standards include the requirement that 1) it be based on an all-IP packet switched 
network; 2) it is  interoperable with 2G and 3G standards; 3) it offers peak data rates of up to 
approximately 100Mbit/s for high mobility, such as mobile access, and up to approximately 
1Gbit/s for low mobility, such as nomadic/local wireless access; 4) it dynamically shares and 
utilizes the network resources to support more simultaneous users per cell; 5) it supports a 
scalable channel bandwidth, between 5 to 20 MHz, optimally up to 40 MHz.  
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although the final specifications of the IMT-Advanced were not announced 
until 2012.92  
  
LTE enables download speeds of up to 150 Mbps and rates of up to 50 Mbps 
to upload data, a much higher speed than that offered by the 3G standard, and 
similar to that of the ADSL. These features allow video conferencing, the 
sharing and downloading of files (such as pictures), a range of applications and 
high definition audiovisual contents. The standard also significantly reduces 
latency compared to 3G, which is essential for applications that require real-
time responses, such as network games. 
 
 
2.2. Mobile broadband’s false start in Spain 
 
To meet the objectives of the EU-2020 Strategy, in 2010 the EC reserved the 
790-862 MHz band for the deployment of 4G technology. This band, known 
as the “digital dividend”, had to be released across the whole of Europe 
following the transition from analog to digital television (“analog switch-off”). 
The reasons for refarming the 800 MHz band to mobile operators lay in the 
fact that these frequencies would improve the quality of mobile broadband in 
motion, boost coverage in large buildings and cover a larger part of the 
territory at a lower cost.93 
  
In countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, mobile 
operators started to use the 800 MHz band in 2012. In Spain, the Ministry of 
Industry presented a Royal Decree in 2009 assigning the liberated frequencies 
between 790 and 862 MHz, and also that of 190 MHz which was free in the 
2.6 GHz band, to mobile telephony. 
  
In the summer of 2011 the frequencies in the 800, 900, 1800 MHz and 2.6 
GHz bands were allocated to mobile operators. Ninety percent of the 
frequencies were issued by auction and the rest by beauty 

92  In 2010, the ITU declared that the candidate standards for 4G, such as LTE, could start 
to be commercialized as 4G standards. Nevertheless, technically LTE is a transitional 
standard. 
93 Although the whole spectrum can be used for any mobile technology, the propagation of 
electromagnetic waves is better in low frequencies in the interior of buildings. In contrast, 
high frequencies on the 2.6 GHz bands have a greater capacity and are more suitable for 
areas with a high concentration of users.  
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contest. Telefónica, Vodafone and Orange obtained the maximum allowed 
frequency at 800 and 900 MHz by auction. However, a block remained 
unassigned in the ‘best’ 800 and 900 MHz frequencies. The fact that Yoigo did 
not bid for them was seen as an indication that it had resigned itself to 
becoming a national operator that could compete with the other mobile 
network operators (MNOs). Other candidates for these frequencies 
included Jazztel and ONO, the new entrants in fixed telephony with a national 
presence. However, neither operator made a bid for this band, due it would 
seem to the high reserve price set at auction and the cost of infrastructure 
deployment. In addition, Orange and Yoigo were granted access to 900 MHz 
and 1800 MHz frequencies respectively having been selected via beauty 
contest.94 
  
Although the frequencies were allocated in 2011, it was expected that 
operators would not start using the 800 MHz frequencies until early 2015 due 
to delays in the reconfiguration of the Digital Terrestrial Transmission (DTT) 
market. In December 2012, the Supreme Court declared the Council of 
Ministers agreement of 16 July 2010, by which TV channels were awarded to 
Atresmedia, Mediaset, Veo TV and Net TV, void, on the grounds that the 
channels had been allocated without complying with the mandatory public 
tender as provided for under the new General Law on Audiovisual 
Communication. The ruling forced the government to restructure the DTT 
market.
95
  
  
In May 2014 the Supreme Court decreed the closure of nine television 
channels and in September a new DTT Technical Plan was launched. The plan 
assigned 30 percent of the frequencies used by national private television to 
increase the offer of the existing channels. In addition, 20 percent of radio 
frequencies were reallocated to 4G mobile services. 
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94 Movistar, Vodafone and Orange paid more than 1,647 million euro for the frequencies, 
while the cable operators paid 24 million. Jazztel, Euskaltel, R, TeleCable and Telecom CLM 
also invested in the spectrum, but in much smaller amounts. 
95 In July 2013, the EC gave Spain authorization to delay the allocation of the 800MHz 
frequencies until 2014. The Commission also accepted a postponement for Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Poland, Romania and Finland, but refused derogations in 
the cases of Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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Figure 2: 3G and 4G technologies coverage in Spain and in the EU-27 
 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
A further explanation for the delay in the reallocation of frequencies was the 
need to retune TV antennas on buildings throughout the country. The 
previous socialist (PSOE) government estimated that this operation would 
cost about 800 million euro, and decided that it should be paid for out of the 
State budget given the poor planning involved in the launch of 
DTT. However, the new DTT Plan modified this project and reduced the cost 
of retuning to 286 million euro. 
  
Interestingly, while Spain and other countries are in the process of releasing 
the 800 MHz band, the EC has begun to evaluate the possibility of refarming 
the 700 MHz band (Ultra High Frequency Spectrum) for the use of mobile 
communications so as to fulfill the goals of the Digital Agenda. The creation 
of this second digital dividend may once again impact the interests of DTT 
operators since they would be limited to the 470-690 MHz band of 
frequencies. This policy would also have a greater impact in Spain than it 
would in other European countries, as the DTT market share is very high 
relative to other audiovisual platforms such as cable or satellite. 
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2.3. First 4G commercial offers  
 
The delays experienced in refarming the spectrum did not however prevent 
some Spanish operators from launching their 4G services in the 1800 MHz 
and 2.6 GHz bands. In May 2013, Vodafone started to provide 4G services in 
seven cities (Barcelona, Bilbao, Madrid, Malaga, Palma de Mallorca, Sevilla and 
Valencia) and the company launched a large marketing campaign to promote 
the service. In July, Yoigo and Orange responded with similar launches, 
making the service available in Spain’s main cities and gradually expanding 
their coverage. When the service was first launched, some operators charged 
higher tariffs for the 4G plan than for the 3G plans, but they subsequently 
eliminated these additional costs. 
  
Initially, Movistar opted to wait for the allocation of the 800 MHz frequencies 
before launching its 4G service, but on seeing its rivals launch their offers, 
Movistar sought a network sharing agreement with Yoigo. In this way, 
Telefónica and Yoigo started to sell fixed-mobile bundles of fibre and 4G 
networks, maximizing the latest generation fixed and mobile broadband 
technologies of both operators. In parallel, Movistar now deploys its own 
network.96 According to the CNMC (2014d), in 2013, of the total number 
(5,866) of 4G base stations installed, Yoigo accounted for 33.2 percent, 
Orange 27.1 percent, Vodafone 20.3 percent, and Movistar 19.3 percent.  
  
In the sections that follow we discuss Spain’s mobile broadband service in 
greater detail. First, we examine the market structure, and then we evaluate the 
evolution of competition and prices. 
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96 The agreement allows Movistar to offer its 4G services over the Yoigo network while in 
return Yoigo is able to commercialize Movistar’s multi-play plans (voice and broadband, 
either ADSL or fibre). In addition, Yoigo can continue to use Telefónica’s transport network 
for 2G and 3G technologies. In November 2013, the CNMC opened disciplinary 
proceedings in order to analyse the possible anticompetitive implications of the Telefónica 
and Yoigo agreements. 
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3. Spain’s mobile broadband market structure  
  
In 2012, after several years of slow growth, the penetration of mobile 
telephony
97
 declined slightly and did not increase again until July 2014,  when 
it reached 109.2 percent (50.7 million lines), a similar level to that recorded in 
2007 (Figure 3). This reduction in the penetration rate was largely attributable 
to the decline in the residential sector, which was hit hard by the economic 
crisis and rising unemployment. As a result, many consumers opted to unify 
their communications services under a single number and so stopped using 
second lines. At the same time many companies and institutions reduced the 
number of mobile lines available to their employees. It should be stressed that 
this phenomenon occurred in parallel with a decrease in voice traffic and the 
introduction of lower tariffs, which significantly shrank carriers’ income. Thus, 
in 2007 while total mobile earnings amounted to 14,103 million euro, in 2013 
this figure had fallen to 7,576 million, a similar total to that achieved in 2012. 
Figure 3: Penetration of mobile telephony services in Spain 
Source: CNMC, annual reports 

97 Mobile service penetration is defined as the number of active SIM cards per 100 people. 
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Compared to its EU-28 counterparts, Spain has one of the lowest levels of 
mobile penetration in Europe, which is almost certainly a reflection of the 
high prices that have traditionally been charged throughout the country 
(Figure 4).
98
 Yet, interestingly 70 percent of mobile contracts in Spain are 
postpaid, a higher proportion than in many other European countries. 
Figure 4: Mobile broadband penetration (January 2014) and active SIM cards 
in Europe
Source: European Commission 
Mobile broadband evolution differs from that of all other telecommunications 
services. The number of mobile lines providing Internet services 
on smartphones has grown at a rapid pace in recent years, reaching 70.4 
percent of the population (30.9 million lines) by the first quarter of 2014. This 
growth can be attributed to the success of mobile applications among the 
population and by the continuous price reductions implemented in recent 
years. Indeed, revenues from mobile broadband have grown at a healthy rate, 
but they do not offset the poor performance recorded by all other 
communications services (see Figure 1). It should also be highlighted that the 
rate of mobile broadband penetration in Spain is above that of the EU-28 

98 See EC reports (2012a, 2012b, 2013) and OECD (2011, 2013). 
	

average, but the country has lost positions in the ranking of service 
implementation. Thus, in January 2014 penetration in Spain stood at 73 
percent, compared to an average of 63 percent for the countries of the EU-28. 
The countries heading the ranking of mobile broadband penetration are 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark, where the rate exceeds 100 percent (Figure 4). 
At the same time, the number of Internet mobile connections (datacards) 
using USB modems/dongles increased significantly until summer 2011, when 
they reached 3.6 million lines, but subsequently this figure slumped to just 1.8 
million in July 2014 (Figure 3). These results suggest that Internet dongle plans 
became obsolete with the emergence of smartphones, tablets and laptops with 
integrated SIM cards. 
In recent years, the intensification of competition fostered by the 
implementation of regulatory policies, the increase in the number of operators 
and technological convergence has transformed the mobile market structure. 
The total number of lines operated by the two main companies, Movistar 
and Vodafone, has fallen steadily while the number of customers signed up to 
Orange (the third largest operator) has increased slightly (Figure 5). At the 
same time, the most recent market players, Yoigo and the other mobile virtual 
network operators (MVNOs) have increased their market share significantly 
since entering the market, and together accounted for 23 percent of all lines in 
July 2014. In April 2013, for the first time in history, the four MNOs lost 
subscribers, while the MVNOs as a whole won lines. Thus, the Spanish 
market has a similar structure to that of the main European markets. 
According to Ofcom (2014), in 2013 Movistar had a 38 percent market share 
of connections, while in France the leading operator had a 36 percent share, in 
Italy 33 percent, in Germany 32 percent and in the UK 31 percent. 
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Figure 5: Operators’ market shares by lines of mobile telephony in Spain
Source: CNMC, annual reports 
The operators’ market shares of mobile Internet vary slightly with respect to 
those of mobile services (voice and Internet) combined. According to 
the CNMC, in the first quarter of 2014, Movistar had a market share of 33.2 
percent of mobile lines, 31.8 percent of which were mobile broadband. 
Elsewhere the respective shares were: Vodafone - 23.1 percent and 24.3 
percent; Orange - 22.7 percent and 22.1 percent; Yoigo - 6.8 percent and 9.3 
percent, and the MVNOs - 14 percent and 12.3 percent. Thus, the mobile 
Internet market shares of each operator are similar to their broadband shares 
except in the case of Yoigo, which has a relatively larger broadband share. It 
should be stressed, however, that if we consider the revenues obtained by each 
operator or the traffic generated, the market is considerably more 
concentrated. Additionally, Movistar and Vodafone have a higher number of 
postpaid customers than the rest of the operators. This is significant because 
these customers are usually higher consumers than their prepaid counterparts 
and so contribute more to the operators’ revenues and traffic. 
Finally, one of the principal indicators for assessing the state of competition is 
switching. Since most consumers already have a landline and a mobile line, the 


operators’ primary strategy for obtaining more customers is by poaching them 
from their rivals by, for example, lowering their prices. In June 2012, CMT 
approved a measure that shortened the period required to make effective a 
mobile line portability request from four business days to just one. This 
change in the regulations has induced a higher switching rate. In 2013, for 
example, over 160,000 landlines and over 560,000 mobile numbers were 
switched each month. The operators that have benefited most from this type 
of policy are the new entrants, Yoigo and the MVNOs (Figure 6).
99
 
In a study drawing on Spanish household panel data, the CNMC showed that 
in 2013 the percentage of individuals who changed mobile operator rose to 
17.2, higher than the 11.7 percent recorded in 2012 and the 14.4 percent in 
2011.100 The increase affected changes in both postpaid (up to 20.7 percent) 
and prepaid contracts (up to 8.3 percent). In the former case, this result can be 
attributed to the new contracts offered in the fixed-mobile bundles. The 
reason most often cited for changing operator was a reduction in the bill (64.4 
percent), obtaining a new smartphone by taking advantage of a special offer 
(24.8 percent), dissatisfaction with the service (24.3 percent) and the search for 
simpler tariffs (19 percent), among others (CNMC, 2014c). 
The latest events in the market provide evidence of a reconfiguration, the 
consequences of which have yet to be felt. Until recently four MNOs offered 
3G services via their own networks, while being obliged to rent out their 
networks to the MVNOs. A total of 24 MVNOs (some of them with a 
majority participation of an MNO)
101
 had entered into agreements with 
the MNOs to offer 3G services. The market entry of the MVNOs in 2007, the 
regulation of termination rates and the economic crisis, among others, meant 
all operators had to compete in terms of price, although several MVNOs 
opted to focus their service provision on specific groups of consumers. 
Among the entrants, Yoigo has played a prominent role, developing a 
different trade policy to that of the other MNOs. At the same time, ONO 
and Jazztel have entered the mobile market by acting as MVNOs and so are 

99 674,720 users switched operator in January 2014, the highest number ever, according to 
the CNMC monthly report. 
100 In fixed telephony the percentage of customers requesting portability in 2013 was 15.4, a 
record of 1.9 million transfers.  
101 For instance, Movistar acquired Tuenti in 2010, Orange launched its “low-cost brand” 
Amena in 2012 and bought Simyo in the same year, and Euskaltel has had an agreement with 
RACC mobile since 2009. In 2012, almost 60 percent of the MVNOs’ revenues were 
generated by special international tariff plans.   
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able to offer both fixed and mobile services. Thus, various operators 
commercialize fixed-mobile bundles of both fixed and mobile platforms, and 
this has served to boost competition. 
It is still too early to determine whether the recent launch of 4G is likely to 
affect the way the market works. To date, the only MVNO which has 
negotiated the use of the MNOs’ 4G network is Pepephone. In February 2014 
this operator broke its wholesale agreement with Vodafone in favor of Yoigo 
after failing to reach an agreement to use Vodafone’s 4G network. However, 
the alliance with Yoigo did not materialize as Yoigo did not receive permission 
from Movistar to sublet its network. Finally, however, Pepephone reached an 
agreement with Movistar to offer 4G by the end of 2014. In the forthcoming 
months, it will be interesting to examine whether it proves equally difficult for 
other MVNOs to reach agreements with the MNOs, since competition in the 
market could be undermined if agreements to use 4G networks are delayed. 
Technological convergence and market concentration have been particularly 
intense in Spain. The arrival of 4G coincided with a number of acquisitions on 
the part of Spanish operators as part of their strategy to create global operators 
capable of commercializing fixed-mobile bundles. In 2014, Vodafone bought 
ONO while Orange launched a public bid for Jazztel. These acquisitions 
should enable the operators to strength their position in the fixed broadband 
sector. It should be stressed that ONO and Jazztel had been posting very 
healthy results thanks to their offering deals that bundled fixed and mobile 
services together, while acting as MVNOs to provide the mobile services. 
Regional cable companies, such as R Cable and Euskaltel, have followed a 
similar strategy gaining a good customer base and acquiring mobile 4G 
licenses for their areas.  
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Figure 6: Monthly evolution of the net number of mobile lines by operator in 
Spain 
Source: CNMC, monthly reports  
A further aspect that might affect the market is the possibility of operators 
reaching agreements on infrastructure sharing and co-investment in LTE 
network deployment, such as that signed between Yoigo and Movistar in 
2014. According to CMT (2013), both the EC and the NRAs are in favor of 
these agreements when they involve the sharing of passive infrastructure (e.g., 
sites and antennas), as has been the case for years. However, in the case of 
sharing active infrastructure (e.g., radio networks, roaming and national 
roaming access), it is essential to strike the right balance between cost 
reductions and the negative impact on competition. An active sharing strategy 
means that an operator can host customers on its network from other 
operators that do not have licenses for these frequencies or which have yet to 
deploy their infrastructure. Similarly, operators might pool their networks in 
order to access them interchangeably. The crucial element here is whether 
these agreements might induce operators to pursue other anti-competitive 
agreements. 
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4. Competition and tariff structure  
  
The Spanish mobile market has long been characterised by an absence of 
competition as evidenced by the prices charged in Spain compared with those 
in the countries of the EU or OECD. A possible explanation for this situation 
is that in the nineties regulation was not particularly strict and the main 
objectives sought were to guarantee the operators’ profitability and to 
incentivize investment. Indeed, in 1998 Movistar retail price regulation was 
abandoned as there were just two operators in the market. The Spanish 
authorities expected that as the market matured, competition would intensify 
and this would discipline prices. When in mid- 2000 it was evident that this 
was not happening, various policies were implemented to foster competition, 
on many occasions at the instigation of the European Institutions.  
  
One regulation that has proved especially effective in fostering competition is 
the reduction of mobile termination rates (MTRs). CMT has progressively 
reduced the MTRs payable by operators when they initiate a call that 
terminates in a rival network (“glide path”). Following EC recommendations, 
the termination prices charged by the four MNOs have been limited to 1.09 
euro cents per minute since July 2013.
102
  In addition, the previously 
asymmetric MTRs have been changed for fixed MTRs across all operators. 
This measure has had the effect of reducing the number of off-net calls and of 
narrowing the gap between on-net and off-net calls.
103
 As a result, the number 
of customers that an operator retains in its network becomes less relevant as 
prices are fixed. This means that entrants can offer more competitive tariffs at 
rates similar to those charged by the incumbent carriers (Calzada and Estruch, 
2013). Moreover, this convergence of on-net and off-net prices might have 
had an influence in the appearance of unlimited plans. 
  
The other policy that has had the greatest impact on competition is, without 
doubt, the entry of the MVNOs. The emergence of Xfera (later Yoigo) as the 
fourth operator in 2000 was expected to intensify competition in the Spanish 
market, but it was too late for this operator to set up a GSM network (even 
though it might have used national roaming) and it was too early to deploy the 

102 In 2012, CMT conducted an analysis of mobile termination calls in mobile networks and 
concluded that all the MNOs and ‘complete’ MVNOs (ONO, DigiMobil, FonYou, 
Euskaltel, TeleCable, R, Lycamobile, Jazztel and Simyo) had significant market power. 
103 On-net calls are those which originate and terminate in the same operator’s network, 
while off-net calls are originated and terminated in different networks. 
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UMTS network (this technology not yet having been developed sufficiently). 
In addition it wasted a number of valuable years in which it might have 
strengthened its position because of the “dotcom crash” of 2001 and the 
regulation of the MVNOs. Finally, in 2006, CMT obliged the three established 
mobile operators to lease their networks to new competitors. This favored the 
entry of Yoigo, who reached an agreement with Movistar to use its network in 
those areas in which its own network had not yet been deployed. In the years 
that followed numerous MVNOs set up their new commercial practices thus 
stimulating price competition.  
  
A final factor – in this case unrelated to the market, but one which accounts 
for the intensification of competition – is the economic crisis that has afflicted 
Spain since 2008. The crisis has meant that households and firms have sought 
to optimize their expenditure and to seek out the cheapest tariffs best suited to 
their needs.   
 
  
4.1. New commercial strategies: service bundling and fixed-mobile bundles 
  
In the last few years the telecom operators have adopted new commercial 
strategies in their battle to win new customers and build customer loyalty. One 
of these strategies is to sell bundles of traditional voice and messaging (SMS) 
services with the Internet. Bundling has a number of advantages for 
customers: first, it typically includes price discounts, but it also means that 
customers only need a single customer service contract, and so they can 
control more easily their expenditure with a single invoice as well as control 
their total expenditure in the communications services.104  
  
In 2013, mobile penetration reached 50.2 million lines in Spain. Of these, 31.4 
million corresponded to lines with Internet access and 18.4 million lines were 
bundles of data traffic with other services, generally voice. According to the 
CNMC (2014d), between 2012 and 2013 the number of people that bought a 
bundle that included the broadband service increased by ten million.   

104 Bundling constitutes a form of price discrimination that allows operators to segment 
customers and to extract a higher rent than they would obtain if selling each service 
separately. Bundling can also generate economies of scale and scope which improve welfare. 
See Adams and Yellen (1976), Evans and Salinger (2005), McAfee et al. (1989), and Nalebuff 
(2004). 
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One of the new contract types that has become most popular are the fixed-
mobile bundles. These offer both fixed and mobile voice and broadband 
services in a single plan and so the operators use both their fixed and mobile 
networks. In September 2012, Movistar released its fixed-mobile bundle under 
the name of Movistar Fusión, and this was widely adopted by consumers. 
Indeed, Movistar was temporarily able to compensate for the loss of ADSL 
and mobile customers that it had been suffering.
105
 
  
Movistar’s strategy forced its rivals to respond and a price war broke out. In 
November 2012, Vodafone and Orange attempted to imitate Movistar’s plans, 
although Vodafone did not include the possibility of contracting a TV service. 
However, the rival operators’ hands are tied to the extent that they can only 
offer their plans where they have the possibility of providing direct access 
(local loop unbundling), in other words, where they are not completely 
dependent on Telefónica’s network to offer ADSL. At the end of 2013, Yoigo 
also launched its fixed-mobile bundle thanks to the cooperation agreement 
signed with Telefónica allowing it to share their networks. This meant that 
Yoigo and Movistar charged similar retail prices, since Yoigo’s customers 
could use Movistar’s fixed networks and change their mobile tariff to one that 
was compatible with Movistar Fusión. Likewise, ONO and Jazztel started to 
offer fixed-mobile plans acting as MVNOs for mobile services.   
  
The fixed-mobile bundles have enjoyed great commercial success. At the end 
of 2012 while there were 1.2 million fixed-mobile plan connections, by the end 
of 2013 this figure had risen five-fold. These included 5.2 million quadruple 
plans that group the voice and broadband services provided through fixed and 
mobile platforms, and 700,000 quintuple plans that also included pay-per-view 
TV channels. 
  
Overall, in recent years the most established operators in the fixed sector have 
acquired a greater presence in the mobile sector, and the operators with the 
highest number of mobile subscriptions have obtained new clients, albeit to a 
lesser extent in the fixed market. In 2013, Movistar, Vodafone and Orange lost 
mobile subscribers, and were unable to offset these losses with new customers 

105 Movistar’s competitors claimed that it was impossible for them to replicate this plan, 
given the wholesale price level that Telefónica was then charging them to use its network. 
But in June 2013 CMT opted to close the case on the grounds of the numerous similar plans 
that operators had launched since 2012. 
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purchasing fixed-mobile bundles. Nevertheless, these operators increased their 
number of fixed broadband lines, and Orange was in fact the leader in terms 
of ADSL portabilities. Meanwhile, Jazztel and ONO benefited most from 
their fixed-mobile bundles, capturing the highest number of mobile 
subscribers.  
  
As the CNMC (2014a) notes, the potential customer savings associated with 
fixed-mobile bundles have had a sizeable “carry-over effect”. While in the 
third semester of 2012 37.2 percent of households with fixed and mobile 
access had all their telecoms services with a single operator, by mid-2013 this 
percentage had risen to 44.6 percent. Surprisingly, the CNMC report shows 
that household expenditure remained similar at the “aggregate level” regardless 
of whether customers contracted the fixed and mobile services with a single or 
with several different operators; however, significant differences were detected 
between households in terms of their expenditure patterns. 
  
Figure 7 shows that Spain is one of the four European countries with the 
highest proportions of bundled communication services, behind Italy, 
Germany, and Slovenia. Furthermore, Spain is second only to Slovenia in 
terms of the greatest penetration of triple packages. EC data reveal the sharp 
rise in the number of lines that are bundles of two or more services. Thus, 
while in 2012 the penetration of bundles stood at 71 percent, by 2013 it was 
recorded at 105 percent. More specifically, bundles of three or more services 
jumped from 40 percent in 2012 to 63 percent in 2013; against 31 and 42 
percent in the case of double plays. 
  
Finally, the other commercial practices that date from 2013 are the elimination 
of minimum contract duration for postpaid plans and the decision taken by 
some carriers (including Movistar) to sell unlocked handsets. In 2013 some 
operators also opted to curtail subsidies on all smartphones included with 
communications contracts, but later owing to the pressures of competition 
they reintroduced these subsidies. These changes together with price 
reductions account for the record number of customers switching operators in 
this period. 
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Figure 7: Penetration of bundles of communication services in the EU-28, 
July 2013 
 
Source: European Commission 
  
 
4.2. Price analysis 
  
The intensification of competition has been an important driver of mobile 
prices, including those of mobile broadband services. Figure 8 shows that in 
Spain the average revenue for each mobile line (ARPU, average revenue per 
user) was halved between 2006 and 2014, falling from 59 to 29 euro per 
connection and quarter. Likewise, Figure 8 reveals that these reductions were 
most marked in the case of postpaid contracts. Furthermore, in 2013 the 
average revenue per minute fell 27 percent for postpaid and 20 percent for 
prepaid contracts.
106
 According to the CNMC (2014c), Movistar and 
Vodafone have drastically reduced their tariffs in response to the loss in their 
customer base to the new entrant operators.  
  
In order to have a better overview of the level of competition in Spain, it is 

106  This fall in prices has fostered consumption. In 2013, the voice traffic increased by 34% 
and data traffic by 115%. However, the number of SMS hardly changed (CNMC, 2014c). 
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useful to compare Spanish prices with those charged in the rest of Europe. 
For this purpose, the OECD has developed a methodology for benchmarking 
mobile telephony prices. The OECD calculates baskets of 30, 100, 300 and 
900 calls in addition to text messages distributed in peak and off-peak times as 
made by a representative consumer. Figure 9 shows the prices for intermediate 
consumption, that is baskets of between 100 and 300 calls, in August 2012. 
For baskets of 100 calls, Spain has the highest prices behind only Italy and 
Hungary, and for baskets of 300 calls Spain has the highest prices behind 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Portugal. These results suggest that there is 
still room for price reductions in Spain. At least, to guide regulatory policy in 
the mobile sector there would appear to be a need to investigate in detail the 
factors that account for the differences in prices between Spain and the rest of 
Europe.  
  
In the case of mobile broadband, Figure 10 shows the quarterly evolution of 
ARPU for postpaid and prepaid mobile broadband lines between the first 
quarter of 2012 and 2014. In this period, there was a 24 percent reduction in 
the average total income, which reflects the intensification of competition. 
  
Finally, Figure 11 also compares the prices charged in Spain with those 
charged elsewhere in Europe. This figure uses data from the ITU to plot the 
minimum prices (in $ adjusted by power purchasing parity, $PPP) incurred by 
a consumer contracting a smartphone plan with 500 MB of download volume 
in the EU-27; most of these offers are postpaid. Figure 11 reveals that in 2013 
the prices charged for mobile broadband in Spain were the sixth highest 
behind Malta, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Cyprus. These data 
provide a snapshot of the average consumer’s mobile broadband use in 
Europe, but they offer various insights into the differences between Spain and 
its European counterparts. 
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Figure 8: Quarterly evolution of ARPU in mobile telephony in Spain 
Source: CNMC, quarterly data 
Figure 9: Prices of mobile calls, August 2012 (VAT included, $PPP)
Source: OECD  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
GR AT EE UK FI IE SE PL FR LU SI OECD USA DE PT SK CZ ES IT HU
100 calls 300 calls


Figure 10: Quarterly evolution of ARPU in mobile broadband in Spain
Source: CNMC, quarterly data 
Figure 11: Minimum prices ($PPP) of mobile broadband (smartphone) in the 
EU-27, 2012
Note: The plans in Germany, France, Poland, United Kingdom and Czech 
Republic are prepaid plans. Source:  ITU, Measuring the Information Society 2013 
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4.3. Spanish mobile broadband plans 
In this section, we analyse the characteristics of mobile broadband plans for 
smartphones in the Spanish retail market. Our study is based on a sample of 
54 such plans, 35 of which also include a voice minute allowance. The data 
were collected from the operators’ websites in the third quarter of 2014. 
Almost half the offers are made by Movistar, Vodafone, Orange and Yoigo. 
The remaining plans are offered by the leading MVNOs in the market: 
Pepephone, Simyo, Tuenti, MásMóvil and HappyMóvil.   
 
First, the operators’ websites classify mobile broadband plans according to 
whether the customer chooses to set up a monthly direct debit (postpaid) or a 
pay-as-you-go payment method by recharging the SIM card (prepaid). In both 
cases, the two main characteristics of mobile broadband plans are the 
download volume and the number of minutes of call included in the offer. 
Only a small number of plans are exclusively for navigating on the Internet 
with a tablet or laptop via a USB modem or MiFi device (mobile WiFi), which 
confirms the little consumer interest in this type of service. Finally, the 
operators’ plans can include a wide variety of subsidized smartphones or 
tablets, which in some cases are unlocked, and the plans are usually subject to 
a fixed-term contract of several months. Additionally, operators frequently 
discriminate between old and new customers, as well as between prepaid and 
postpaid customers, in terms of price and handset subsidies. 
 
The MNO and MVNO plans do not present the same technological 
characteristics and their commercialization strategies also differ. MVNOs do 
not yet have access to 4G technologies, with the exception of Pepephone who 
started to commercialize 4G in early 2015. Moreover, MVNO plans have 
volume allowances that do not, in most cases, exceed one gigabyte. The 
MNOs, on the other hand, offer several plans with volume allowances in 
excess of two gigabytes. Interestingly, Movistar competes directly with 
MVNOs for customers with an average or low consumption pattern via its 
MNVO company, Tuenti. It should be stressed that none of the plans 
provides unlimited Internet usage, possibly so as to avoid arbitrage.  
 
Most of the MVNOs offer plans that provide volume allowances of exactly (or 
around) one gigabyte and which bundle this data usage with voice minute 
allowances. MVNOs also have several plans for low usage consumers, i.e., 
below 500 MB. In contrast, MNOs sell plans with higher volume allowances 
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and focus more specifically on customers who are intensive users of the 
Internet (most of these plans have volumes with a capacity over 500 MB). For 
instance, Orange and Vodafone, respectively, offer up to five and six gigabytes 
of download volume for the mobile broadband tariff on smartphones, 
compared with the two gigabytes offered by Simyo or 1.9 gigabytes offered by 
Pepephone. 
 
Some MVNOs, including MásMóvil and Simyo, allow their customers to 
create a plan by combining a broad variety of data and voice allowances 
(“menu à la carte”). Others, such as Tuenti, focus on the youngest customer 
segment, and their bundled services include voice IP. Thus, most MNO plans 
include data allowances and just a few offer voice only plans (typically 
prepaid). In contrast, MVNOs have a greater number of voice only offers and 
Internet can be purchased as an add-on. 
 
Finally, the MVNOs analysed here do not offer any subsidies on handsets 
when the customer contracts the tariff and also acquires a smartphone. Thus, 
MVNOs commercialize handsets and the tariff separately so that the price of 
the plan does not embed any handset cost. It might be the case that MVNOs 
prefer not to subsidize handsets in exchange for cheaper tariffs, but they may 
not be able to maintain this policy if competitors start reducing prices.
107
 It 
would be interesting to determine whether Spanish MNOs that enjoy a large 
market share, or which provide their services in a number of countries, are 
able to offer better smartphone discounts because of their greater bargaining 
power with handset manufacturers. 
 
 
 4.3.1. Prices of mobile broadband plans 
 
In this section we examine Spain’s mobile broadband plans. It should be noted 
that the plans are quite heterogeneous in terms of download volume and 
technology and that operators adopt different commercial strategies, including 
bundling (allowances of minutes for voice and/or text messages), 
penalizations when a customer uses all the megabytes included in the plan (a 
charge per additional megabyte or a speed reduction), a terminal subsidy or 

107 CMT (2013b), in an examination of the handset subsidy policies in 2012, concludes that 
operators offering discounts on smartphones do not necessarily charge higher prices than 
operators that do not include a handset in the contract for a mobile service tariff. 
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other promotions. Of these characteristics, here we only capture the download 
volume (in gigabytes) and the number of minutes of calls included in the 
plans. Figures 12 and 13 show the price of the plans included in the tariff and 
distinguish between MNO (blue) and MVNO (red) plans. They also 
distinguish between Internet plans only (circles) and bundles that include 
broadband and minutes of voice (spheres). The minutes of voice in each plan 
are captured by the size of the sphere. While a number of plans offer 
unlimited voice calling, none of the plans offers unlimited data download (the 
maximum being six gigabytes). 
 
 
Figure 12: Prices of postpaid mobile broadband plans (Euro, VAT included, 
October 2014) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure 13: Prices of prepaid mobile broadband plans (Euro, VAT included, 
October 2014) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
Inspection of the graphs reveals a positive relationship between price, 
download volume and number of minutes of voice. It also shows that the 
prices of postpaid and MNO plans are higher (in an interval of 5 to 50 euro) 
than those of prepaid and MVNO plans (in an interval of 5 to 30 euro). At the 
same time, the postpaid and MNOs plans offer greater data volume and longer 
minute allowances. If, for example, we focus our attention on the one gigabyte 
volume plans offered by MNOs and MVNOs (that is, 18 of the 54 plans), we 
see that the latter are cheaper. The plans that provide just mobile broadband 
(circles) can be supplemented with voice services if the customer makes an 
additional payment per minute of voice (although in some cases the user only 
pays a call set-up fee). In the case of the plans that do not bundle broadband 
with voice minutes, the greater the volume allowance, the lower the price paid 
per megabyte (i.e., a “non-linear tariff”). 
 
Finally, Figure 14 shows the cheapest monthly tariffs of the mobile broadband 
plans only.  Operators not offering an exclusive Internet plan (i.e., the plan 
also includes voice allowance minutes) are indicated with an asterisk in the 
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graph. Three intervals of download volume are considered: 0 to 0.99 GB (low 
usage); 1 to 1.99 GB (average usage); and higher than 2 GB (high usage). 
Broadly speaking, the tariffs offered by MVNOs are always lower than those 
charged by MNOs. However, Pepephone, MásMóvil, and HappyMóvil do not 
offer plans with more than 2 GB. In contrast, many of the MNOs’ plans 
include voice allowance minutes. 
 
 
Figure 14: Minimum prices (euro, VAT included) of smartphone mobile 
broadband plans in Spain 
 
Notes: Pepephone and Tuenti use Movistar network. Simyo, MásMóvil and 
HappyMóvil use Orange network. *Broadband and voice. Source: Own 
elaboration 
 
 
4.3.2. Price benchmarking of fixed-mobile bundles 
 
Finally, we analyse the prices of fixed-mobile bundles drawing on a sample of 
23 such plans collected in the third quarter of 2014. Figure 15 represents the 
minimum monthly prices for plans that combine in one bill all the voice and 
fixed broadband services (including monthly land line rental with VAT) and 
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voice and mobile broadband services. Here again we classify the multi-play 
service according to the respective download interval (low, medium or high) 
of the mobile broadband service. An asterisk indicates when the cheapest 
bundle also includes TV in the price (note that Movistar offers TV in all of its 
multi-play services). The figure shows the operators that have fixed and 
mobile networks (e.g., Movistar, Orange, and Vodafone) and the operators 
with a fixed network that act as MVNOs, e.g., Jazztel (in negotiations with 
Orange) and ONO (recently acquired by Vodafone). We also include 
MásMóvil, which commercializes a fixed-mobile bundle thanks to an 
agreement with Jazztel for fixed services and with Orange for mobile services, 
and Amena, which is the “low cost” brand of Orange. 
 
 
Figure 15: Minimum prices (euro, VAT included) of convergent plans in 
Spain 
 
Notes: ONO use Movistar network and Jazztel use Orange network to 
provide mobile services. *Broadband and voice. Source: Own elaboration 
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This analysis shows that Jazztel is one of the most competitive operators (in 
2013 it grew by 240 percent and reached a customer base of over a million 
thanks to its fixed-mobile bundles). Nevertheless, the price differences across 
operators for these fixed-mobile bundles are not as great as those found for 
the mobile broadband plans above. This might reflect the greater competition 
between operators to capture new customers by offering multi-play services. 
 
The CNMC’s analysis of fixed-mobile bundles identifies small price 
differences, or differences that are at least smaller than those found between 
mobile broadband plans. This situation might reflect the competition between 
operators in the battle to win new customers. The CNMC (2014b) reports that 
the average price charged in 2012 for contracting fixed and mobile services 
separately was 57.6 euro per month, falling to 49.3 euro in 2013. By 
contracting a fixed-mobile bundle customers saved on average 6.5 euro a 
month.    
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the evolution and current state of the mobile 
broadband market in Spain. It highlights the relevance of the progress made 
by European mobile technological standards for the deployment of mobile 
broadband services. Thanks to progressive technological innovations, the 
speeds provided by mobile technologies are rapidly catching up with those of 
broadband, and it has been possible to develop smartphone applications that 
are modifying users’ communication behavior and handset use. 
In recent years, competition amongst mobile operators has grown 
noticeably. MNOs have had to accommodate the entry of MVNOs, but at the 
same time the former have created secondary brands that compete directly 
with the latter for low consumption users. This has led to significant price 
reductions. However, telecommunications convergence has also changed the 
operators’ business practices, promoting the launch of multi-play services that 
have been highly successful among consumers. MNOs today seek to attract 
and retain customers by offering fixed-mobile bundles on a single bill for all 
telecommunications services. 
The intensification of competition and the launch of fixed-mobile bundles 
have also resulted in the restructuring of the market. Thus, Vodafone has 
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acquired ONO, Yoigo has reached an infrastructure sharing agreement 
with Movistar, and Orange is negotiating the purchase of Jazztel. In parallel, 
fixed and cable operators are using the MNOs’ networks to offer their mobile 
services and some have acquired 4G licenses. However, the market 
restructuring process has created doubts about the future role of MVNOs. To 
date, MVNOs have been able to use the MNOs’ networks when offering their 
3G services, but in the forthcoming months MVNOs will have to negotiate 
the use of new 4G networks. 
In recent years, Spanish mobile communication prices have fallen significantly 
and there has been strong growth in mobile broadband penetration, which is 
now above the EU average. There can be little doubt that this is the result of 
the intensification of competition, which has been achieved through the 
regulatory activity of the Spanish and EU authorities and the increase in the 
number of operators. The regulation of MTRs has reduced off-net call rates 
and encouraged the emergence of bundles. At the same time, the entry 
of MVNOs has increased the number of offers, giving customers a wide 
choice of commercial offers at prices that are lower than before their entry. 
Despite this, Spain still stands below the EU average in terms of the 
penetration of active SIM cards and is one of the countries with the highest 
prices for mobile services. The main challenge for the future will be 
maintaining competition in a market that is becoming increasingly 
concentrated. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
This dissertation studies the different aspects of fixed and mobile broadband 
Internet services from a competition and regulatory policy perspective. The 
novelty of this research is that it analyses in depth the pricing policies of 
telecom operators using a set of fixed and mobile broadband plans. First of all, 
the models developed in the dissertation aim to find how the market structure 
and regulatory policies implemented in each country may affect the level of 
prices paid by end-consumers. Secondly, the models also explain the features 
of each of the plans discussed, which reveal how operators use the 
heterogeneity of the broadband service to design and establish retail tariffs.  
 
A common finding across the three chapters of this thesis is that regulatory 
policies which have been successful in promoting entry to the broadband 
sector have also increased competition and benefited customers by way of 
price reductions. In this respect, the second chapter shows that the “ladder of 
investment” theory (Cave, 2006), adopted by European regulatory authorities, 
has important implications on prices in the fixed broadband sector. This 
theory shows that, in order to promote sector competition, regulators initially 
facilitate the access of entrants to incumbents’ networks so that entrants only 
need to make very small investments at first (resale or bitstream access). 
Subsequently, once these entrants have acquired a level of experience and 
increased their customer base, regulators then create incentives designed to 
encourage entrants to invest in their own facilities (local loop unbundling 
access, LLU). This study demonstrates that broadband prices are lower in 
those countries where entrants have invested in their own facilities and make 
greater use of LLU access, and higher when they use bitstream more intensively. 
On the other hand, when operators build their own network or compete using 
different platforms (DSL, cable modem or fibre optic), the study shows that 
prices are not substantially affected. 
     
The analysis of the mobile broadband sector within the third chapter shows 
that mobile operators commercialise their plans using multi-tier pricing 
schemes based on the mobile services’ different characteristics. This study 
reveals that data allowances (gigabyte caps) are a key feature used by mobile 
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operators in the setting of prices. Another relevant finding is that operators 
usually bundle their broadband plans with a smartphone device, and in cases 
where popular smartphone brands are provided, customers ultimately pay 
much more than for SIM-only Internet plans. Finally, regarding the effect of 
entry, the study shows how mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) have 
promoted competition and helped to reduce prices. 
 
The last chapter is a case study of the Spanish mobile broadband sector, which 
highlights the evolution of the Spanish mobile market towards greater 
competition and how, more recently, the MVNOs’ tariffs and the success of 
multi-play bundles (four and five play plans) have fostered competition. 
 
It is important to note that the fixed broadband service is analysed during a 
period when the European fixed broadband market had already reached some 
degree of saturation and penetration growth rates were decreasing (period 
2008-2011). However, the analysis period of the mobile broadband 
corresponds to an expansion phase (period 2011-2014) of the service. In this 
context, it can be observed that fixed and mobile broadband plans present 
very different features and are also commercialised differently. Indeed, 
operators might modify and adjust their plans’ characteristics to cater to an 
environment of increasing demand in terms of subscribers to communications 
services, but also of higher demand in terms of traffic (gigabytes) or quality 
(download speeds). They have done this by creating “innovative pricing plans” 
(Lee, 2011; Corrocher and Zirulia, 2010) so as to maximise revenues and 
monetise innovations in technology. 
 
The remainder of this chapter harmonises the most important conclusions of 
the three chapters which form my dissertation. The final paragraphs of the 
conclusion mention some further fields of the broadband service that could 
have been explored further. 
 
 
Chapter 2. Broadband prices in the European Union: competition and 
commercial strategies 
  
The fixed broadband plans are highly differentiated in many aspects, but two 
essential features are the download speed and bundling practices of broadband 
with voice and/or TV services, all of which have a strong positive impact on 
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prices. In the same vein, download speeds and bundling are used by the 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and international institutions (OECD, 
ITU, EC and BEREC) to compare the retail access costs of broadband 
services across countries. Indeed, these bodies use these two parameters to 
create “baskets” of plans and to compare retail tariffs within each basket.108 
This shows us that the heterogeneity of broadband plans makes it necessary to 
group plans sharing key features in order to make like-for-like comparisons of 
the tariffs across operators and countries. It is important to highlight that, 
while the download speed increases the quality of the service and impacts 
positively on customer utility, the customers’ benefits from bundling remain 
ambiguous (Evans and Salinger, 2006).   
 
Where the technology is concerned (DSL, cable modem, and fibre), the study 
reveals that the price paid per Mbps for cable modem and fibre technologies is 
lower than DSL plans. This is an interesting result in a period of controversy 
where operators are balancing out the interests of deploying Next Generation 
Access Networks (NGANs). However, plans using NGANs, such as fibre 
technologies, are usually commercialised with higher download speeds, hence 
these plans might be more expensive as a result. This finding is especially 
important because regulators want to foster the deployment of NGANs, but 
ultimately this depends on the profits that operators think they can make from 
investing in them. 
 
The most insightful finding in this chapter sheds light on the effects of 
regulatory policies on the level of competition in the fixed broadband market. 
NRAs provide “entry assistance” to new operators by setting access prices at 
different levels from the incumbent’s network according to the “ladder of 
investment” theory (LOI, Cave (2006)). The regulation of access is described 
as the competition generated when entrants use the incumbent’s network (the 
incumbent’s network is mostly DSL in the countries analysed); this is called 
intra-platform competition. The results show that retail prices are higher in 
countries where entrants resale incumbents’ plans or use bitstream access 
compared to the countries where operators make a comparatively higher use 
of LLU. Moreover, the increase in prices due to intensive bitstream appears to 
be much higher compared with the reduction in prices which occurs when 
entrants use direct access (LLU); this might be linked to the possibilities of 

108  “Baskets” are constituted of broadband plans split into bundles, stand-alone offers, and 
download speed intervals.  
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greater differentiation and higher quality with LLU.  
 
On the other hand, this study finds little evidence of price changes when 
entrants build their own network or compete using different platforms (inter-
platform competition). Duplicating the incumbent’s network at one time is 
risky and requires high sunk costs. Yet, operators that rely only on their own 
networks, usually cable modem or fibre, might be competing more in quality 
products rather than on prices. Moreover, operators in some countries serve 
different geographic parts of the market. For instance, in Belgium, the Flemish 
region is mostly served by cable operators, while in the Wallonia region it is 
predominantly DSL, and while these two platforms do not directly compete, 
the pricing model considers that they do. This is not captured in the analysis 
and might affect the result obtained for inter-platform competition, which 
appears not to create significant differences in prices. 
 
 
Chapter 3. Pricing strategies and competition in the mobile broadband 
market 
 
This chapter analyses in depth mobile Internet plans on smartphones using a 
similar approach as in the previous chapter. This study complements the 
previous one on fixed broadband, which has not considered wireless 
broadband technologies. These technologies have experienced significant 
expansion since the end of the last decade. Operators have adjusted their 
mobile tariffs from the previous usage, based only on voice and text messages 
(SMS), to tariffs that charge mainly for data traffic and less for the traditional 
voice/SMS services. 
 
This study analyses the strategies adopted by mobile operators when they set 
the prices of mobile Internet plans for smartphones. In the mobile sector, 
operators have designed multi-tier price schemes so that consumers select a 
plan according to their usage of both the Internet and phone calls. This allows 
operators to monetise usage of the mobile service and adapt to competition by 
segmenting the market. It is found that the price is based mostly on the 
consumption of Internet rather than voice. Operators only offer a small 
number of unlimited usage contracts (“all you can eat” data plans) and the 
majority of plans are commercialised with data caps (volume allowances in 
gigabytes). The study shows that the prices of plans with data limits are 
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substantially lower than the unlimited data plans. However, customers may be 
penalised when they end the data cap and plans may automatically charge 
additional fees or ‘overage charges’ to continue using the Internet. Indeed, 
most plans add ‘overage charges’ when the client exhausts the data cap, and 
moves the customer to a plan with a new allowance (amount of gigabytes) or 
to a pay-as-you-go tariff type (per kilobyte/megabyte). In the end, customers 
which are not aware of these ‘overage charges’ may end paying higher bills 
than expected.  
The relevance of data allowances in the mobile market contrasts with the fixed 
broadband service studied in the previous chapter. For fixed broadband plans 
speed thresholds are used as the main characteristic of the service to segment 
customers, and most fixed broadband plans are data unlimited, while this is 
not the case for mobile Internet plans.  
 
There are different reasons why operators use data allowances: i) to segment 
customers according to their usage so as to maximise their revenues and adapt 
to competition; ii) to avoid problems of network congestion when many 
customers are downloading from the Internet; and iii) a third question has 
been analysed in a paper by Economides and Hermalin (2014) who signal the 
interest that operators have in establishing data volume caps in order to 
pressure content providers (e.g.: video-on-demand companies) to lower either 
their prices or the quality of the content (so that it requires less capacity). 
Thus, telecom operators are able to extract potential content providers’ rents 
using caps on volume. This is also related to operators’ claims against the 
“network neutrality” approach, which treats all data on Internet services 
equally. Indeed, by setting data caps, operators are violating the net neutrality 
principle, as some customers end up paying more when they use Internet 
services which demand high data volumes (Trinh et al., 2012). 
 
One of the most important contributions of this paper is to identify the 
operators’ “subsidies” when providing a smartphone with the Internet tariff. 
Operators act as the most important smartphone distribution channel, and 
offer customers the possibility to buy the smartphone either separately or 
together with the plan. For instance, given the importance of the operator as a 
channel through which to sell smarpthones, the manufacturer might wish to 
provide a significant discount to the mobile carrier, expecting this will 
incentivise the take-up and popularisation of a specific brand. The evaluation 
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of these subsidies lies in the final effect of several competition forces 
impacting on the price paid the by the end-client for the smartphone (with the 
tariff). The potential effects discussed in this chapter are: i) at the wholesale 
level, the relative bargaining power of the operator versus the handset 
manufacturer; ii) exclusive contracts between these two market players 
(Sinkinson, 2014); iii) at retail level, the operators’ strategies to use the 
smartphone as a tool to segment customers with a higher willingness to pay 
for the mobile service; and iv) to what extent the discounts obtained by the 
operators are passed through to the end-consumer. The result of the analysis is 
in line with these market forces, although it does not enable each of them to 
be quantified separately. However, the analysis reveals that the most in-
demand smartphone brands, iPhone and Samsung, imply a lower subsidy to 
the final consumer compared to other brands which are not so well-
established in the handheld-device market. Furthermore, while the price 
differences between these two brands and SIM-only plans (plans without a 
smartphone) result in  substantial costs, the analysis shows there is no clear 
evidence of any important differences between plans including “other brands” 
and SIM-only tariffs.  
 
Compared to the previous chapter on fixed broadband, where there is scope 
to study the effects of regulatory policies within a market which has been 
heavily regulated since its beginnings in the 1990s, the mobile broadband 
market arose only a few years ago (with 3G technologies) and it has not been 
so heavily regulated to date.  In fact, the regulation of mobile broadband arises 
indirectly from the regulation of prices paid between mobile operators 
according to the quantity of off-net mobile phone calls (mobile termination 
rates, MTRs). More recently, in Europe, regulators have encouraged MVNOs 
to reach agreements with operators with their own network (MNOs), in an 
attempt to promote entry in the mobile market.  
The chapter incorporates, in the final section, the regulatory measures 
mentioned in the above paragraph along with the level of operators’ 
concentration in each geographic market using a subsample of 20 EU 
countries. The findings show that the differences in market concentration 
across the 20 European countries do not correspond with significantly higher 
prices. As for the regulatory factors that might affect tariffs, MTRs do not 
seem to have any effect, which might be attributed to the lower contribution 
of voice services to the tariff, and also to the underlying “glide path” by which 
operators have been reducing the MTRs and making them converge in recent 
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years. However, the promotion of competition via the entry of new mobile 
service providers, the MVNOs, appears to have reduced the mobile 
broadband tariffs. This suggests that the entry of MVNO’s promotes 
competition.   
 
 
Chapter 4. Competition in the Spanish mobile broadband market 
 
This chapter illustrates how the mobile broadband service has expanded 
greatly in Spain, achieving a higher than 70 percent penetration rate by the 
beginning of 2014. This growth can be attributed to the benefits that have 
accrued from the development of the third and fourth generations of mobile 
technology and to constant price cuts in the market. Yet, despite these 
reductions, prices in Spain remain above the European average. The chapter 
describes the process of technological innovation that has facilitated the 
emergence of mobile broadband, and the launch of this service in Spain. The 
commercial strategies recently adopted by mobile operators, including 
bundling and plans offering fixed and mobile services, are examined. The 
analysis shows that the presence of MVNOs and the availability of bundled 
offers have been effective in fostering competition and reducing prices in 
Spain. It also analyses how the successful release of multi-play bundles (four 
and five play plans) have promoted market restructuring and concentration.  
 
Firstly, this study explains how harmonisation of standards contributed to the 
diffusion of mobile services in Europe compared to the US, where different 
and incompatible standards competed against each other. Also, the “dotcom 
crash” at the beginning of the 21st century meant that operators ceased their 
investment in 3G technologies. In Spain, while the launch of 3G services 
occurred relatively early on, incorrect decisions taken regarding the award and 
re-farming of frequencies between mobile operators and digital TV channels 
delayed the launch of 4G, and also increased public spending. 
 
Another relevant aspect is that entry has been essential to increase competition 
in the Spanish mobile market. New operators appeared thanks to the 
government issuing of new mobile licenses and the intervention of the EU in 
helping entrants by setting asymmetric MTRs (lower for small network 
operators, Yoigo in the Spanish case), and also allowing new entrants without 
their own network, the MVNOs, to reach agreements with the MNOs to use 
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their frequencies (Calzada and Estruch, 2013). MVNOs have released 
“innovative pricing plans” that are different from MNOs, and in broad terms 
have undercut the MNOs’ tariffs to grow their customer base (Kiiski, 2006). 
Some common patterns within MVNOs are that they target low usage 
customers compared to MNOs. Also, MVNOs commercialised more types of 
plans, such as only voice plans or voice over IP, and allowed more flexibility 
over voice and data allowances. Moreover, the MVNOs’ tariffs do not 
subsidise the handset with the tariff, and as yet none of the MVNOs have 4G 
plans in place (Pepephone should be offering 4G by the beginning of 2015).  
 
To adapt to the intensification of competition, MNOs have also changed their 
pricing strategies so as not to lose their customer base. At the end of 2012, 
Movistar released the multi-play bundle Movistar Fusión, which grouped fixed 
and mobile voice, broadband service, and digital TV in a single bill. Rival 
operators subsequently followed this billing strategy with similar plans after 
realising that customers were very keen to contract all of their 
communications services under a single tariff. In fact, before 2012, four or five 
play bundles did not exist, yet only two years later they accounted for 63% of 
all bundles (7.6 million multi-play bundles). This shows that commercialisation 
plays a very important role in increasing the adoption of telecommunications 
services.  
 
The usage of bundling was a controversial issue when Movistar first launched 
its multi-play offer Movistar Fusión. In fact, at the beginning, rival operators 
claimed that it was not possible to replicate Movistar’s multi-play offers 
(however, these operators started to launch similar plans soon after Movistar 
Fusión). This raises the question that although the practice of bundling might 
promote the penetration of the service, it might also be used as an 
anticompetitive tool in the market. Indeed, an operator with market power in 
one of the communications services might start commercialising bundles to 
leverage power in a second service. Thus, bundling might promote 
competition but could also be considered an anti-competitive practice if the 
aim of the operator is to force the exit of its rivals, or to prevent entry in 
secondary markets (Nalebuff, 2004; Mariñoso et al., 2008). Also, from the 
consumer perspective, some customers might find themselves at a 
disadvantage when taking out a bundled contract, for instance, if they have 
difficulty switching all services to an alternative provider.  
 


All in all, we can take certain conclusions from the analysis of the structure 
and pricing of the mobile market in Spain. The evolution of the market has 
followed a less concentrated market and higher competition with the 
emergence of new operators. This has been pro competitive, but at the same 
time there is a trend that points towards a concentration of mobile and fixed 
telephony operators, in part thanks to the success of the multi-play bundles 
which have promoted market concentration between operators using different 
platforms in recent years (Orange and Jazztel, and Vodafone and ONO). 
Entrants might be limited by not being able to offer these convergent 
products, as well as MVNOs not being able to reach agreements with MNOs 
to deliver 4G technologies. This study signals that it is important to bear in 
mind these changes in the mobile market so as to allow competition forces to 
benefit customers. 
 
 
Suggestions for future research  
 
In this dissertation, unfortunately, we could not analyse fixed and mobile 
broadband plans jointly in order to take into account the relationship between 
fixed and mobile broadband tariffs (Sriuan and Bohlin, 2012; Haucap et al., 
2014). Also, it would be interesting to better understand substitution or 
complementarity patterns between mobile and fixed broadband using evidence 
at consumer level (Nakamura, 2015). Furthermore, in this line of research, it 
would also be interesting to study the degree of substitution between mobile 
broadband on smartphone and via USB modem. The latest technological 
improvements, such as the use of the smartphone as a modem USB 
(‘tethering’) with the mobile plan, may well have promoted this substitution, 
although it remains to be tested empirically. 
 
There are more questions related to this dissertation which might have been 
examined further, which are left for future research. For instance, bundling is a 
recurring topic that has been widely studied in the economic literature (Adams 
and Yellen, 1976; McAfee et al., 1989) but the empirical research on bundling 
decisions in the telecoms industry might be developed further. Chapter 2 has 
examined bundling from the supply point of view, and found positive 
correlations between bundling and the use of direct access (LLU) by entrants. 
Also, an OECD report (2011) examines and describes bundling in the 
broadband market from the supply side in OECD countries. However the 


literature on bundling telecoms services from a consumer perspective is 
sparse, and it would be interesting to test empirically if the consumers’ 
advantages from buying bundles offsets the drawbacks (e.g. lock-in effects 
with the telecoms provider). In this respect, there are two related relevant 
studies that analyse the bundling of TV channels in the cable TV market. The 
first, an empirical work by Byzalov (2010) is based on a consumer demand 
choice model for bundles of cable television channels in the US, and finds that 
requiring cable companies to break up their main packages, allowing 
consumers to pick individual channels or small “mini-tiers” on an à la carte 
basis, would imply big drops in numbers of subscribers for cable companies, 
while customers do not gain much from unbundling. In a similar vein, 
Crawford et al. (2004) also use data from the cable TV industry in the US and 
find that bundling reduces consumer heterogeneity and that consumer welfare 
falls while cable companies increase their revenues; ultimately, the total welfare 
effect is positive. 
 
Finally, the Special Eurobarometer, published by the European Commission, 
contains a large source of consumer data on communications services and 
consumer satisfaction which could be used for future empirical research. This 
survey data might be used to explore European consumers’ experiences when 
switching provider, satisfaction with the operator, and tariff transparency, 
amongst others. Indeed, this survey data has already been used to analyse 
substitution patterns between fixed and mobile technologies (Grzybowski, 
2012).  
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